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INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem. This d issertation proposes to ex-
amine carefu lly the thought of vJilbur l'1arshall Urban in 
ord er to set forth the metaphysical system i mplicit 
it . Profess or Urban did not p blish any systema tic 
in / 
stat r -
1 
ment of his metaphysics, though most of his works were I 
highly metaphysical . But there are meta physical conclu -
s ions imp li ed in his thought which he failed to make 
exp licit. Also this inv estig ation proposes to examine 
Unban' s metaphysics critically to discover what is co-
her ent and what is not coheren t in :i.t in order that its 
mer i ts and defects mi ght be made ap parent. There is much 
I 
e p istemological material included in the investig ation I 
also since Urban's epistemology and his metaphysics are 
1 
I 
I 
U b 
' 
. i 
r an s s1g- 1 
inte ~rally bound tog ether. 
2. Significance of Urban 1 s 'l'hought . 
I 
I 
nifi cance does not arise from orig inality but rather frqm 
I 
his p o inted d efense of metaphysical trad i tion in the fa c e 
of twentieth century attack upon the tradition. 
n o t mea n that Urban has no orig inality . He has 
This d 0es 
i mportab t 
I 
con tributions to make in the are a of value particularly~ 
and in the whole field of metaphysics as touched 
i 
by value. A contribution which is broadly recognized is 
his great help in bringing the value question to the at-
tention of American thought as a central problem. 
The tradition that he wishes to defend will be ap-
parent in the exposition. It is sufficient here to mention 
some of the chief men who have influenced his thought. 
Plato is important for his doctrine of the Good in the 
sixth book of the Republic. Here Plato ties being to the 
Good. This is foundational to Urban. Aristotle and St. 
Thomas Aquinas have exerted a realistic, even dualistic, 
influence on him. Augustine's doctrine of time and of a 
non-temporal, infinite God have been influential. Kant's 
influence is largely through the neo-Kantians such as 
Rickert and Windelband. Urban has great admiration also 
for Hegel, particularly for his monism. Urban's value 
theory was strongly influenced by Rickert, Ehrenfels, and 
Mei:nong at various times in his development. A strong nega-
tive influence was Nietzsche, who challenged Urban to his 
philosophical depths early in his career. Other negative 
influences who helped to determine Urban's thought are such 
men as Dewey, Bergson, Darwin, Spencer, James, Whitehead, 
Alexander, and the positivists whom Urban labels philo-
sophical 11 modernists.n Against these men Urban argued 
vigorously for a conservative metaphysical tradition, and in 
so doing he helped to develop further some of the implications 
ii 
of that tradition; he added significantly to its strength. 
Urban's emphasis on synthesizing the tradition in 
spite of well-known controversies existing in the history 
of thought is rather unique. He does not ignore these de-
bates but emphasizes more the area of agreement runong the 
debaters than that of disagreement; this is especially true 
when they are set in contrast to the modernists. Pointing 
out these common factors is a significant contribution. 
3. Previous Literature in the Field. No other com-
prehensive examination of Urban's thought has been made. 
Published material is restricted to reviews, review arti-
cles, · and articles of debate with Urban. A brief sketch 
of Urban's thought is given in J. L. Blau's Men and Move-
ments in American Philosophy.l A Master's thesis was sub-
mitted to the department of philosophy at Indiana University 
on Urban's value theory, comparing it with Nicholai Hart-
mann's value theory.2 This thesis does not show much in-
sight; furthermore it was written before publication of 
some of Urban's books. 
Urban is referred to by many other writers, but none 
take him up for thorough examination. 
4. Method of Investigation. The research reported on 
1. J. L. Blau, Men and Movements in American Philosoph • 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952 , 302-312. 
2. Charlotte Ann Jeanes, "The Ontological Status of Ought," 
unpublished M.A. Thesis presented to the Philosophy De-
partment of Indiana University, April, 1943. 
iii 
here is based on an examination of Urban's writings, plus 
the types of works of other writers mentioned above, plus 
other works which discuss similar ideas. Urban was a 
prolific writer; the full list of his works are given in 
the bibliography. He wrote continuously throughout his 
teaching career with the exception of a few years follow-
ing the publication of his first major work, Valuation: 
Its Nature and Laws, in 1909. For a few years following 
this no articles appeared, for h is thought was making a 
major change. He continued his writing up until his 
death, publishing both articles and books during retire-
ment. Most of Urban's major ideas are found to be pub-
lished in articles and later expanded and published in 
book forra. This investigation has drawn on all his books 
and most of the articles. However, a few of the articles 
will not be referred to except in the bibliography; this 
is particularly the case when the articles discuss ideas 
which Urban has stated better elsewhere. 
The investigation takes up three major areas of 
Urban's thought: epistemology, value theory, and meta-
physics proper. Urban's metaphysics cannot be p resented 
nor understood adequately without considerable development 
of his epistemology and value theory, for his metaphysics is 
deeply dependent on these and intertwined with them. 
The first five chapters are largely expository; 
iv 
however, some criticism is given with the exposition. 
Chapter VI is a brief chapter which summarizes the in-
vestigation and makes several overall criticisms. 
5. Sketch of Urban's Life. In connection with one of 
his articles Urban gives a brief statement of personal data. 
Because of its pertinence here and its brevity it is quoted 
in full: 
I was born in 1873, the son of Rev. A. L. Urban, 
a clergyman of the Protestant Episcopal Church, 
from whose essentially philosophical and mystical 
mind I received most of my philosophiCal inter-
ests and impulses. I was educated at the William 
Penn Charter School, Philadelphia, and at Princeton 
University, receiving from the latter the A.B. de-
gree in 1895. In the same year I was appointed 
Chancellor Gre en Fellow in Mental Science at 
Princeton. I studied at different times in the 
Universities of Jena, Leipzig, Munich, and Graz, 
passing the examinations for the doctorate at 
Leipzig in 1897.1 
Urban's teaching positions were at the following schools, 
which are given in chronological order: Ursinus College, 
Trinity College, Dartmouth College, and Yale University. 
Urban began his study of philosophy when positivism 
was dominant. Th is along with psychological and scientific 
emphases early influenced him through J. M. Baldwin, Otto 
Liebmann, and Wilhelm Wundt. Urban found himself, in his 
student days, in an anti-metaphysical atmosphere; so he 
1. "Metaphysics and Value," Contemporaij American Philosophy, 
ed. George P. Admms and W. P. Montague New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1930). II, 356. 
v 
suppressed metaphysical motivations.l The interest in 
psychology and the anti-metaphysical attitude ·are mani-
fested in Valuation and in the articles which preceded it. 
However, the writing of that book raised metaphysical 
questions that it did not answer; so its publication 
marks a turning point in Urban's thought. He gradually re-
jected the method and major conclusions he reached there 
and became far more metaphysical. Years later he says 
that he did not know it then but that he was one whom 
Metaphysik allein macht selig.2 He says, "Philosophy, 
metaphysics--what you will--is for me life itself, or at 
least the interpretation of the meaning of life. 11 3 
This exposition of Urban's thought is mainly con-
cerned with his later views. Chapter II, however, con-
siders his early interpretation of value before moving to 
the later view. 
1. Ibid., 357. 
2. Ibid. J 
3. Ibid. 
vi 
CHAPTER I 
PROLEGOMENA TO METAPHYSICS: INTELLIGIBILITY 
The doctrine of intelligibility is one of the keys to 
the entire thought of Wilbur Marshall Urban. He wrote an 
article in 1924 entitled "Intelligible ~lorld. nl Then in 
1929 he published one of his most important books under the 
title The Intelligible World. In these works he laid down 
the conditions of intelligibility followed by an interpre-
tation of the kind of a world an intelligible world must be. 
Urban's basic thesis concerning intelligibility is 
that value and being are inseparable. This is what he calls 
the "axiom of intelligibility.tt2 This concept of insepara-
bility is so important that the whole of the next chapter 
will be devoted to an examination of its meaning and justi-
fication. In this chapter it will be considered only for 
its contribution toward an understanding of intelligibility. 
Of necessity there will be some overlapping in the two 
chapters. 
Intelligibility as a philosophical concept, did not 
first appear in Urban's writings with the 1924 article; how-
ever, from then on it was definitely central. Before this 
1. ~1. M. Urban, "Intelligible World," Philosophical 
Review, (January-March, 1924), 1-29, 115-142. 
2. This phrase may be found in Urban's The Intelli~ible 
World (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1929), 5 and 
61, as well as in several other places in this same work 
and in all of his major works published after The Intelligible 
World. 
time there were articles on value1 in which he began to 
develop the concept. The earliest suggestion of the notion 
is in his doctoral dissertation, The Hi story of the Prin-
ciple of Sufficient Reason: Its l\1etaphysical and Logical 
Formulations. In this work Urban suggests that ethics, 
relig ion, and metaphysical unity a r e worth categori es that 
perhaps "might be fonnd to have a s1..1.fficiency of their own. n2 
This is the only suggestion in the dissertation on the pro-
blems of value and intelligibility, but it is a hint t h at 
his thought was already beginning to flow in what was later 
to be one of its major channels. In t he 1924 article3 
Urban says t h at intellig ibility is tied to "sufficient 
reason," and that this in turn requires an understanding 
of ori gin, of finality, and of value. Origin and finality, 
or destiny, are here interpreted as purpose and not merely 
efficient cause.4 
In order to understand Urban's treatment of intelligi-
bility it i s significant to see what it was that motivated 
him to a consideration of the subject. \;Jhat he calls 
"philosophic modernism" has been his chief enemy . He states 
that his position has large ly been de ve loped in critical 
1. For example, 11 0n Intolerables: A study in the Logic of 
Valuation," Philosophical Review, and Scientific Neth od, 
XIII (1916), 449-465. 
2. (Princeton: The University Press, 1898), 87-88. 
3. p. 127. 
4. Origin and finality as categories will be treated in the 
last chapter. 
2 
reaction against modernism. 1 He finds the modernists to 
be wholly unintelli gible; in fact, unintelligibility is the 
chief characteristic of these people beyond the fact that 
they are recent and contemporary thinkers. Tradi tional 
philosophy, in spite of disagreements in some areas, has 
always held to certain values and meanings, such as the 
possibility of metaphysics, the meaningfulness and unity of 
reality, and the inseparability of being and value. Modern-
ists are typified by Ni etszche, who might in a sense b e con-
sidered the originator of the group; he wants a complete 
transvaluation o1' values. He sees, rig...h. tly Urban t}'l..inks, 
that in tra.di tJ.onal metaphysics t;ne.r-e ltl a lot in common 
among the various thinkers in spite of some d isa..:;r eements, 
but he would overthrow even these common factors. 
Mo dernism began by asserting the autonomy of sci ence.2 
Locke's physiology of knowledge and Darwin's theories led 
to the naturalization of intelligence.3 This meant the re-
moving of absolut.es in reli gion and art and philosophy in 
favor of relatives. Evolution for modernists is explanatory 
and time is causal. The future has become all important. 
"Ideas are no longer d i sproved; they are simply superseded 
by new i deas. The latest is the truest, and time refutes 
I. The Intellig ible ~orld, 4. 
2. Ibid., 15-16. 
3. W. !VI . Urban, Beyond Re a lism an d Idealism (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1949), 257. 
3 
ever·ything . " l Ur ban calls this the "futuristic fallac,_r . 11 2 
Pnother charac teristic of modernisw is its neo-nom·-
nalism or logics.l a to :tsm . 3 Nom·"na l" sm, Urban holds , is the 
most terrible of a ll heresies , not only bec ause it dest roys 
t he p o ssibility of me taphysics and r e li gion, but a lso be -
c ause it bring s a comple t e s t u lt ification of di scourse and 
u tter uninte l l:i :s · bili t y .L~ 
•Tho is Urban talking about under the classification 
"mod ernists"? It is such grou s as the prae;rnatists, posi-
tivists, creative evo l utionis ts, behaviorists, and natural " sts. 
In various places t hrou_,ho t his writings he names s pe c ifi -
cally such people as ~Tietzsche , Darwin , Spencer, Berg son, 
DevJey , vfilliam ,James , ~·Jhi tehead, Alexander, Vaihinger, and 
Cro ce , to mention a few . r hese men hEve made some worth -
whi l e contribution to thon ght, but by a n d l a r g e t h ey E.re on 
the wrong track, accor ding to Ur ban . 
'I'r e modernis t s are "mim te phi losophers . 11 ~-,.:Lnute philo -
sophers are 
a sort of sect which dimi ish all the most val a b l e 
thing s , the thoughts, vi.ews , and hopes of men ; a ll 
the k novJ led g e, notions, and theories of t he mind 
they reduc e to sense; human nature they contract 
1. The I ntellig ible World, 18 . 
2 . Ibid . 
3 . v • :·1 . Urban , Lan?;uag e and Rea lity : The Philosophy o f 
Lanp1a ,rse a nd the Pr1.nciples of ymboli sm (New York : The 
r-1acmri1an ~"' o ., 1939r;-J5T . 
4. Ibid . , 721 . 
4 
and degrade to the narrow, low standard of 
animal life and assign us only a small 
pittance of time instead of immortality. 1 
Over a gainst thi s group are the "magnanimous philo-
sophers," who insist on seeing thing s in the le.rge . The 
great philosophers of the past belong to t h e magnanimous 
traditi on. 'I'hey are characteristically human; that is, 
t h e y put value as seen by men at the center of reality 
and interpret all other thing s in the light of this. 
Belong ing to the great tradi tion, to name a few by way of 
illustration, are Plato, Aristotle, st. Au gustine, st. 
Thoma s, Kant, Fichte, and He gel . 2 Urb an re f ers to this 
trad ition in capitals--Th e Great Tradition . He also uses 
v er y frequently the title philosophia perennis.3 
This is a sk etch of the motivational background of 
Urban's development of the doctrine of intelligibility . 
Now i t is necessary to turn to an examination of the phi lo-
soph i ca l b a ckground of t he doctrine . 
1 . PRESUP POSITIONS 
Nietzsch e s ays in his Die Vorurteile der Philosophen 
1 . Quoted in The Intellig ible World, p. 12, from Ber k eley, 
Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher . 
2 . The Int e lli gi ble l.J or ld , 11- 12. 
3. Philosophia perennis has this general re f erence to the 
Great Tradition in Urban; i t must not be confused h ere with 
its usage by the Neo-Th omists, who mean by it the more limited 
tradition of Aristotle and st. Thomas. 
5 
that he has examined the philosophers and found certain pre-
judices t urning up in all of them. On this basis Nietzsche 
d enounces traditional philosophy and offers his complete 
transvaluation.l Urban considers Nietzsche to have brilliant 
insight in this observation, but he does not accord with 
Nietzsche's desire to change this situation. Phi losophers 
do have "presuppositions." (This word is to be preferred to 
11 prejudice.tt) "Philosophy is the one field of thought in 
which presuppositions are admitted and values acknowledged . n2 
This recognition makes of philosophy not prejudices but 
really an absolute freedom from prejudices. This constitutes 
the autonomy of philosophy and distinguishes it from common 
sense and science.3 
Unearthing these philosophic 11 prejudicesll is the most 
joyous ac t ivity of modernism in philosophy. In the ey es of 
this movement presuppositions are really " g ratuitous assump-
tions11 and 11 sheer mistakes ."4 
1. Friedrich W. Nietzsche, Die Vorurteile der Philosophen, 
referred to by Urban in The Inte11igf'61e World, 381'. Urban 
mentions this title from Nietzsche as if it were a book 
title, but it is realll the title of Chapter I of Nietzsche's 
Jenseits von Gut und Bose. Urban is not as careful as he 
might be In checkin g his referenc~s; ·other errors and mis-
quotations have been f ound, too. 
2. The Intellig ible 1tJorld, ~-0 • 
3. Ibid . 
4. Ibid., 41 
6 
But Ur ba n sees c ertain presupposit ions necessary u.Thich 
I 
canno t be avoided by the philosopher without 11 tr2.nscending 
I 
his mvn skin . ul These are not Vorurt ei le but Grundurteil~. 
I 
'Ih ere is a natural b ent of the intellect exp ressed in the 
presuppositions of t raditional thOL.l ,(J.;h t . The history of 
philosophy has constantly shown attempts at p u rifying these; 
I 
' 
that is, attempts to distinguish between prejudices and 
necessary presuppositions. 
'I'ypically the method that has been used to make the 
distinc tion is the application of the principle of self- 1 
r efutation or int ernal consi sten cy . No thinker can fail to 
I 
I 
epply this test to his system and expect it to hold up as I I 
I 
I 
true . 
! 
It remains true ths.t internal consistency, properly 
underst ood , must remai n the ultimate to uchstone of 
a ll thought . Indeed, vJ e cannot proceed a st ep in 
our thinking withou t a cknmrJledging the.t v-rhich, for 
interna l rea sons, we reg ard as the inevitab le way of ! 
interpreting experience . There a.re no fundamental f 
truths of experience for vJhich I can give any r easonr 
t-vh ich are not, in part at least, a priori; reason : 
being here defined in that l arge-mindeo-way which 1 thinks of it in terms of an i n t e rnal ne ce s si t y liJhicb 1 
my co ns ciousness makes Trlanif est in variotts ways . 2 ) 
I 
This is the principle that has been used a gainst the skeptic, 
t he agnostic, and the r'elativist . It has b een used by the 
idealist ag ainst the realist and v:'ce versa. 
ally an arg1Jmentum ad hominem.3 
1 . Ibid . , L~2 . 
2. Ibid ., 44 . 
3. Ibid., 44-45. 
It is essen t i -
1 
7 
Urban uses argQmentum ad hominem in this sense also in 
other places, especially in Beyond Realism and I dealism. He 
cannot mean by it an appeal to the prejudices of the in- ' 
dividual hearer, as formal log ic usually means by it, but 
rath er an appeal to the hmnanity in man, what others would 
c a ll an anthropomorphic element. His meaning then is t hat 
the principle of self-refuta tion is an a priori form of intel-
lect; it is a norm of thinking , and in this sense it is a 
I 
value concept. Furthermore it must also mean in this s ense 
t hat it is immediately g i ven. In Language and Reality, 1 
Urb an state s that there are "co-implicates of experience" 
given indirectly in experience and that these are a priori 
or that they are "intellectual intuitions." " Co-implicates" 
here is essentially the same kind of thing as what he refers 
to above as argumentum ad hominem. 
The principle of self-refutation, as basic to cri ticism 
of presuppositions, is one of the determining principles of 
intelligible discourse. It cannot be used to develop a posi-
tive philosophy, for it is only a negative test. But any 
proposed philosophy must be able at the beginning to pass this 
test.2 All valid presuppositions d o pass it. 
In his d i scuss i on of presupposi tions Urban uses several 
other terms as near synonyms. He uses "presupp ositi on" ae 
1. L·anguag e and Reality, 669. 
2. Intellig ible World, 45-46. 
8 
~~--------------- ---- ------·~ 
"th e most colourless term to descri be t h e more general condi-
tions of int elligi ble discou rse."l " Assumpti on" is a term 
u sed wh en i t i s more or less consciously acknowledged as a 
condition of intellig ibility. Further: 
An a s s umption be c omes a tostulate when, as the term 
i ndicates, it takes t h eorm or a demand. such de-
mand is made, h owever, only when that which i s de-
manded may conceivably be denied. Thus in philo-
sophy, notab ly in Kant, a postulate is a d emand f or 
t h at which may be doubted, but which yet seems neces-
sary to the solution of a self-evident problem, as 
in the case of the p ostulates of t h e practical 
reason. An axiom cannot be completely d istinguished 
f rom a postulate ••• It can be defined no more accu-
rately than as an established principle in any art 
or science which j_ s accepted as self-evident.2 
None o f t h e se are to b e t h ought of as prejudices but as 
n e cessa ry conditions of i ntelligible thought.3 
Urban f inds three such necessary presuppositions which 
are h eld by practically every one i n t h e history of thought. 
IJ.'hey are t hat "I exist and others l i ke me, inhabiting a 
-vwrld. 114 These a re presuppositions which are not s u scep tible 
to empirical proof. They are the necessary co-implicates of 
1. Ibid., 47. 
2. Ibid., 47. 
3. In Beyond Realism and Idealism, 126, and also in Humanity 
and Deity (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), 206, Urban defines 
a presupposition as an assumption or postulate whose denial 
is self-refuting, because its denial would destroy the ex-
perience from which it proceeds. 
4. Intelligible World, 47-48. 
experience--necessary to make experience understandable 
and intelligible. Since they cannot be proved they can only 
be acknowledged, but they must be acknowledged as necessary 
to anyone who wishas to communicate meaningfully with 
others • 
. In the light of their necessity these presuppositions 
may be called a priori. Urban defines a priori at this 
point as that which is true no matter what. Elsewherel he 
defines it as meaning both universal and ~ecessary. There is 
nothing in The Intelligible World to oppose this definition; 
it is a better statement of his usage than a mere "true no 
matter what ." Necessar y here i s opp osed to contingent; it 
is not opposed to voluntary , for the a priori does not compel 
acceptance as does sensation; it "compels" rather a free 
acknowledgement for an understanding of experience. A~ such 
the a priori is really a matter of values and validities.2 
J u stification for this last statement will be apparent in the 
discussi on of values in Chapter II. 
" I exist" is a presupposition of all knowledge which i s 
acknowledged by every one. It is not syllogistic conclusion 
as De scartes made it. That "oth ers like me" exist is also 
generally acknowledged. Some attempt to prove this, but 
Urban holds it is not sub ject to logical proof, for proof 
presupposes communication, and cormnunicat ion presuppo ses 
others to communi cate with. Hence, one can only acknowledge 
1. 111. M. Urban , Fundamentals of Ethi cs (New York: Henry 
Holt & Co., 19 30 ), 175. 
2. The Intellig ible World, L~8-49. 
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the e x isten ce of others as a presupposition; thi s is, as a 
matter of fact, the course normally followed, for communi-
cation has always been a long -established habit of any 
person before he thinks of the necessity of proving the 
existence of others. 
The presupposition of the existence of a "world" in-
habited by people is necessary, but it has a special diffi-
culty. Hen believe they are grasping the sum-total of all 
things, that is, the world, when they are truly only grasp-
ing a part. In ppite of what they think they are usually 
talking about limited wholes, for it does not seem possible 
to apply predicates to that which is unlimited. 1 This diffi-
culty will be discussed later in connection with the doctrine 
of c~od in Chapter ::v. In the present context Urban is satis-
fied to mean by world, as presuppositional, that men must 
alway s assume back of any philosophical discourse at least 
limited wholes and that these limited wholes continually 
drive thinkers on to try to make statements about reality as 
a whole., that is, about a "world." But the belief that some-
tning can be said about being as a whole is what constitutes 
the driving force of metaphysics. 2 
Traditional philosophy does not stop here. There are 
further presuppositions necessary about the "world" to make 
it intelligible. It is necessa.ry to presuppose that Ens est 
1. ~., 49-50. 
2. Ibid., 50. 
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unum, verum, bonum. This is the axiom of intelligibility 
expressed in another form, and in it are sun~ed up the 
· · of all tl"me. 1 ttpre judices" of metaphyslClans 
i. unum. Concerning unity as a philosophical pre-
supposition, Urban says that no thinker can speak of the 
totality of things and be intellig ible without it. Even 
pluralists find a kind o f unity. James, for example, says 
the world is one sub ject of discourse. Be sides this meager 
kind of unity there must also be at least lo gical unity; 
logic may not be the key to reality, but no interpretation 
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of reality can be understood which is illogical and incoherent. 2 
Urban holds that there must also be some kind of metaphysical 
unity. The h istory of metaphysics shows this. To grasp the 
world metaphysically means to see it as a totality and then 
to characterize that totality, that is, to ascribe some 
quality to i t. This kind of unity is what Urban calls axio-
logical, as opposed to purely lo gical, unity. It is axio-
lo gical also because it includes meanings and values as well 
as existents. Furthermore, the principle of order is neces-
sary before any philosophy can be a system of philosophy , and 
philosophy cannot be anything without being s y stematic. 
System must take a privileg ed position. Here is axiological 
dominance in the presupposition of unity of the world. This 
is implicit also in the Medieval terminology, ens realissium, 
1. Ibid., 50-51 . 
2. Ibid., 53 . 
for h ere the natura l being is as s umed to be the most orderly. 1 
ii . Verum . Thi s leads on to a consideration of Ens est 
. . • verum, which Urban treats as meaning . It has been 
s h oirm in the case of Ens est 1.-mum, that 1.-mi t y itse l f is con-
ceived under t h e dominance of values. " The u l timate object 
of our thought is not abstr act being unrelated to meaning and 
value, but meaning and value itself of which being is a form . 11 2 
The "prejudicen f or meaning goes deeper than the prejudice 
for unity. " The wor l d is j u dge d as totality precisely because 
~ri thout totality meaning is impo ssib l e • 11 3 
Meaning is n o t put in the world by the human mind ; it 
must b e there fir s t . To deny this is to fail to pass t h e 
test of self- refutation . Traditional thought holds to mean-
ing in t h e world . N:o dernism denies i t. l'1 odernism is re f uted 
as follows: "The discovery of nonsense in the world would 
not have been possible t o us unless we were aware of a mean-
ing in life wh ich we p erceive to b e cont radicte d by the 
sense less spe c tacle before us . 114 If there were no meaning 
we would not be capable of r e cognizing it. Denial of mean-
ing i mplies meaning . 
iii . Bonum. This le ads to a cons i d e ration of Ens est 
. . • b om.Lm, for "back of the concep t of meaning lies the 
1 . Ibid . , 55-5? . 
2 . Ibid . , 5? . 
3 . Ibid . 
4. Ibid., 58. 
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concept of value, and the two concepts c annot be separa ted."l 
Urban considers t h is statement so important tha t he h as put 
t he whole of it in italics. 
" The inte llect is oriented tovmrd value. 112 There is a 
"value-centric predicam.ent • 11 The idealist recognizes this, 
but those lrJ"ho would refute the idealist at t h is point are 
c aught in the predi c ament themselves. As Royce points out3 
prior to t h e question, 11 \'lh at is the real itself?" is the 
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question , 11 Ho-vr ought I to conceive the real?" The only possible 
way to enswer this p rior question is to do so in the light of 
on e's ideals of knowledge. Ideals are value norms. If t h e 
ideal is the independence of the object .from t he k nower, in-
dependence is recognized as a value; i.f coherence is the 
criterion, it is recognized as an ultimate value. One is 
still caught in the .v.alue-centric predicament . cannot be 
escaped because "meaning lies above all being, and b ecause 
meaning is inseparable from value. u4 
Realists thinkS that the priority placed on values by 
idealists means that reality must sat i sfy us, but Urban points 
out that t h is is not the case at all. It may be far from 
1. Ibid., 61. The italics are Urban's. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Josiah Royce, Lectures on Modern Idea lism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1919), 237, qu~The Intelligible 
'ltlorld, 62-63. 
4. The Intelligible World, 64. 
5. Urban lifts up E . G . Spaul ding , The New Rationalism ( New 
York: Holt , 1918 ), 206f. 
s ati s f ying us. That i s not the point . It is rather ~hat to 
d eny all value to the universe is to deny truth and meaning , 
which are themse lves values . 'I'his entails a self-refutation. 
Some s ay there is no meaning in the world , tha t the demand 
for meaning or intelligibility is a matter of pure desire . 
This cannot be . Some have actually desired a meaning less 
world . But to deny meaning is really self-refuting , as has 
been shown. 'l'his is an argument from the possibility of ex-
perience to the necessary conditions of such possibility, 
that is, an argument to presuppositions. 1 
i v . Ens realissimum. There is one other " prejudice" o.f 
the Great Tr adition, 11 the last and most fundamental presuppo-
sition of traditional thought--the prejudice in favour of 
ultimate re a lity or of an ens realissimum. 112 This is the 
"ontological prejudice," denial of which is distinctive o f 
philosophical moderni sm. 
What does Professor Urban me an by the "ontolog ical pre-
jud ice ? " He d o e s not a lwa y s u s e a forthright style that 
makes h is meanin g s obvious. Here is a case in point. How-
ever, taking en s realissimum as the clue, one is able to see 
that what he really means is: reality is a totality , and 
that tota lity has an u l timate meaning v.rhi ch is absolute. 
This becomes evident also in l a ter writing s, especially in 
Humanity and Deity, v-rhere he shows clearly that he means by 
1. ltJ . M. Urban , Humanity and Dei ty (London: Allan & Unwin, 
1951), 204-206. 
2. The Intelligible World , 65. 
15 
ens realissimQm an absolute, infinite God . This who le subject 
of t he Abs olute will be treated extensively later; here it 
is only necessary to und erstand the meaning of "ontological 
p rejudic e ." 
In his d iscu ssion of ens re a lissimmn Urban makes it 
clear that he pref ers to mak e a di stinction be tween "reality " 
and 11 e x i stence, 11 whi ch, he recogn i zes, is not made by all 
t hinkers. For him "reality" is the wider t erm; it is all-
inclusive . " Exis tence" i s restricted to refer to objects in 
s pace and time, that is, to physical existen ce. "Reality" 
includes besides "existence" such t hin g s as uni vers a ls, 
values , log ic , subsistencies, and validities. 1 
Other p rejudices have been he ld in opposition to the 
ontolog ical prejudice, such a s, prejudices in favor o f the 
permanent , or the changing , or the r e l at ions of things . But 
these are a ll partial approaches, which is see n by the fact 
that they e liminate other meaning s of r eality and become un-
intelligible. Because they are partial they are a lso self-
re f uting . The concept of ultimate reality is a priori to 
intellig ible thought. Here is t h e basis for metaphysics, 
f or metaphysics is t h e "science of maximum context" a s will 
be s een later in this exposition. 
The ideal of ens realissimum is itself intellig ible only 
" 1.'11'hen it is realiz ed t hat value and reality are inseparable 
1. Ibid., 71. This di stinction should be kep t in mind 
throughout this exposition of Urban's thought. He is care-
f ul in most places in all of his writings to use the words 
in these meaning s, although there are a few inconsistencies. 
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concepts."l Reality can be abstracted from value and seen 
to be the most ultimate category, but as such it is also 
the most meaningless.2 
This treatment of specific presuppositions is not by 
any means complete. Rather it is only introductory, given 
for the purpose of showing the a priori method and for the 
purpose of giving background understanding. A full develop-
ment of presuppositions leads directly into Urban's meta-
physics and so will be deferred to Chapter IV. 
2. DIALECTIC. 
Closely related to the use of the term presupposition 
is "dialectic" as Urban develops it in Beyond Realism and 
Idealism. Dialectic is argument to and among presupposi-
tions with the goal of clarifying the presuppositions and 
harmonizing, if possible, opposing ones. The doctrine of 
dialectic as developed in Beyond Realism and Idealism is 
really a later, fuller development of the presuppositional 
method. Since this method is the heart of Urban's method 
of approach to metaphysics, it is significant to develop it 
further. 
1. Ibid., 74. 
2. Ibid., 74-75. The reader will recognize at this point a 
close parallel to Hegel's beginning stage of the dialectic. 
Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Logic of Hegel translated from 
Enc clopadie der hilosophlschen Wissenschaften by William 
a ace Lon on: 0 or Univers1 y Press, , 158-163. 
Hegel sees pure being as passing over into nothing because 
of the utter emptiness of the concept. 
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Di a.lectic is a \vor d tha.t has h 2d a long and r e pe ctable 
b istor in philos ophy , g o ing all the way b a ck to t he Gr eeks. 
- t comes from the Gr eek verb b'to..Afy<::>~or..c... , me a n i ng l i t e r elly 
r / ' 
"through ( otc:<- ) s p eaking ( .Af-yc..N , I s p eak ) . " As Dr. Brie:ht man 
point out,l fo r the Gre e l{S it me ant the g ive and ta ke of 
con ve r sation, e s pe c i ally as Socrates u s ed it in the qu e st i on 
ancl ansvJe r meth od. Th e word h as oft e n be e n u s ed v ep:uely t o 
r efer to t h e t ensi on of viewpoints i n di s pu t a tion . Ur b a n 
b a s t hi s i n the backgrot n d of h is us a g e , bu t h e goe s on to 
eve l op it as a method of working with p r esu pposi ti ons . 
i. The Spirit of Dielectic. There is a certain p rope r 
spirit of cUalect ic Bs an attitude i n dis put a tion . Quoting 
P l ato ' s The aet e t us , Urb a n s ay s that dialecti c is not a me r e 
disputation but di s cns s i on in a f r i end l y s p i r·· t . Be r efers to 
Royc e' s te r mino logy , "ch arity o f mutu al interpr etat i on " and 
p oin ts ou t that this is poorly developed among philo s ophe r s .2 
The true spiri t of dialectic is a des i r e by l1TIJ_t u al s eeking 
to g et at t h e tru t h, n o t a mere seeking to confound opponents. 
Each dia lectician should as s m1e t tat his opponent s a r e men of 
b oth g ood v-li 11 a n d g ood intellig ence. 11 'Thi s means that He 
should d iscourag e t he cheap tric k s of ord i n ary controversy , 
t he r e tort , courteous or discourteous, t he search for mere l y 
v e r bal i nconsi s tenc i e s ." I nstead one should seek the spirit 
of a man ' s thought whi ch is l ikely to b e better t han h i s 
1 . d g ar Sh effield Br i ghtman , An Introduction to Philosophy 
(2d ed . rev .; NevJ York : Ben r "- Holt 13 ~ Co . , 1951), 35. 
2 . Ur ba n, Beyon d Reali sm and I de a l i sm, 32 . 
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wording of it. 1 Urban maintains that the spirit of dialectic, 
as h e h o lds to i t, is more than a mere ethic of debate; it 
is the strategy necessary for the mutual seeking of truth. 2 
This is true b ecause when one is dealing with basic pre-
suppositions, the field that Urba n allows for dialectic, the 
f inal and only appeal to an opponent is to a mutual acknow-
l edg ement of values, f or Urban maintains that a ll basic assump-
tions are taken up in order to be able to g ive meaning to an 
interp retation of reality.3 
An exsndn a tion of the spirit of dialectic leads on to 
the understanding of its stag es. 
ii. The Stages of the Di ale ctic. There are three stages 
to the d i alectic; Urban follows Hegel's pattern in respect to 
the stages --thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. In his own 
vTOrds: 
l. 
2. 
3. 
It /the dialecti£7 consists in the first instance 
in aeve lop ing the tunderivable first principles' 
upon which an opinion or belief rests and forcing 
the one who holds them to a cknovdedge them expli-
citly. In this p rocedure the method of self-refu-
t a tion is the outstanding f eature •••• It consi sts, 
s e condly, in comp aring antithetice.l, i.e., appar ently 
mutua lly contradictory doctrines, for the sake of 
determining whether they are rea lly contrad ictory, 
and thus leading throug h initial, and p erhaps 
inevitable exclusive theories, to some truth whi ch 
includes them both. F ina lly, it consists in exhibit-
ing a comp l ex truth, by look ing at one s ide and 
then at the other, in order to obta in a combined 
Ibid., 32-33. 
Ibid ., 33. 
Ibid., 33-34 . 
view of the whole. This insight which follows upon 
the transcendence of antithetical positions is 
called the dialectical synthesis.l 
The first stage, then: is a clarification of meanings; 
this is done through dialogue or discourse. Di a logue is 
another derivative from b[GL ).f:rw. and dialectic has never 
lost its connection with the search for truth through d i s-
course. This thesis, or first stage , implies as clarification 
the definition of terms; then the postulates assumed by the 
definitions must be made explicit. Having proceeded thu s 
far the di alectician must take a further step in his first 
stage by giving a precise specification of the universe of 
discourse in which his postulates are held to be valid sub-
sistents, for often arguments are unresolvable because the 
disputants are not actually crossing swords but are each 
fighting straw men in ent i r e ly separate battlefields. Urban 
holds that the dialectical S\vordsrnan, being f orced into the 
clear f rom behind any protecting camouflage of unclarified 
definition, is apt to find that the antithetical pos i tion is 
not a real contradiction but B.n opposition of meaning s and 
values. If this is true then the two can be tr anscended in a 
synthesis by an understanding of the nature of oppositions 
and negations.2 
1. Ibid., 123. All the following references unti l further 
not i ce-are a lso f rom Beyond Realism and Idealism. 
2. This discussion of stag e one is a sunwary of pp. 124-125 
except f or the derivation of dialogue and the battlefield 
metaphor. 
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Since an understanding of negation is necessary to 
all diale ctical procedure it must be clarified. In the 
sense of self-refutation negation must be applied in the 
first stag e of the dialectic as a test of con sistency fo r 
the postula tes or presuppositions laid dov.rn . As an example 
of one who fails this test we may note the sceptic; he 
asserts as knowledge that the r e is no knowl edge . Out of 
h is own mouth he is s i lenced. A valid presuppo s ition is 
one that cannot be deni ed without assuming its validity in 
the very denial. To deny it is literally wider-sinnig . 1 
The positivist , too, re f utes himself by sho-v.ring the inva-
l idity of his presupposition when he says, "Only that whi ch 
c a n be verified by sensation constitutes knowledge ." Since 
this statement cannot be verified by sensation his very 
premise destroys itself . 
Hany apparent con tradict ions , hm-.rever, turn out to be 
11meta-logi cal112 and therefore not contradictions • . Here 
we have negation in another sense. Contradiction is t h e 
ruling principle in logical systems, "but the r e lation between 
the presuppositions or postulates of such s y stems is one not 
o f contradiction but o f op position."3 Contra diction can only 
arise within a single universe of discourse, a sing l e coher-
l. 126. 
2. By "meta-log ical" Urban means l i tera lly, " beyond logi c a l"; 
hov.re ver , it becomes a pparent later that v.rhat lies beyond 
logic is meaning s and v a lues. 
3. 127. 
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ent s y stem. Th e coherence i tself is derived from the supposi-
tion of the sy stem "'rh i ch is what makes that system t h e uni fied 
syst e m it is. Betwe en log ica l systems opposition can only be 
meta-logica l, that i s, opp os i tion of me aning s and v a l ·ues. 
l•le talog ical opposition always involves this 
antithe s is of v a lues, and since meaning is in-
sepa.rable f rom intention, with its re f erence to 
v a lue, d i alectical opp osition can be understood 
only by makin g explicit this reference.l 
Ne g a t i on o f an y kind never occurs in existence bu t only 
in d iscour s e . 2 In d iscourse it i s o f the t wo kinds a lrea dy 
c on s i d e r ed : log ica l and t he antithe sis of v alu es. But 
v a l u es do not contradi ct; they only oppose, for example, the 
f lesh lusting against the spirit and the spirit against t he 
f lesh. This is true on the theoret i c a l or cognitive level 
of v a l ue s the s ame as on the pr a ctica l level.3 
Implie d in the fore going discussion is the second stag e 
of the di a lectic, for the examina tion of the opposing vie'\.-T 
is the second stage . I t i nvolv e s clarification of t he anti-
t hesis as for the thesis in stag e one, and comparison of the 
o pp osin g points of view by reco g nizing that the opp osition 
must b e one of me aning s and valu es r a ther than of lo gic. 
'•lhen this is done object i v e ly one shou ld be able to f ind 
1. 129 . 
2. 128 . 
3. 129-130. For Ur b a n to s a y this presupp oses a d octrine 
o f obj e ctivity of v a lues. I t will be shown l a t er t h at h e 
d oe s h old such a vi ew. 
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elements _on both sides that are legitimate. Then he must 
proceed to the third stag e of the dialectic and seek a 
synthesis. 
The third stage when seen as an insight into the 
synthesis of opposites does not really do violence to 
either logic or experi ence as many think. The synthesis 
transcends the opposing positions by including them in a 
"higher truth." But this transcendence is really i mplied 
already before the synthesis is made. 
It is already implied in the exp l ication of 
meanings and of the logically underivable pre-
suppositions of our beliefs. It is carried 
further when we come to understand the nature 
of the antithesis or opposition zrn the second 
stagi7 of our beliefs and reaches its culmina-
tion in the recognition of the false alternative 
which the analysis discloses and the practical 
truth of both thesis and antithesis.l 
iii. The Relation of Dialectic to Experience and Logic. 
Dialectic does not violate experience and logic; rather they 
presuppose dialectic. They are not intelligible without it. 
Dialectical problems are genuine problems which arise out of 
experience and logic but are not solvable by them.2 They 
are i mplied in experience. 
Dialectic transcends experience in the sense of exp lain-
ing its grounds; it transcends log ic in the sense of examining 
its presuppositions. It is necessary to both for understand-
1. 130-131. 
2. 132. 
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ing and interpretatton. 1 
Di a lectic is esp ecial ly pertinent to the epistemolog-
ica l p roblem; "wha t is true of the k nowledg e of things 
cannot b e true of the knot-Jledge of knmv-ledg e. 11 By "things" 
24 
Urb a n usua lly me ans objects in s p ace and time; this is evidently 
his meaning here. He continues: " Otherwise knowledg e would 
its e l f become a thing , and, being such, would lose all uni-
vers a l significance, a nd the whole problem of knov-rledg e be 
2 begg ed." I\noi-rledge is not a thing, nor a relation between 
thing s. Hence, to explicate it involves a shift from the 
realm of things to that of meaning s. Theories of kno\vl e dg e 
a nd truth c a nnot be "verified by criteria devised for the 
knmv-ledg e of thing s . " This is the tro uble with the empiri-
cist 1 s criterion that nothing is meaningful or true which 
c annot be verified by sensation. The crite rion itself is 
not thus verifiable and is therefore self-refuted. 3 
Some object to dialectic on the basis that its explica-
t i on of me aning gets nowhere with philosophical proof . It is 
true that dialectic does not coerce the mind as empiricism 
and rationalism seek to do. Rather it see~s only to persua de 
to a free acknowledgement of its propositions, but truth is 
found in this persuas i on the same as in coercion . It must 
be of the n e ture of an insight based on mutua l sharing of 
ideals and values. All epistemological positions must come 
1. 132 . 
2. 134. 
3. 134 
to recog ni ze t his ultimately. Since the premise of t h e 
empiricist is self-refuting , if taken as its own justification, 
if it stands a t all, it must be recognized a s grounded only 
in a d ialectical f oundation. Mutatis mutandis, this is true 
1 
for the rationalist a s we ll. 
This does not mean that dialectic s uppl ants either 
exper ience or logic, but that both pr e s uppose dialectic. 
Ur b an ho l d s that 
Empirical verification (with i ts compulsion) 
applie s only to statements regarding particular 
mat ters of fact; logi cal demonstration, with it s 
compulsion, only with respect to prop osition s in 
the same limi ted logi c a l system; when it comes to 
the ul timate presuppositions of both experience 
and log ic--which are both metempirical and met a -
log ical--the on l y criterion p ossib l e is one to 
which I have never been able to g ive a ny other 
name than that of philosophical intelligibility. 2 
This do es not mean that dlalectic, or the pre suppositional 
method is synonymous with intelligibility. Int e llig ibility 
has the l arger extension. Further exposition is n e cessary 
before it can be fully seen. Here it is only meant that the 
foundation of intelligibility begins with examina tion of 
presuppositions. 
It is now apparent tha t dialectic for Urban and argument 
t o presuppositions is the same thing . It is a lso apparent 
that t hi s is an extremely significant point in understanding 
1. 157-158 . 
2. 159 . 
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his whole approach to metaphysics. In Language and Realitx1 
he says that the presuppositions which are necessary to an 
understanding of experience (he calls t hem the co-implicates 
of experience) are gi ven indirectly in experience and that 
they are not merely regulative as Kant held : they are 
constitutive. If presuppositions are constitutive, they 
are metaphysical. He s t ates in Language and Reality that 
metaphysical reasoning is "of the nature of argument to pre-
suppositions.112 
Urban says that in the Great Tradition knowledge derived 
thus has been known as a priori or intelle ctua l intuition. 
He a lso u ses pos t ulati on in the same sens e . He says that 
metaphysics is not veri f iable by empiricism.3 It s evidence 
is by postulation of the propositions which are the neces-
sary conditions of intelligible discourse. 
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Proof in metaphysics is not really "proof" b\lt "per-
suasion," a pressing to the free acknowledgement of presupposi-
tiona. This knowledge by dialectic is really a third aspect 
of knowl_edge, the other two being perception and conceptio·n. 4 
It is no less important than the others. In fact it is 
absolutely necessary for intelligibility. "Metaphysical 
1. Language and Reality, 669. 
2. Ibid., 653. The italics are Urban's, showing the impor-
tance-fie sees in this statement. 
3. Sensation is his meaning of "empiricism." 
4. Ibid., 676-678. 
postulation is necessary to ~ound out our experience, ~and 
as such it i§ . . . necessary to make all other languages 
intelligible." "The elimination of metaphysical language 
1 
would mean the stultification of all discourse." 
Urban's treatment of dialectic as given here is based 
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on his Beyond Realism and Idealism, one of his latest writings. 
But it is apparent that this later development is really just 
a further development of his treatment of presuppositions 
in The Intelligible World. Both involve an a priori method--
arguing from the "is" to what must be if the 11 is 11 is what 
men know it to be. 
All world views that are intelligible have a speci-
fic form which is a · priori in the sense that it 
develops necessariiy out of the attempt to interpret 
and express ·adequately in the form o~ reflection 
the meaning and experiences of life. 
Dialectic' or the examination of presuppositions, is 
necessary to get back behind experience to find its meta-
physical foundations. The choice of one set of presupposi-
tions rather than another Urban, it has been shown, decides 
by persuasion to mutual acknol-Jledgement. The basis here for 
mutuality is intelligibility. It is necessary now to turn 
to an examination of the conditions of intelligibility. 
2. The Intelligible World, 207. 
3. CONDITIONS OF INTELLIGIBILITY 
The ideal of intelligibili~, as it has func-
tioned in historic philosophy, includes ••• 
two distinct but closely related elements. On 
the one hand, there is the ideal of an intelli-
gible world, an intelligible order, in which a 
life of meaning and significance can be lived. 
On the other hand, there is the ideal of intelli-
gible concepts, of a form of philosophic intelli-
gibility, in which this world, this order, can be 
adequately apprehended and expressed.l 
The first of these elements involves the "penetration 
into, or comprehension of, the meaning of the world;" the 
second involves 11 adequate interpretation and communication 
of that meani~.n2 Both of these must involve value, for 
11 the intellect i tseli' is oriented towards value, and • • • 
the problems of the intellect are value problems • 11 3 
i. Intelligible Meaning of the World. Intelligibility 
has several levels of meaning. What might be called primary 
intelligibility or common sense intelligibility demands no 
more than that terms refer to observables--observable by 
either the "outer" or 11 inner 11 sense. For example, 11 The 
dog has pain. 11 Here both dog and pain are recognizable by 
experience, 11 dog" by 11 outer 11 sense and 11 pain11 by 11 inner" 
sense.4 
But this corr®on sense intelligibility only partially 
1. Ibid.' 178-179. 
2. Ibid.' 195. 
3. Ibid.' 176. 
4. Ibid.' 180. 
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satisfies the d emands of t he mind . In ord er to k now more 
d e eply the sci entist penetrates bene a th the world of co~non 
s ens e to d i sco ver l aws t hat rela t e the objects of experi e nce. 
Th e scientist s eeks 11 a deeper uni ty, a real s imp licity, a 
genuine continuity. 111 'rhis i de a l of scien tific intellig i-
bility can be re a ched only by concep tual an a l y sis b eyond the 
mere observat i ons of experi ence. But the u n ifying laws of 
science do not bring f ull und erstanding . Some scientists 
r ec ognize this. Remaini n g after t h e explanations of science 
is still the need of mak ing life and the world in which it 
is liv ed intellig ible to men themselve s. Th is Urban h olds 
to b e t h e essence of ph i losophy. Science attempts to be 
wert-freies Denken and is therefore a n abstra ct i on from 
re a l i ty a nd c annot g ive full intelligi bility. Phi losoph i cal 
meaning must go beyond the me aning s of co~mon sense and 
science for full intellig ibility. 2 
Philosophy h a s a lways b een able to criticize the lower 
levels an d po int out their i nsufficiencies; its a bility to 
fill those gap s h a s b een more diff icult. It has attempted 
to d o so under the f ollo\-ring concepts: penetrabili t y and 
c omprehensibility . The r e must be some way of penetrating 
into the essence of t hings oth er than by abstra ct c onceptions 
if they are to be understood; tha t is, there must be s ome 
a nalogy to direct h~man exp erience. Also for intellig ibility 
1. I bid., 181. 
2. I bid ., 1 81-182. 
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there must be some principle of comprehensiveness; that is, 
1 
e xperi ence must be seen in some systematized wholeness. 
An intelligible world is, as we h ave seen, in 
the last analysis one in which a life of mean-
ing and significance can be lived. In a world 
ultima tely impenetrable, ultimately incomprehen-
sib l e , such a life i s, indeed, impossible. But 
what mak es a penetrable, a comprehen sible world ? 
Is it not fina lly and solely the fact tha t it 
provides the context for an intelligibl e li fe? 
Any life, to be intellig ible , requires to be 
understood through the i deals or v a lues by which 
tha t life is lived . But a world, in order to 
be an intelligible context for such a life , must 
also b e one in Hhich the v a lues, by which the 
individual life i s l ived , have their counterpart 
in an order of values that is cosmic. This 
involves also t he notion, first cle a rly pres ented 
by Kant, t hat int rinsi c value s con st i tute t he k ey 
to an intellig ible world, and tha t the separation 
of value ~rom exi stence means ult i mate unintelli-
g i b ility . 
This rather leng thy quot a tion is v ery important because 
i-r; shows Urban's meaning of the d emand of livability and also 
why he makes the inseparability of value and reality primary. 
Value for him lies at the very root of intelligibi lity. 
This is much the s ame approach as that of pragmati sm with 
its "practica l consequences" test for truth. However, Urban~ 
t houg h he onc e thought of b e ing a pragmatist, rejects prag -
matism s p ecifically because of its abandoment of an ontolog ica l 
approach.3 
1. Ibid., 18 2-183. 
2. Ibid., 183. 
3. Cf. The Intellig ible World, 1?6. 
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The three concepts, penetrability, comprehensibility, 
an d livability, express the whole ideal of an intellig ible 
world. The thing tha t they h a ve in common, ~-.rhi ch is 
mi ssing from co~mon sense and scientific intelligibility, 
is their demand for intrinsic intelligibility. 1 This is 
to be contrasted with the intelligibility of conunon sense 
a nd of science which is merely externa l and instrumental; 
that is, the common sense and scientifi c levels of meaning 
are limited; they presuppose philosophic meaning and in-
telligibility f rom which to derive their own ful l and f inal 
meaning . Phi losophia perennis has always held to an ideal of 
intrinsic (philosophic) intelligibility; modernism charac-
teristically denies it. 
11 The only form of intrinsic intellig ibility in connec-
tion with persons is ta will actin g for the sake of the good,' 
or more generally, a will oriented towards values. 112 Intel-
lect cannot be separated from intention. This is the way men 
understand themselves; it is also what they mean when they 
t a lk of understanding other selve s. " Only that which is the 
centre of meaning s and values has such intrinsi c intellig i -
bility." But Urban does not s top there; he takes another 
very i mportant step and says, " But it is a lso intelligibility 
of the same sort, I think, that alone satisfies us in connec-
1. Ibi d ., 183-184. 
2. Ibid ., 185. 
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tion with the 'world' itself."l All intelligibility must 
be in terms of purposive activity, which always means "a 
will oriented toward value." 
ii. Intelligible Communication. Participation in 
community life, in groups both small and large, has as a 
condition of mutual understanding the acknowledgment of 
identical values, if there is to be any real communication. 
Hence, the second condition of intelligibility is intelli-
gible communication. In order for there to be any communi-
cation there must be community of meanings, that is, the 
acknowledgement of identical meanings and values. These 
are beyond all distinctions in philosophy, even beyond the 
distinction of realism and idealism.2 
The first kind of intelligible communication is verbal 
intelligibility. This means that the accumulated connota-
tion of terms must be retained, which always implies the 
acknowledgement of values. For example, if one wants to speak 
about a living being he must keep the category of life in-
tact and not speak of a living being as merely an aggregate 
of chemical and physical properties. So also must he treat 
love, mind, community, or God.3 
1. Ibid., 185. 
2. In this discussion Urban has taken a long step toward 
personalism, for the interpretation of all reality in terms 
of purposive activity of wills oriented toward values is the 
core metaphysical principle of personalism. However, Urban 
stops at this point without any acknowledgment even of the 
existence of a view called Personalism. 
3. Ibid., 189. 
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The second kind of intelligible communication, which 
he calls real intelligibility, is like the first except that 
it goes a step further. Verbal intelligibility has to do 
with terms; it demands that their reference be to the parti-
culars which accepted meaning points to. Real intelligibility 
has to do with putting terms together into judgmental form; 
here the meaning of a judgment or proposition is what is at 
stake.l 
Meaning and values are inseparable. When a person says 
in a propositional form that he means so and so he intends 
to convey a meaning from himself to another. Even if he is 
talking about bare "facts" he has an intention. Facts can-
not indicate anything without reference to some purpose or 
value intended. Intention, it must be noted, is a purposive, 
therefore, value term. Thus, "To make meaning, in any fashion 
whatever, part of the perveived object, part of the reality 
of any object, invo1ves making value part of the reality of 
this object. u2 This is real intelligibility in distinction 
from merely verbal intelligibility. 
Intelligibility is here to be distinguished from truth, 
for a statement may be intelligible yet not true. However, 
there is a close relation between intelligibility and truth, 
and "an unintelligible statement cannot ultimately be true."3 
1. Ibid., 193. 
2. Ibid., 190. 
3. Ibid., 191. By nultimate" Urban means here taken in f'ull 
metaphysical context. 
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At the epistemological level at which he is here discussing the 
issue intelligibility is synonymous with the fullest meaning 
of meaning (in distinction from merely verbal meaning). 
thus: 
Untruth and unintelligibility are to be distinguished 
False propositions are those that do not correspond 
to existence, but have coherent meanings that might 
so correspond. Unmeaning (unintelligible) proposi-
tions are those that not only do not correspond, 
but are positively incompatible with existence and 
reality. Thus, for example, it is false to say that 
human beings can live without eating; it is meaning-
less to say that ropes can be made out of sand or 
capital out of debts.l 
The unintelligible examples given here do have verbal 
intelligibility, but they do not have real intelligibility, 
for the reason that the purposes and values intended by the 
terms and acknowledged generally by everyone are incompatible 
with each other and with "reality" in the above usage. In 
order for there to be incompatibility with reality, reality 
is here conceived (and must always be so conceived) as in-
separable from value.2 
The compatibility here spoken of means, in the first 
place, the absence of logical contradiction in a proposition. 
1. Ibid., 191. The use of "correspond" here is merely for 
illustrative purposes. Urban is not committing himself to a 
correspondence theory of truth. 
2. Ibid., 191-192. 
It means, in the second place, harmony of the intentions 
expressed in the subject and predicate terms. The modernists 
are guilty of incompatibility (and thus of unintelligibility) 
when they speak of "God in the making" and the "emergence 
of Deity.nl 
Urban states that the distinction between real intelli-
gibility and truth is only relative; in metaphysics intelli-
gibility and truth are synonomous, but this is reached only 
in maximum context.2 
Real intelligibility is here seen to be very similar to 
the coherence criterion of truth. Logical coherence demands 
that there be no contradictions; empirical coherence demands 
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that there be no empirical disharmony. The distinction be-
tween empirical coherence and real intelligibility as developed 
here is that the latter is only applied to a proposition consi-
dered within itself or to other small contexts, whereas co-
herence not only considers this but also empirical and logical 
harmony with all other relevant propositions: it deals with 
larger contexts. At the "ultimate" level Urban, of course, 
goes along with this, for he holds that ultimately "the to-
tality of intelligible discourse !! the truth."3 Truth and 
meaning coincide in maximum context. Ultimately "the sole 
criterion of truth is intelligibility."4 
1. Ibid., 195. 
2. Language and Reality, 365-366. 
3. Ibid., 392. 
4. Ibid., 393. 
Urban's full doctrine of truth can be understood best 
only after a discussion of the place of logic and the levels 
of cognition.l 
Besides verbal and real intelligibility expressiveness 
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is necessary for intelligible communication, and this is 
determined in respect to any philosophy largely by the cate-
gories. "Philosophies are known by the categories they keep."2 
The traditional categories, for example, life, spirit, self, 
society, God, organism, personaLity, are expressive; also 
they cannot be reduced further to something more simple with-
out loss of their very meaning. The reason they cannot be 
reduced is that they are value concepts. They are so because 
any meaning presupposes value, as has been Shown above, but 
they are also value concepts because "the objects which they 
represent or express have meaning and value as part of their 
very nature or reality.n3 Life, for example, is a meaning-
less concept unless conceived as a center of values in dis-
tinction from a machine which has only instrumental values. 
This is a fortiori true of the other traditional categories 
mentioned in this paragraph. Modernism denies that these 
categories are irreducible simples for the very reason that 
1. These follow the conclusion of the discussion of communi-
cation. 
2. The Intelligible World, 196. 
3. ~., 199. 
it denies their meaning to be centered in values. Behaviorism 
is a good illustration. It presumably is trying to interpret 
the human mind but denies the mind by reducing it to a bio-
logical existence; it does the same to all psychological con-
cepts. Behaviorism has thus worked itself into an amusing 
dilemma which it cannot solve because it does not even recog-
nize its plight. It is talking an unintelligible language.l 
It has just been shown that intelligibility is deeply 
involved with communication. It has always been recognized 
by thinkers that communication to be intelligible must con-
sider the demands of logic. Hence, it is necessary now to 
turn to a consideration of the relation that logic has to 
intelligibility. 
4. LOGIC AND INTELLIGIBILITY 
Urban holds with Herb art that logic 11 ist die Moral des 
Denkens."2 It is a necessary presupposition of intelligible 
thought. As such it is basically formal and normative. He 
defines logic as a science of meaniqss, "the meanings of 
words and sentences which are necessary for the relations of 
implication and for inference. 11 3 Logic is a sort of algebra 
which yields correctness (not truth). 4 It is 11 the mould of 
1. This paragraph is based on The Intelligible World, 195-205. 
The categories will be discussed at length in Chapter IV. 
2. Ibid.' 82. 
3. Language and Reality, 277. 
4. Ibid., 322. 
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thought." 1 This illustrates the formal characteristic of 
logic. 
In another place Urban defines logic as " a normative 
science, a science of those absolute values that must be 
acknowledged if intelligible communication is to be possible." 2 
Logic is not the science of whatever is (an ontological 
view),3 but of correct thinking. It sets the norms for such 
thinking, norms that. everyone must recognize, norms without 
which thought cannot proceed at all. Urban holds that this 
is the traditional view of logic.4 
The norms that logic applies are not to be derived from 
logic itself, for they are values. "The normative character 
of the logical derives from the extra-logical or metalogical."5 
Logic, as such, is primarily formal, but its forms are applied 
for a purpose, which is normative. Logic is applied to 
thought much as ethics is to conduct. The norms that logic 
seeks to apply are "the logical values of correctness, 
apodeictic certainity, perfect inference, etc. 116 If a thinker 
would have these values then he must apply the forms of logic. 
Here is the normative function of logic; here it is die Moral 
des Denkens. But the norms themselves are extra-logically 
1. Ibid., 328. 
2. The Intelligible World, 87. 
3. Urban rejects all ontological logics, of which he finds 
both idealistic and realistic examples. His consideration of 
these is presented in Chapter III. 
~- · Ibid., 104. 
5. Language and Reality, 327. 
6. Ibid., 327. 
derived, that is, from axiology. 
Logic is a necessar~ presupposition of intelligible 
1 thought, but it is not the only such condition, as the 
ontological logics tend to assume it is. 2 It must get its 
material from intuition, 3 on the one hand, and on the other, 
it must add the context of discourse. For "a proposition 
outside discourse is nothing."4 Logic as formal and normative 
is above any particular ontology. It is above the distinction 
between idealism and realism. It will fit either of these, 
because it is only a scaffolding. It is necessary to intelli-
gibility, but other consideration s must determine the actual 
system of truth.5 
It has been shown above · that for Urban communication 
is an essential condition of knowledge. Logic is also im-
portant, t:or it is a condition of intelligible communication. 
Also basic to communication is language. The relations of 
language to cognition and intelligibility are crucial for 
Urban. It is necessary to turn now to a consideration of 
1. The Intelligible World, 83 
2. Ibid., 125. Ontological logics will be discussed in 
Chap~III. 
3. Language and Reality, 322, 328. 
4. Ibid., 328. Just how intuition and discourse enter into 
tota~owledge situation will be taken up a bit later in this 
chapter. 
5. w. M. Urban, "Value, Logic, and Reality," Proceedings 
of the Sixth International Con~ress of Philosophy (1927), 
288; also The Intelligible Wor a, 113, 114. 
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this problem. 
5. LANGUAGE, COGNITION, AND INTELLIGIBILI'I'Y 
Logic cannot stand alone in yielding intelligibility 
and meaning, for ''logic presupposes that terms have meaning 
and that propositions have sense, but it cannot determine 
that meaning and that sense."l Hence, it is necessary to 
move to the metalogical, which includes both the pre-logical 
and the post-logical. The pre-logical has to do with the 
data or intuitive content of knowledge; the post-logical has 
to do with meanings and interpretations, which, carried to 
completion, is metaphysics. Urban maintains that knowledge 
cannot be complete without metaphysics. 
Pervading the entire area of knowledge according to 
Urban is communication, which in turn implies language. 
Hence, this section of the study must be concerned not only 
with cognition but also with language. Language is involved 
at all levels of cognition, including the post-logical or 
metaphysical meanings. 
A brief digression is necessary again to note that a 
strong factor in Urban's development of this theme, as in 
many of his others, is the fact that he is reacting against 
philosophic modernism. The form that this modernism takes 
in its opposition to a proper philosophy of language is neo-
1. Language and Reali5r, 330. 
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nominalism.l 
In one mood it ~odernism7 is flirting with 
an extreme Behaviourism Which defines science 
as language well-made and then views languag e 
a s a merely biological adap tation to environment 
--the only result of which is a p an-fictionism 
that swallows up science itself. At another 
moment it dreams of an absolute log ic which can 
become so only by a complete divorce from language. 
In the f irst case language can say nothing true, 
in the latter nothing that re a lly interests any-
body. 
Thi s is what I call nee-nominalism, and is 
the key to all modernistic tendencies in philosophy.2 
He adds tha t nominalism is the "deepest, most dreadful of 
all heresies. 11 3 
This heresy asks men to turn their backs on all the 
past with its categ ories of substance, cause, and purpose, 
and to listen only to modern ideas. But re a lly science 
p re supposes natural language and cannot explain it. Modern-
ism leads to comp lete paralys is of s p eech.4 
Urban wrote two special articles on this problem speci-
fically aga inst ~fJ.1.i tehead . He say s Whitehead's Process and 
Reality "proved to be almost the most unintelligible essay . 
in philosophy ever written," because of its new language but 
1. Ibid., 366f. On page 370 he specifically names Russell, 
Bergson, and vJhitehead as examples of what he means. 
41 
2. W. H. Urban, "Metaphysics and .Value," Contemporary American 
Philosoph~, G. P· •. Adams ar.td W. P. 1-1ontague (ed.), (New York: 
The Il'1acmi lan Co., 1930), II, 378. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 378, 379. 
even more because of the assumption that conventional language 
cannot express metaphysics. 1 Whitehead assumes~ Urban says~ 
that natural language is a useful abstract ror life but that 
2 it is not molded on the true nature or things. Hence vfhite-
head uses a language of pure dynamism. All language "must 
be pulverized into verbs," Urban interprets.3 In the 
second article on Whitehead Urban says very much the same 
things. He adds that process philosophies are unintelligible 
because something must become.4 
Having set forth the chief opposition, which in itself 
has helped Urban to develop his view~ this investigation 
must move on to present his positive view. Urban states his 
"true" view as follows: 
Language which. • • is inseparable from 
thought and knowledge~ is not moulded on 
reality. It is rather the mould in which 
1. vl . H. Urban, " Elements or Unintelligibility in vlhi tehead' s 
Metaphysics," Journal of Philosophy, XXXV (No. 23~ 1938 ), 
617-618. . 
2. Ibid., 621. Urban sees natural language as displaying 
the true nature of things; there is a "natural metaphysics 
of the hmnan mind". More of this idea Hill be developed 
in Chapter I V. 
3. Ibid., 625. One might wonder whether Urban could be 
a ccusea-of pulverizing all l a nguage into nouns and adjectives 
with hi s insistence on substance and values as central; this 
will be seen more clearly in later chapters on value and meta-
physics. 
4 . vl . N. Urban, 11 \fui tehead 1 s Philosophy of Language and Its 
Relation to Hi s Metaphysics," The Philosophy of Alfred North 
Whitehead , ed. P. A. Schilpp (Vol. III of The Library of 
Living Philosophers; Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern , 
1941), 301-327. Here is a strong indication of Urban's 
commitment to a doctrine of substance. 
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reality as significant is first given. This 
is the idealistic minimum which must be present 
in any adequate philosophy of language.l 
Reality as we know it is other than the hypotheti-
cal pure experience out of which our knowledge 
has developed; lf!7 is an ideal constrnction in 
which language Eas been the chief creative force.2 
Two observations immediately suggest themselves on 
the basis of this passage: (1) Urban is at least partly 
an idealist. A thorough discussion of the "idealistic 
minimum" is taken up in a later chapter on the relationship 
of idealism and realism.3 (2) The second observation is 
that here is one of Kant's main theses from Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft. Kant holds that the forms of the intuition 
and the categories of the understanding constitute reality 
as human minds know it and that the Ding-an-sich is never 
known. Urban readily admits to strong influence from Kant. 
It will become more and more apparent in this investigation 
that this doctrine of Kant is primary and formative in Urban's 
thought. Urban does not always use Kantian terminology, es-
pecially in his discussion of language and cognition, but 
Kant is fundamental here nevertheless.4 
1. Language and Reality, 375. 
2. Ibid., 50. 
3. Chapter III. Urban's entire book, Beyond Realism and 
Idealism, is dedicated to a discussion of this relationship 
and to the thesis that there is a minimum of both idealism and 
realism necessary to any true metaphysics. 
4 • . Indeed Urban notes favorably in La~afe and Reality, 331 
332, that Mauthner has said that Kant's r tlk der reinen 
Vernunft is really a Kritik der Sprache. 
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How does Urban support his contention that laneuage 
is the "mould of reality," tha t language is the "creative 
force" of reality as men lmovJ it? This leads to a considera-
tion of cognition and its various levels. 
i. The Levels of Cognition. Urban rejects the dyadic 
view of cognition in favor of a triadic view. The dyadic 
view holds to knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by 
description . Knowledge by acquaintance means direct know-
ledg e, presentational immediacy, intuition. Knowledge by 
description means indirect knowledge, tha t is, representation 
in idea . Urban would temper both of these by t h e addition 
of language as a determining factor in both; he would also 
add a third level which he refers to as "interpretation or 
dialectic . " 1 He g ives special attention to each of these 
leve ls as 11metalogical problems of languag e ." 
(1). Intuition . Urban sees two kinds of intuition, 
sensuous intuition and direct experience or Erlebnis of 
qualities and values. 2 In the case of the first of these 
there is a "wha tness 11 of the sense datum given prior to 
linguistic expression, but nothing can really be said to be 
known even at this lowest level of cognition without its 
being expressed in words given in the form of propositions . 
The sense datum is mere awareness; it cannot be c a lled know-
ledge. One must say at least "this is g reen," or "this is 
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1. Lan guag e and Reality, 337-340. All footnotes until further 
notice are from this same work . 
2. 341. 
damp ." " Propositions are the elements of k nowledge , f or only 
judgment s or propositions c a n be true or false ."l Even the 
atomic nnits of cognition must be g iven in propositional 
form, for example, "This is g reen." Henc e , Urban concludes 
that l anguage is a nec e ssary part of cognition on t h is low e r 
level. 2 
Is the sense datum lmov-Jledg e? Urban's a nsv-.rer is No . 
Pure awareness unexpressed or even expressed in the form o f 
an atomi c proposition is not to be d i gnified with the title 
11Knov-..rledge . 11 Henc e , " knowledge by a cquaintance" is not a 
proper terminology . 
Pure awareness ••• does not even give us presenta-
tional knowledg e in any intellig ible sense o f the 
1r1ord ; it is not an acqua.intance with objects, not 
even with simple qualities. One c a nnot tell what 
t h is intuit i on g ives him . Even if it is there it 
c a nnot be expressed. The expression " affirmation 
1n implicit terms" repres ents the attemp t to keep 
t he notion of 3knowledge v.ri thout the notion of l i n-guistic f orm. 
Urban a dmits that it is partly a matter of definition 
a s to '-1he t he r the intuitional level should be d i gnified with 
the name 11 kno1r1ledg e . 114 But his a r gument against the t e r mi -
1. 343 . 
2. Urb an no tes t ha t h is view iB simila r to that of Croce 
deve l oped in his aesthe tics. However , Urba n f e els Croc e 
has mad e cow~unicability a mere addendum to expression. This 
will not do . Communicability is insepa.rable from expression 
and therefore from knowledge . 
3. 342. 
L~ . 343. 
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nology "knowledge by acquaintancen is weak; those who support 
it could just as well say by definition that the terminology 
is appropriate. It appears that Urban tries to give better 
support to his doctrine that intuition and expression are 
inseparable by making the definition of knowledge to include 
expression. But this is a petitio. principii. There is 
really no good reason why Jones cannot be said to have know-
ledge of a pain getting worse by immediate awareness even 
before he has formed in his own mind the proposition "this 
pain is getting worse." Urban is arbi tracy at this point. 
At the lowest level of cognition the contribution of 
the mind, according to Urban, is only the contribution of 
linguistic form. For Kant the mind contributes more; it 
imposes upon the datum the forms of the intuition, that is, 
the forms of space and time. Kant is more radical at this 
level than Urban. It might have been more consistent, how-
ever, if Urban had followed Kant at this point, for at this 
level language is not constitutive of reality, which doctrine 
Urban desires to maintain. Language here is merely expressive 
of reality. 
Only sensuous intuition has been discussed up to this 
point. Non-sensuous intuition or Erlebnis includes 
(a) the emotional, non-sensuous intuition, of 
values, or we may perhaps say, tertiary qualities; 
(b) the non-sensuous intuition of form and form 
qualities, as for instance of a melody; (c) the 
non-sensuous intuition of such indefinable and 
undefined objects as "love" or "life. 11 1 
1. 344. 
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Th e s ame argument g iven for sensuous intuition against 
C8.1 ling this leve l knov.rledge and in defense of the idea that 
the datum is nothing to the intui to r 'l.vithout forma tion into 
linguistic form hold s, mutatis mutandis , for the non-sensuous 
typ e of intuition.l 
Urban concludes then "that any intuition of reality, 
knm:v l edge by mere acquaintance, without an element of des-
crip tion, is pur e myth . 11 2 He moves on to say that 11 the 
exp ression is ••• a constitutive part of the intuition 
its e lf. 11 3 'I'hen he generalizes to include the whole of the 
knowing process and says "the expression is a co n stitutive 
part of the knovling itself . u4 
Urban assigns great importance to t h is conclusion: 
I t is this thesis, then, tha t we wish to maintain . 
47 
It is, viewed from every angle, the most important 5 thesis, pe r haps, of our entire philosophy of language . 
He a llows that the mind can think in terms of g eometric 
figures, algebraic signs, and ideographic symbols, but he con-
tends tha t these a re a lso l anguages, for l anguage is s ~rmbolical 
representation . 
1. 3~-4-345 • 
2 . 3~-7. 
3. 3L~7 . I t has been noted above that the arg ument for this 
is ina dequate . If Urban had allowed expression to come at a 
reflective level instead of the intuitive level he would have 
been on more solid g round. 
4. Ibi d . 
5. Ibid. 
One other p oint should be noted on the intuiti ve level. 
It is that, even here, a dualism begins to appear between 
the expression and the expressed. 1 Even on the acquaintance 
level an element of representation and description is neces-
s ary . 
Without this polarity, and therewith the reference 
of the presentation to the thing p r e s ented, the 
entire notion of knowledge collapses. It follows 
that the problems of know~edge and the problems of 
languag e are inseparable. 
However, intuition is still inadequate , e ven on its 
own level. Beside s de scription an element of interpretation 
must be added, for even perception cont a ins some interpreta-
tion. There is always an element of judgment in i t. "It 
is only in interpretation involving communic a tion that know-
ledg e has its being • •• as Pl a to expressed it in the 
Theaetetus, ' Knowledge is judgment plus disc ourse.'"3 'l'his 
is partly log ica l interpretation, but it also involve s meta-
physical interpretation, even on t he level of acquaintance. 
As one moves to the hi gher levels it becomes even more 
signific ant. 
A corolla ry of the doctrine of knowledGe here presented 
1. 348. Quite evidently then Urban would hold to an episte-
molog ical dualism. 
2. 349 . He admits great influence by Ernest Cassirer on 
his philosophy of language and says the point quote d is the 
underlying theme of Cassirer's Phi losophie der Symbolischen 
Formen ( Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1925). 
3. 350. 
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Urban holds to be that: 
The categories of knowledge are ultimately ••• 
the categories of language in the philosophical 
sense of language ••• ~nd the categories of intui-
tion are categories of expression and thus of 
languag~. Otherwise e xpressed, the only way to 
determine being or reality is in those forms in 
which statements about it are possible. 
Here Urban is opening up the principles that he will 
use for his doctrine of reality; metaphysics is to be 
found in the categories of language. This is to be dis-
tinguished from mere grammatical categories, which vary 
from language to language. This he holds to be the "heait 
of the category do.ctrine of both Aristotle a,nd Kant. n2 
(2). Description. It has been shown above that for · 
Wi lbur Urban an element of description is involved in 
presentation, but description may g o beyond this to a 
level of more specific description or re-presentation, 
where intuition is not primary . In this sense description 
includes three types of representation: (a) copying or 
imitation, (b) an::.log ical representation, and (c) symbolic 
representation.3 
1. 350. cr . also 150. 
2. 351. This whole doctrine of the ins eparable rela tion-
ship of intuition, expression, and reality , is set forth in 
his article " Cassirer 1 s Philosophy of Languag e," The Philosophy 
of Ernst Cassirer, ed. P. A. Schilpp ( Vol. VI of The Library 
of Living Philosophers; Evanston , 1949) , 407-41~- , in essen-
tially the same form as g iven above from Language and Reality. 
The same thing is g iven briefly in respect to relig ious know-
ledg e in Humanity and Deity, 297f. 
3. 352. 
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The i mitation type carries the sense of picture, even 
spatial picture. Examples are maps and mechani c a l models. 
Here t he form is the central part of representation. 
An a log ical representation is really a type of picturing, 
too. But, whereas i mitation pictures by rela tions of 
quantity , analogical representation pictu res qualities 
and values. This is especially evident in paintings. 
There is an aesthetic 11 distortion11 from pure copying in 
order tha t qualities and values mi ght be made to stand 
out in larg e significance. This is quite significant in 
art; vJithout it art would not be art. Art must express 
l 
purpose, a "sense," to its pictures. 
Symbolic representation is a non-pictorial form. A 
symbol is something that stands in place of something else. 
\•Th a t resembl ance it has to the thing symbolized is only 
a resemblance of structure. Exa.mples are: (a) A musical 
score symbolizes a symphony in such a way as to make 
possible reproduction of the symphony, but it in no way 
"looks" like the symphony sounds. (b) Mathematical 
formulas s ymbolize the reality that science sees, but they 
do not picture that reali ty. This i s the point at Hhich 
the significance of language is seen, for the function of 
l · t b l" al"t t picture l"t. 2 anguage lS o sym o lZe re l y , n o _ 
l. 353-356 . 
2. 356-357. 
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In further discussion of symbolism Urban drop s the 
distinction between analogical and sy mbolic representation. 
" Analogical predication is the very essence of the symbolic 
function . 111 In harmony with this he dlstinguishes between 
signs and s ymbols . 2 igns are mere substitutions for what 
they stand for. They are merely descrip tive terms in the 
lowest sense of representation: they are not intuitive. 
Symbols , on the other hand, are found "where the intuitive 
elements of language function for the non-intuitive or con-
ceptual."2 
Urban is using "intuitive" here in a different sense 
than that given above. Here it means conceptual insight 
into the meaning of a term. As such the term can be ex-
tended and used metaphorically to re.fer to other objects 
than those it c an refer to literally. 
The fact that meanin g can be transferred from one t hing 
to another is the heart of the symbolic function o f language 
for Urban . He speaks of "fundamental metaphor ." 11 l\•1e t aphor 
is ••• essentially discovery of new meanings and their 
fixa tion and determination by means of old names." 3 The 
essence of fundamental metaphor, as Urban u s es the termino-
logy , is the intuitive meaning , intuitive here connoting a 
value quality that can be transferred from one object to 
1. 42~- · 
2. 408-413. 
3. 675. 
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another. This is what transfers from coldness of ice to 
coldness of recep tion . Unless there were this intuitive 
content the word could not be transferred . 1 Symbols are 
not literal ; litera lism is merely copy r epresentation . 
1rlhere this is the case the term is a sign instead of a 
symbo l . 
Religion, a rt, science , all l anguages , use symbolism. 
They a ll contain a literal element , f or all kno"t·Tledge must 
be tied to the data of exp erience , but there is much that 
i s symbolic construct . It is espe c i a lly necessary to see 
this i n science . The l angua ge of modern science is a mathe -
matic a l langua g e ; its . concep ts a r e idea l constru cts. Both 
mathematics and concepts are highl y symbolical . The scien-
tist must remember this and not commit the fallacy of mis -
placed l iter a lism as he does, for example , when he speak s 
o f all reality as determined . In this case he has used 
t he metaphor of a machine and a pplied it litera lly , whe re 
it c an only be used symbolically . 2 
Two o b servations need to be made a t this point . First 
intuition is over- extended here far beyond t he mere g iven-
ness of immediate experience; secondly , s ymbolic representa-
tion is no mere descriptive level of cognition; it i s highly 
conceptual , that is , hi ghly interpre t ive. 
1 . 177 . 
2 . Cf. Lan guage and Re.~li ti_ , Chapte r XI , and Humanity and 
Dei~ , Chapter X. 
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Indeed Urban recognizes this. He says that as there is 
no intuitive knowledge without description, there is no 
descriptive knowledge without interpretation. This is so 
even in poetry, for the poet is trying to give some "sense." 
This leads into interpretation, for a part of the sense of 
a picture is in interpretation. 
An aesthetic picture, mo less than a spatial 
or logical picture, is true or false, but the 
meaning of truth and falsity is determined by 
the "universe of discourse" in which the state-
ment or proposition is made. In other words, a 
description of manta happiness, such as that in 
the line quoted !Yman•s happiness, his flaunting, 
honeyed flower or soul~, is meaningless in one 
universe of discourse, but may have the deepest 
sense in another.l 
Hence, there is no description without interpretation. 
(3). Interpretation. Both presentational immediacy 
and representation have an element of interpretation in 
them. The question now arises whether there is an element 
of knowledge which is interpretation alone. Urban's answer 
is Yes. It is only when there are interpretation and inter-
preters that knowledge on the first two levels reaches a full 
level of mee.ning. All propositions about "meaning" and 
about knowledge, if they are knowledge at all, are knowledge 
by interpretation. But: "If they are not knowledge, then 
we have as the basis, or presupposition, of other elements 
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of knowledge •propositions• which do not belong to knowledge."2 
1. 361. 
2. 364. 
But this will not do, lest all knowledge fall to the ground 
for lack of an adequate foundation. Knowledge by interpre-
tation, or dialectic (for they are the same) is the founda-
tion of the 11 Iv1eaning of :rvieaning," the meaning of truth, and 
the meaning of the criteria of verification. Interpretati on 
must itself b~ knowledge and contain in itself the possi-
bility of verif ication. 1 
The consequences of this doctrine Urban sees to be 
fer-re aching. 
In so far as there i s knowledge by interpretation 
truth must, in the last analysis, be immanent in 
discou~se; the totality of meaningful discourse 
must be the truth. • • • A second important conse-
quence is the light such a view of knowledge throws 
upon the debatable field of metaphysical language. 
Metaphysics ••• is preeminently this field of know-
ledge by interpretation. It is the language of 
maxim~~ context, the language which alone makes 
intellig ible our other languages. Here knowledge 
is knowledge by interpretation and the criterion of 
metaphysical truth is determined b y that fact.2 
Kant refers to metaphysical propositions as transcenden-
taler Schein. But Drban interprets Kant to mean that they 
are Schein only for empirical v erification. They are not 
so ultimately. F'or metaphysics is necessary both for the 
regulation and the interpretation of empiric al proposi-
tiona; they are necessary for the presuppositions of reason 
1. 364. 
2. 365. 
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in both its empirical and its practical usage.l Urban agrees 
with Kant at this point and summarizes the point o~ view by 
saying: 
Metaphysics ••• is precisely that activity which 
seeks to round out our experience and to make it 
intelligible. · In this sphere intelligibility and 
truth are synonamous.2 
In these last ~ew paragraphs one can see i!n .a nutshell 
both Urban's doctrine o~ truth and his metaphysics. His 
doctrine of truth as immanent in discourse is treated more 
~ully below. Metaphysics will be expanded more fUlly in 
Chapters IV and V; however, it is already becoming clear what 
the meaning of metaphysics is. It is the "language of 
maximum context" which cannot be intuited directly but which 
must be postulated in order to give intelligibility to all 
other knowledge. Experience is incomplete; it is unin-
telligible without the interpretation of metaphysics.3 
It was noted early in this section that Urban follows 
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a Kantian point of view by making the mind, through languages, 
creative in apprehending knowledge. 'rThe expression is a 
constitutive part of knowing itself. 114 He adds that this is 
"the most important thesis perhaps of our entire philosophy 
1. 36.5. 
2. 36.5-366. 
3. 36.5. 
4. 347. 
of l anguage.nl The contribution of the mind is what Urban 
means by interpretation, 
The contribution the mind makes is the value intention, 
that is, whatever value the mind intends to communicate 
when it sets forth a given proposition; this is usually 
truth value but also frequently includes other values. 
All the discussion given earlier in this chapter on pre-
suppositions cannot be logically defended; they can only 
be acknowledged as logically unsupported judgments of value. 
The implications from this reach into all knowledge, that is, 
this level actually reaches into the other levels. But the 
mind does not create knowledge pure and simple, for there 
are intuitional data that the mind must use in bui lding 
its constructed reality. 
The contribution of the mind is also apparent in 
the above statement that experience is incomplete without 
metaphysics, for the postulates of metaphysics are given in-
directly through thought and not directly in experience. 
It was shown earlier in this chapter that Urban con-
sidered the categories of language to be the categories 
of knowledge. It will be shown later that he also finds 
these to be the categories of reality as men know it.2 
It will be noted that this exposition uses the termino-
logy "creative contribution of the mind" whereas Urban uses 
1. Ibid. 
2. Cf. Chapter IV. 
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"language" and "expression" in the quoted passages. These 
terms are quite typical of his writing. Instead of using a 
straight forward terminology he uses a device which brings 
confusion to his readers and at times to himself. The 
difficulty lies in the fact that he hypostatizes "language." 
1 He speaks of it as a ''chief creative force," as if language 
is a power that operates independently of any mind. This is 
a device used quite consistently throughout Language and 
Reality as well as in his other writings concerning language. 
Until the reader comes to realize Urban's usage, it is diffi-
cult to understand him. vlhat he calls "philosophy of 
language" (and this is what a large part of Langus.ge and 
Reality purports to be) is really mostly theory of know-
ledge and truth plus a discussion of symbolism. When he 
speaks in terms of "language of" one can usually interpret 
him as meaning the body of truth of a certain field, for 
example, 11 language of art," "language of religion," "language 
of science," "language of metaphysics." 
In this doctrine of cognition Urban has given a broad 
place to language and its representative and interpretive 
functions. One may doubt, however, whether he has given 
adequate place to intuition. It is true that he allows for 
it, but insists on expression as a part of the intuition 
itself. This is to add a representative function; hence it 
is no more pure intuition. The issue is left clearer if 
1. 50. 
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the pure datum of experience is c a lled intuition. Then 
when the datum is expressed, that is, when a term is assigned 
to it, one can recognize that the descriptive level is 
reached. This would broaden the area of description to in-
clude such low levels as "This is green" and "This is da.rnp:. 11 
But Urban himself recognizes a descriptive element here; 
these plainly belong on that level, because they are judg-
ments. Urban's d&emphasis on intuition makes it possible 
for him to lose track of experience too quickly. He is 
not able to keep a balance between experi ence and reason. 
His doctrine of intuition says t oo much to allow him to be 
a consistent empiricist. 
This discussion also gives us the clue to what Urban 
means by the term "exp erience." Experience means more than 
"situations-experienced," to use Brightman's terminology; 
it includes representation at the lowest level; it is the 
datum plus an expression of it. Urban usually p refers to 
apply the term only to sense experi ence; however, in this 
discussion he makes allowance for non-sensuous experience 
under the terminology Erlebnis. 
It is necessary now to turn to a consideration of 
the doctrine of truth which h a s had to be postponed until 
this point . because it could not be fully understood unti l 
after levels of cognition were presented. 
ii. The Doctrine of Truth. As has been quoted above, 
language for Urban is the "mould in which reality as signi-
ficant is first given." This statement is concerned with 
knowledge of reality, but knowledge and truth are correla-
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tive conceptions. The truth problem then, as related to 
knowledge and through knowledge to language, becomes the pro-
blem of the relation between an expression and an object 
expressed. 
In considering the three levels of cognition for the 
truth relationship one finds tha.t it does not arise at all 
on the level of mere acquaintance, the level of presenta-
tional immediacy. It begins on the second level, the level 
of re-presentation, but it belongs preeminently to the level 
of interpretation.l At the second level the "most primitive 
notion of truth arises--that of copy or correspondence. 11 2 
But since this level is incomplete without interpretation, 
it is at the third level that the truth relationship be-
comes definitive. 
At this level truth is seen to be a relation between 
an object and an expression. Since knowledge is of the 
nature of an ideal construct a true proposition must express 
an intention. This is not seen unless the proposition sets 
forth the sense of the object it is representing. Hence, 
Urban's key statement about truth is that "Truth. • • • is, 
in the last analysis, adequate expression. 11 3 Added to this 
must be the statement that truth is immanent in discourse. 
It cannot be separated from discourse or communication, 
since this is vital to expression. 
1. 376, 377. 
2. 376. 
3. 379. 
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This implies that correspondence views of truth are 
not wholly satisfactory.l However, there is something of 
correspondence in this meaning, for truth must be represen-
tative in some sense of that which is expressed. 'I'h at it 
is not pure correspondence is seen in the fact that adequacy 
of the expression to the expressed means adequacy with re-
spect to the sense or intent. The relation of expression 
to expressed is not a relation of identity or even simi-
larity.2 
A map is ttrue' when it represents certain 
spatial relations. A portrait is true when 
it represents the character. A model of the 
atom is true when3it represents the constitu-tion of the atom. 
The mode of adequacy in each of these cases is different, 
but in all of them it is adequacy with respect to intent, 
whatever else it is. This illustrates Urban's value-
centric interpretation of knowledge and truth. 
The verifiability theory of knowledge and truth as 
set forth by the positivists Urban finds to be woefully in-
adequate, because it limits huma n experience very narrowly, 
that is, to sense experience only. However, verifiability 
rightly understood is both proper and necessary. The proper 
view of it is not verification of an immediate sense datum. 
1. 380. 
2. 381. 
3. 382. 
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Only propositions can be verified, and even the simplest 
proposition refers to other sentences. "It is these, not 
the sense datum, which do the. verifying. 111 An isolated 
sense datum might be a mere accident. Verification must 
tak e place in a whole process of r elating in the proposi-
tional context. This takes place chiefly at the level of 
interpretation where only the concept of adequacy applies. 
It takes place i n a universe of discourse which implies 
mutually acknowledged assumptions as to rationality and 
intelligibility on the part of all members of the con-
firming community. 2 
Urban really prefers the word "authentication" to ex-
press his meaning instead of verification. It is a word 
that comes from the realm of art. It takes place in comnuni-
c a tion. In the community of experts in art, or, in his wider 
usage, in any field, when there is mutua l acknowledgement 
of val ues and their rela tions, there is authentic ation. 
':Phis is direct authentication. Indirect authentication 
takes place when there are mutually acknowledged i mplica-
tions in the discourse. For example, when a man says noth-
ing is. good but mastication and sex he implies truth is good 
and indirectly authenticates it and refutes himself. This 
is the way the existence of other selves is proven, for 
1. 386. Cf. in this connection his contention that truth 
is immanent in discourse. 
2. 387, 388. 
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c ommunicat ion with o t her selves indirectly i mp lies their 
e x istence. Other selves must exist because throu gh communi-
cation they give one his own full meaning and inner reality. 
Also they are the confirming body for external reality.l 
Communication is central to Urban's doctrine of k now-
ledg e. This is because of his Kantian approach. Reality 
as known to men is largely what their minds constitute it. 
Hence, verification must be through corronunication. Communi-
cation rescues knowledg e from individual subj ectivity and 
p u t s in its place the stamp of the "racial" mind instead. 
The contribution of the individual is tested against the 
experience of the race. 2 
The idea that knowledge needs social verification to 
be declared true Urban holds to be historically sound. He 
quotes Plato as saying ( Theaetetus) "Knowledge is judgment 
plus discourse." He f'inds the same concept in s t. Thomas. 
Royce held to the idea of' the "beloved community."3 Urban 
apparently took the idea of cow~ity verification directly 
f'rom Royce who in turn developed it out of Peirce's con-
firming community of scientists.4 
1. 213-218 ; also " The Knowledge of Other Selves and the Prob-
lem of Me 8ning and Value," Philosophical Review (May, 1917). 
2. Languag e and Reality, 223. 
~ ( 3. Cf. Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity New York : 
Th e Macmillan Co., 1913). 
4. Humanity and Deity, 316. 
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Truth as seen by God, that is, truth as verite.s ontologies.,"' 
needs no such social verification, but "truth as veritas 
humano obviously does.'d 
Urban's doctrine of truth as adequacy of expression 
suffers from ambiguity. Urban is not definite enough on how 
to know when an expression is adequate. He corrects this 
problem partly by his doctrine of verification as just shown. 
But is this enough? Is it "adequate"? Some things may be 
"expressed" very well and even have social verification and 
still be false. Such was the medieve.l idea that the world 
was flat. Urban tries to meet this kind of objection by hold-
ing that there must be an object independent of the knower, 
but this contention is pretty well overcome by subjectivity 
in his system. The knower does too much; confirmation may 
declare the false to be true. One may admit that confirma-
tion by the community of experts tends to lend more and more 
probability to a truth-claim, but there is need of a more 
objective test for the experts themselves to apply than Urban's 
test allows. Also one must consider the fact that an idea may 
be just as true the first time it is thought of as after the 
community has confirmed it, though confirmation brings greater 
conviction of truth. was Einstein's theory of relativity 
any less true when he first published it than after it had 
been put to confirming test by several scientists? 
Urban's doctrine of adequacy is very much like empirical 
coherence, but it does not allow as much place as coherence 
1. Humanity and Deit~, 318; also "The Dialectic of Meaning 
and Truth," Philosop y and Phenomenological Research, IV 
{March, 1944}, 399. 
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does for the individual in testing truth. Empirical coherence 
gives the individual expert a device to use in private approach 
to truth even before an idea is submitted to the community. 
The members of the community can individually apply it.l In 
his main discussion of truth as adequacy of expression Urban 
allows some place for empirical coherence, but considers it to 
be partial ("Coherence is but one value among these.")2 and 
not as ultimate as adequacy.3 
However, in other contexts Urban is more charitable 
to empirical coherence, and actually it becomes apparent that 
much of what he means by adequacy is caught up in the co-
herence criterion. A rather lengthy quotation from his dis-
cussion of the language of metaphysics is illustrative: 
Metaphysics is discourse and, like all discourse, 
to be intelligible, it must be coherent. This 
coherence is, in the first place, absence of 
logical contradiction. Logical form is, as we 
have seen, so interwoven with all our speech that 
to violate this form is to entail contradiction and 
incoherence. But this is only the negative aspect 
of the demand for coherence. As the condition of 
philosophical intelligibility coherence means much 
more than this ••• Nothing is intelligible to us 
unless it is part of an organized and coherent whole 
of experience. Even in science intelligibility 
means ••• at least this. The fact is no longer 
isolated; therefore it is intelligible. But . for 
philosophical intelligibility coherence must mean 
more than this. Not merely absence of logical 
contradiction; nor merely necessary connections 
1. Urban allows this, really, in his doctrine of real intelli-
gibility. cr. discussion p. 35 above. 
2. w. M. Urban, Review of The Idea of Value, by John Laird, 
Journal of Philosophy, XXVII {1930), 291; ci'. also ''Beyond 
Realism and Idealism vs. Two Types of Idealism," Philosophical 
Review, XXVII (January, 1918), 69. 
3. Cf. Language and Reality, 391. 
in the sense of science; but that more fundamental 
coherence which arises out of the demand to round 
out our experience and to make it meaningful as 
a Whole. Coherence as a condition of philosophical 
intelligibility is the reflection of the nature 
of the object of metaphysical activity, namely, the 
omnitudo realitatis.l 
Hegel could hardly have stated coherence better himsel£. 
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Even coherence as the re£lection o£ the nature o£ omnitudo 
realitatis is comparable to Hegel's "Das Wahre ist das Ganze."2 
The point at which Urban thinks adequacy supersedes 
coherence is in its inclusion o£ the principle o£ funda-
mental metaphor.3 But this does not seem to add anything to 
coherence as generally advocated, £or certainly those who 
hold to the empirical coherence criterion allow for intuitive 
content. Otherwise there would be nothing to cohere. However, 
not all would grant the value connotation to intuition that 
Urban wants here. It is interesting to note, on the other 
hand, that Urban uses coherence elsewhere as a test o£ value. 
He says, "That value is highest which contributes most to 
the coherent functioning of our life or experience as a whole. n4 
6. SUMMARY 
This chapter o£ necessity has had to be lengthy because 
1. Ibid., 674-675. 
2. G. W. F. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, (Berlin: 
Duncker und Humblot, 1841), 22. 
3. Language and Reality, 394. 
4. w. M. Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 193U), 175. 
it presents all of Urban's basic epistemological foundation 
for his metaphysics, as well as several initial metaphysical 
hints. For Urban epistemology and metaphysics cannot be 
separated ultimately. 
The chapter began with a discussion of presuppositions. 
In order to have intelligibility Urban held that one must 
presuppose his own existence, the existence of others like 
himself, and a world that he and they inhabit. Further 
presuppositions about the world are necessary; it must be 
~' verum, and bom.un. Back of this there must be an 
ens realissimum. These metaphysical presuppositions, 
Urban holds, rest their persuasion not on reason but on 
logically unsupported judgments of value. Clarification 
and justification of such presuppositions is called dialectic. 
Dialectic seeks to find which presuppositions all men must 
acknowledge in order to have an intelligible world. 
"'Intelligibility" is the basic theme of the chapter; it 
is a term which Urban uses as virtually synonomous with 
"meaningful." Ultimately it is synonomous with truth, but 
this is only at the metaphysical level. Below that level 
are common sense and scientific intelligibility. The former 
of these merely demands reduction to terms of the familiar; 
the latter demands reduction to unity, simplicity, and con-
tinuity. But these are only external forms of intelligi-
bility. Intrinsic intelligibility is found only in 11 a will 
oriented toward value." 
In community life intelligibility is found in communication. 
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In order t .o have intelligible communication there must be 
community of meanings. This means the absence of logical 
contradictions and the presence of harmony of intentions 
in propositions, in other words community of value pre-
suppositions. 
Following this an examination of cognition was taken 
up. Urban gives three levels: intuition, description, 
and interpretation, but he tends to erase the distinctions 
between the levels after giving them. He finds interpreta-
tion (which is really the metaphysical presuppositions, 
dialectically derived) reaching all the way down into in-
tuition and constituting the intuition itself. This, how-
ever, does not erase the datum of experience completely, 
for he does allow a "bare awareness" prior to its expression. 
It must be expressed to be intuition, however, This greatly 
weakens the possibility of keeping a balance between em-
piricism and rationalism in Urban's developing system. 
After cognition the criterion for truth was set forth 
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to be "adequacy of expression." This is very similar to 
empirical coherence. It is to be distinguished from intelligi-
bility which in cognition only demands compatibility between 
subject and predicate terms. Adequacy finds verification 
in a whole context of propositions, that is, in the complete 
universe of discourse pertinent to a given proposition. In 
the long run, however, compatibility of subject and pre-
dicate is determined by a context outside themselves. 
Ultimately intelligibility and truth coincide in maximum 
context, which is metaphysics. 
The basic principle of intelligibility, whether in 
science, art, religion, epistemology, or metaphysics, is 
the primacy of value. Its relation to existence will be 
considered in the following chapter. 
Urban summarizes much of the burden of this chapter 
in the following passage: 
Out of this demand for adequacy arises the ultimate 
condition of all intelligibility--that •great meta-
physical truth' as Whitehead calls it, that •all 
ultimate reasons (or intelligibility) must be in 
terms of aim at value.' It is ••• only processes 
oriented towards the 'good' or value that have 
primary or intrinsic intelligibility--all the rest 
is secondary and derived •••• It is upon this 
(purposive activity) that all other intelligibility 
depends. Th~ only linkage of facts that is ulti-
mately and intrinsically intelligible is one which 
is interpretable in terms of value. No relation with-
in nature is really intelligible unless it can be 
understood as, something analogous to relations with-
in our own experience and its activity ••• Thus the 
concept of will alone renders that of force intelli-
gible in any philosophic sense; but will itself can-
not be defined by anything more primitive.l 
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1. Language and Reality, 675. There is a strong affinity 
with personalism in this passage. Cf. B. P. Bowne's doctrines 
of substance and causality in his Metaphysics, (Boston: 
Boston University Press, rev. ed; 1926). The theory of know-
ledge and truth given in this chapter is taken largely from 
Lan~uage and Reality; most of it is also given in "The Dia-
lec ic of Meaning and Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, IV (March, 1944), 377-399. 
CHAPTER II 
VALUE AND EXISTENC~ 
Science appeals to facts •••• but what it 
calls 1 facts 1 is det.erm.ined by a criterion 
(and a criterion is always a princi ple of 
evaluation) which is based upon prejudgment 
as to what shall be called fact.l 
Appeals to experience doubtless have their 
significance, but to have any significance 
at all, they must be supplemented by a new 
appeal to reason. • • • An appeal to reason 
must include an appeal to value as part of 
rationality itself.~ 
There is a fundamental value-centric predica-
ment in all knowledge which science itself 
cannot escape.3 
These quotations from Humanity and Deity summarize 
much of what has been included in the previous chapter 
and suggest the theme of this chapter, the relation of 
value and reality. 
Sc i ence frequently claims to see all that reality is. 
But the value-centric predicament shows that science is 
based on an initial value which scienc e itself cannot 
justify; so for scienc e to claim it sees all of r eal i ty 
is really to beg t h e question. Science itself is in 
nee d of an apologetic which it can get only from reason 
and from the values toward which all reason is oriented. 
1. W. M. Urban, Humanity and Deity (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1951), 46. 
2. Ibid., 43-44. 
3. Ibid., 47. 
69 
The idea that science is self-authenticating is sheer 
illusion and a dangerous one. Scientific objectivity 
can never be pure disinterestedness but only the dis-
f 1 d . 1 interest o persona es l re. 
Value then is central in the interpretation of 
reality for Urban. But aside from its place in all 
knowledge how is value itself related to reality? May 
it be said to exist? Or does it subsist? Or does it 
have some other status? 
In attacking the problem this investigation will 
move historically, f or Urban changed his mind rather 
radically on the problem at a certain early stage. 
1. URBAN'S EARLY POSITION ON VALUE 
It was in the summer of 1897, while he was in his 
second year of graduate study in Germany, that Urban became 
interested in the value problem; it wa s to become forma-
tive for his philosophy. Almost by accident he picked up 
a copy of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals and Meinong's 
Psychologische-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie 
He speaks of his reading of Nietzsche thus: 
1. This paragraph is paraphrased from Humanity and Deity, 
47-48. 
2. H. JVI . Urban, "Metaphysics and Value," Contemporary 
American Philosophy, ed. George P. Adams and w. P. Montague 
(New York: The r-1acmillan Co., 1930, Vol. II~, 3.58-3.59. 
7·0 
I shall never forget the long night in which 
I read through the Genealog~ of }'[orals. It 
was, I believe, the greates single spiritual 
adventure of my life. In the grey light of 
the morning I found myself surveying the 
wreckage of my beliefs in a curious mood--one 
in which a profound sense of loss ;..ras not un-
mixed with that unholy Schaden-freude in which 
the naturally destructive instincts of youth 
so often find satisfaction. Enough that I 
knew from that moment that, not only was the 
problem of values my problem, but also that 
it was destined to be the key problem of the 
epoch in which I was to live.l 
It was not that Urban followed Nietzsche (although 
the "unholy Schaden-freude" does show up in his early 
views on value as a reaction against traditional 
philosophy); it was more that Nietzsche became for him 
an advocatus diaboli, one who erred terribly by his 
transvaluation of values but who at the same time pene-
trated to the heart of traditional thought better than 
most of its friends. 2 
Meinong's little book approached the value problem 
from the point of view of psychology. It was only natural 
that it should hold a strong influence over the young 
Urban, who at that time was seeing all concepts from the 
"scientific point of view.t13 The scientific approach was 
inspired by several of his teachers: J. M. Baldwin who 
was promoting genetic psychology and evolutionary naturalism 
1. ~., 359 
2. Ibid. 
3. ~· 
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at Princeton, Otto Liebmann who was crying "back to Kant" 
at Jena, and Wilhelm Wundt who held scientific method 
to be the ideal for philosophy. Urban's first major work, 
Valuation: Its Nature and Laws, subtitled Being an Intro-
duction to the General Theory of Value, 1 written under this 
influence, was inscribed2 "To James Mark Baldwin as a mark 
of appreciation and respeat." 
As he continued his studies he became interested in 
Ehrenfels who only confirmed him all the more in the 
psycho-biological point of view. He says of that time 
Value appeared as "a biological phenomenon 
appearing in a psychological form," and this 
conception started me on an analysis and inter-
pretation that was essentially genetic and 
evolutionary in character.3 
This period was expressed in his book Valuation and, 
preceding it, several articles, largely psychological in 
character.4 What he had in mind was a kind of phenomen-
ology of valuing. The publication of Valuation, however, 
marked the close of this phase of his thought, for in the 
very process of developing his phenomenology he found his 
1. London: swan Sonnenschein and Co., Lim., 1909. 
2. The dedication page. 
3. Ibid., 360. 
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4. For the present study the most important of these writings 
is the book and the two following articles: "Definition and 
Analysis of the Consciousness of Value," Psychological Review, 
XVII (January and May, 1907), 1-36, 92-121; t1Wfiat Is the 
Function of a General Theory of Value?": Philosophical Review, 
XVII (January, 1908), 42-62. 
psycho-biological method crumbling under him, so much so 
that his last chapters become much more philosophical and 
tend to oppose the rest of the book.l 
This brief survey outlines the general pat t ern of 
Urban's early thought on value; it is necessary now to 
examine it more closely. 
Urban finds two main problems in general theory of 
value: (1) the descriptive or empirical or psychological 
problem; this is a matter of feeling the value of objects; 
it is a process. (2) The normative or axiological problem; 
this is the evaluation of the objects and the experiences 
of value; this is a function whose meaning and norms must 
be developed.2 Since the present investigation is interested 
in philosophy and not scientific processes it is not neces-
sary to develop here psychological description except in 
relation to definition of value. 
i. Definition of Value. Urban sees the unreflective, 
non-philosophical minds as holding that values are tertiary 
qualities, but he rejects this, because values must be felt 
to be value at all; value is a relation between an object 
and a subject's feeling and will.3 Value arises in psycho-
logical processes. By abstraction, an object may be given 
1. "Hetaphysics and Value," 360-361. 
2. "1:!hat Is the Function of a General Theory of Value?" 48; 
Valuation, 6. 
3. Valuation, 21. 
value in itself,l but on examination it 
becomes clear that the worth judgments express 
not attributes of objects apart from the subject 
even when the value is described as actual and 
objective, but rather functions of the relation 
of subject and object.2 
It is possible by abstraction to attribute value to 
an object in itself, and this is what is done in ordinary 
speech, but on close examination value is seen to arise in 
a relation between an object and a subject. When one attri-
butes value to an object he is indicating presuppositions in 
his attitudes. Objectivity of worth predicates is really 
due to antecedent psychical processes. Value qualities are 
"funded meanings; 11 that is, they represent the accumulated 
meaning of antecedent psychical processes.3 
The antecedent psychical processes Urban has in mind 
here are affective-volitional meanings. These are to be 
distinguished from cognitive meanings. Cognitive meanings 
are descriptive; they are of the nature of truth; affective-
volitional meanings have a factual or descriptive reference, 
as do cognitive meanings, but their sense as values is dis-
tinct. Their basic content is appreciative rather than des-
criptive.4 
1. Ibid., 23. 
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2. Ibid., 25. There are times in Urban's later view when one 
is l~o believe the value is attached to the object. 
3. Ibid., 23-26. 
4. Ibid. I 26f. 
The concept "affective-volitional meanings 11 Urban has 
synthesized from Ehrenfels and Meinong. Christian von 
Ehrenfels holdsl that desire is basic and feeling only dis-
positional. Urban rejects this view because one may feel 
the worth of a friend without desiring his presence.2 
Alexius Meinong makes feeling basic.3 Urban takes some-
thing from both views, but he accepts Neinong' s view as 
more basic than Ehrenfel's view because the sense of worth 
must always involve felt meaning, but it need not always 
involve desire or volition. However, there is always at 
least a conative disposition presupposed which may become 
explicit. The definition then must include at least this 
much from Ehrenfels: "An object has worth in so far as it 
is either desired or has the capacity of calling out desire, 
has, in other words, desirability. n4 Value then is not mere 
feeling as Meinong holds; it is both feeling and desire, with 
feeling holding the primacy. 
The full definition of value, which has now been com-
p leted, may be summarized thus: 
LJalue is~ funded affective-volitional meaning, 
1. System der Werttheorie (Le ipzig : 0. R. Reisland, 1897), 
Vol. I, 35; referred to by Urban in Valuation, 35. 
2. Valuation, 36. 
4. Va luation, 39. 
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in terms of psychological equivalents. The 
psychological equivalent of the worth predicate 
is always a feeling, with certain meanings de-
termined by actual cognitive presuppositions or 
types of cognitive reaction which actualise pre-
existent conative dispositions. The value or 
funded meaning of the object is its capacity of 
becoming the object or feeling and desire through 
actualization of dispositional tendencies.l 
ii. The Normative or Axiological Problem. Psycho-
logical description, when it is of a value nature, leads 
into appreciative description, which is essentially norm 
construction. Appreciative description has references 
beyond present experiences to "meanings acquired in in-
di v i du a l and social processes. These are always references 
of t he present state to something presupposed."2 Values 
are always subjective in the sense that they are based on 
some psychological process, but this always leads back to 
I 
presuppositions that have a kind of objectivity. This is 
seen in the fact that "the feelings and desires determined 
in one process may exercise a control over the feelings and 
desires determined by other processes, and that this control 
gives them a form of objectivity." This objectivity is what 
Urban calls a norm.3 
In general, the norm is an assurn1tion or postu-
late of existence, representing the p ermanent 
1. Ibid., 44. 
2. Ibid., 8-9. 
3. "What Is the Function of a General 'l'heory of Value?" .59. 
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aspects o£ desire, und erlying changeable £eelings 
and judgments. Its £unction is the control o£ 
appreciation, o£ the subject worth-judgment •••• 
Normative objectivity .•• consists ••• in the 
acknowledgement o£ a presupposition of subjective 
value, and is ultimately founded in subjective 
process •••• fValue assumptions? show themselves 
to be the product of a selective genetic di£fer-
entiation of our desires •••• in which some of 
our desires have developed into permanent and 
objective demands.l 
It may be seen from this quotation that these norms 
are constructs based on psychical processes.2 One may 
interpret Urban here as finding these to be constructs 
very much like the constructs o£ contemporary science. 
The atom, for example, is a construct built on the basis 
of observations of certain critical experiments. Atoms are 
never observed directly, but some object must be presupposed 
which can g ive rise to the observations. So the scientist 
formulates a construct in harmony with all of the pertinent 
observations. The trouble in carrying this kind of opera-
tion over into the value realm is that values always arise 
within minds; they are psychical processes instead of ex-
ternal processes. This gives them an inevitable subjecti-
vity. However, in these subjective processes are manifest 
certain persistencies which Urban refers to as "the perma-
nent aspects of desire." 'l'his persistence within an in-
dividual and also from individual to individual is a kind of 
objectivity that shows through the subjectivity. Hence, it 
1. Ibid., 60-61. 
2. Valuation, 9. 
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may b e formulated as conceptual constructs analogous to the 
constructs of physics. It has an objectivity in the same 
sense that the law of g ravity does, except that the data 
from which it is constructed i s affective-volitional i nstead 
of sen s a tional. This is not a metaphysical objectivity, 
but is an empirical construct. It is, however, objective 
in the sense that it is non-private; its objectivity is 
socially g rounded. Value universals, so constructed, are 
descriptive in one sense. They e.re descriptive of apprecia-
tion; they may be called the laws of appr e ciation. 
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The quotation also shows that these constructs, though 
descriptively grounded, perform a normative function. They 
are desires which have "developed into permanent and objective 
demands." They function to control future valuing. 
LA norm is the] product of appreciative description 
and construction of subjective feeling. • • • When 
it is ••• objectified and projected, it becomes a 
demand, the acknowledgement of which is the condi-
tion, or presupposition, of further appreciations, 
or subjective feeling s •••• Its function is the 
control of appreciation.l 
The norm then is both subjective and objective. Urban 
holds that this view is opposed to any doctrine of absolute 
values which would ignore the psychological genes i s, for 
there can be no appreciation without description. 2 A doc-
trine of absolute values is one that finds norms to be 
1. Ibid., 17-18. 
2. Ibid., 19. 
metaphysically objective; the norms are handed do1·1n to man 
like Platonic forms. But Urban, following an empirical 
rather than a rat ionalistic approach, finds them constructed 
from human experienc e s of feeling and volition. 
In objecting to absolute values Urban has in mind such 
thinkers as Plato and other early Greeks who developed 
ethics abstracted from psychological reference to the laws 
of feeling and desire; he also had in mind contemporaries, 
II 
notably Hugo Munsterberg. 
Ameri ca had not had much emphasis on general theory of 
value before the publication of Urban's Valuation, but the 
introduction of the subject to this country came with 
significant emphasis, for in the same week that Urban's 
1 II • volume was published Hugo Munsterberg publlshed his The 
Eternal Values.2 Adding to the drama was the fact that the 
two books took radically different p oints of view. II Munster-
berg's volume was built around the conviction that there are 
absolute values. Urban opposed this as unempirical. Each 
man had the privilege of doing a review for the other man. 
Urban's review was not of The Eternal Values but of a work 
" published the previous year by Munsterberg in German. In 
II his review Urban objects to Munsterberg's removal of psycho-
logy from pure values; he objects to Mllnsterberg's use of 
1. Noted in "Value rl'heory and Aesthetics," Monist, XXXVI 
(October, 1926), 605-626. 
2. Boston: Houghton r!fifflin Company, 1909. 
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absolute values instead of empirically constructed norms. 
His objection is against the unempirical rationalism in-
volved in this approach. Values always arise out of a 
relation of a subject and an object; they are never given 
without psychological processes. 1 
" Munsterberg's article is more than a review; it is a 
defense of his own view against Urban and others. 2 He says 
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Urban's Valuation is positivistic, relativistic, psychological, 
analytic, concerned with facts. Against this his own view 
urges an idealistic, absolutistic, epistemological, and teleo-
logical approach.3 He claims that he is more comprehensive 
than Urban, for he allows that the psychological method is 
all right in its place but that it goes too far when it lays 
claim to being an ultimate philosophy. He suw~arizes his 
own view thus: 
The eternal values are not existing but are valid; 
they are not valid for a world beyond experience 
but for an experience which becomes a world only 
through the organizing activity of our will •••• 
He who seeks a world 7that is, a uni-verse in-
stead of a chaos? must find in that world a reali-
zation of all tne various aspects which the funda-
mental will towards a world offers. It is the 
~. W. M. Urban, Review of 
zug e einer Weltanschauung, 
of Philosophy, Psychology, 
523-527. 
" Philosophie der Werte: Grund-
by Hugo Mttnsterberg, Journal 
and Scientific Method, V, 
2. ";The Opponents of Etern.al Values," Psychological 
Bulletin, VI (1909), 329-338. 
3. Ibid., 329. 
real labor of my book The Eterna.l Values to show 
that those various aspects wbJc we ca truth and 
harmony and beauty and progress and law and morality 
and religion and so on are indeed only different 
aspects of that one fundamental demand.l 
The interesting thing about this controversy, and the 
reason for bringing it in here, is that this strong opposi-
tion melted away as Urban began to find inadequacies in his 
own approach. His later view is much like £1-llnsterberg's. 
One can see much similarity in this quotation to the argu-
ments of Chapter I where Urban's epistemology is given . 
There Urban's argument is that certain presuppositions are 
necessary to interpret reality. These presuppositions c an-
not be arrived at on the basis of experience or reasoned 
argument; the only possible kind of argwnent is dialectic 
which is not so much reason ultimately as it is persuasion 
to mutual acknowledgement of the co-implicates of experience . 
necessary to make experience intelligible. The demands of 
intelligibility are not empirical or rational; they are 
value demands. If one is to have the value that comes from 
knowledge of reality the presuppositions must be acknow-
ledged. This presupposes that knowledge is valuable, that 
truth ought to be pursued. Hence, Urban argues that these 
values are antecedent to description and to experience; they 
must therefore be eternally valid or absolute in much the 
II 
same way Munsterberg holds. 
1. Ibid. , 335. 
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This discussion picked up from Chapter I represents 
Urban's later point or view. However, hints of this argu-
ment began to press in upon Urban even while he developed 
h is phenomenology or value in Valuation. He had developed 
his concept or axiology not only for the purpose or norm 
construction but also as a normative, a philosophical point 
or view. This demanded that he relate his constructed norms 
to metaphysics. Do they have only a conceptual status? 
How are they related to existence and truth? In attempting 
to answer these problems Urban floundered. He was not able 
to satisfy even himself. He could not satisfactorily 
harmonize his psychological viewpoint with his axiological 
v i ewpoint. 1 
In attempting to harmonize the two Urban wrote thus: 
The norms are related to reality by reference beyond them-
selves. Affective-volitional experiences "are in some way 
identical or continuous 1vi th a reality that transcends 
momentary experience. 11 2 They have a reference outside them-
selves. Somet imes this is to an object, desired or enjoyed, 
1. "Metaphysics and Value," in Contemporart American Philo-
sophy, Vol. II, 361. According to his brot er, the Reverend 
Percy Urban, LSiven to the author in private conversation? 
he was ready to abandon the idea or publishing Valuation- by 
the time he was finishing the manuscript until friends Who 
read it urged him to publish it. He never did put it through 
a second edition even though there was much demand for it. 
His attitude toward it in later life was one or strong anti-
pathy. 
2. Valuation, 401. 
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which exists in the physical sense; sometimes this is to 
an over-individual experience, tha t is, an experience of 
feeling and will which is also shared by others and has a 
social, rather than private, status. 
In the first of these Urban is talking about what 
Bertocci calls 11 value-possibilities."l The second of these 
refers to the common potentiality within men to realize 
values; a common human nature could be expected to give 
rise to common subjective experiences. This is what Ber-
tocci calls "value-potentialities.n A more careful analysis 
here would have helped Urban, but he seems not to have seen 
this distinction. 
But this is not the only relation value sustains to 
reality and truth. Urban beg ins 1n his last chapter of 
Valuation to suspect that the existential and truth judg-
ments are themselves but special forms of valuation, 
because in predicates of reality the 11 objectiven or intent 
of these predicates is always of a value character. An 
intent carries purpose, which is a value concept. This 
argues for the primacy of value. 2 This is in harmony with 
Urban's doctrine of intelligibility developed in Chapter I 
and briefly recounted above. It is also in harmony with 
the view of value he later adopted, but in Valuation he was 
1. Peter A. Bertocci, Introduction to the Philoso;hi of 
Religion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 195!), 2 7 • 
2. Valuation, 423. 
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not quite ready to go all the way with this. so he argued 
that existence and truth have axiological meaning only as 
far as they serve to bring acknowledgment of a s pecial in-
tent. This intent is to relate for the human mind its own 
impressions and ideas. But this does not exhaust the mean-
ing of existence and truth for reality as a totality; it 
only makes it understandable for the human mind.l 
But Urban was not satisfied with this explanation that 
the intent only partially exhausted the meaning of existence 
and truth. Hence, the completion of Valuation marked the 
major shift of Urban's thought life. It is necessa~J now 
to turn to a consideration of Urban's later view of value 
and the reasons that led to it. 
2. URBMi 'S LATER POSITION ON VALUE 
In later years Urban found a vicious circle in the 
psychobiological position which he (and others) had held. 
The circle is in the presuppositions of psychological value 
experiences; to understand them one must carry them back to 
life itself. He put it thus: 
We wish to understand values (and understanding 
involves validation) by carrying them back to 
life. But in this it is already assumed that 
life and its continuance have value. We have 
already acknowledged value as something known. 
The recognition that value is a logically 
primitive concept that can be neither defined 
l. Ibid., 425. 
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nor validated in terms of anything else, came 
to me to be the first condition of any intelli-
gible discourse about values at all.l 
But this circle, apparent in the nonlogical values, is 
even more significant in the realm of knowledg e and 
logical values. For philosophic a l intellig ibility neces-
sitates a doctrine of values.2 "In all meaningful d i s-
course about values acknowledgment of absolute values is 
already presupposed. 11 3 If life and k nowledge are to have 
any g enui ne significance, they must get it from absolute 
values. The values of life and knowledge are antecedent 
therefore to psychological processes which were primary 
in Valuation. 
Urban says that the philosophy of absolute values be-
came his creed, but even this did not fully satisfy him. 
He suirrrnarizes his position and its instability thus: 
The affirmation of absolute values which do not 
exist in any intellig ible sense of that word, 
but whose objectivity is p recisely their validity--
absolu te values tha t can be acknowledged, but 
whose acknowledgment is the condi tion of any 
meaningful existential or truth judgment--has, 
indeed, some thing in it both of the sophistication 
and the willfulness inseparable from our epoch. I 
had a feeling from the first that this creed, 
wh ile a necessary state in thought, could not be 
final. The self that holds these absolute values, 
t h at acknowledg es their validity, must also, so 
1. " Hetaphysics and Value," in Contemporary American Philo-
sophy, Vol. II, 363. 
2. As wa s expla ined in Chapter I. 
3. Ibid. 
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to speak, push out into life and r ea lity. The 
desert of mere validity is u_nbearable. About 
this very notfon of validity I realized certain 
difficulties. I came to see that while we must 
learn to breathe this somewhat rarefied air, we 
could not remain very long in it. Or, to change 
the figure, while we must learn to talk the 
language of validity, plain man and philosopher 
alike must in the end speak an ontological language. 
By this I mean that while the philosophy of abso-
lute values must be a necessary stage in any intelli-
g ible philosophy, it carm ot be final; it must ulti-
mately pass into a metaphysic.l 
.And thus Urban's study of value led him directly to meta-
physics, although he started out in it as a. psycho-
log ical study. 
Urban's personal statement, just given, about his own 
development is a good introduction to the change in his 
views. This passage epitomizes his movement in value theory 
over the next several years. The full meaning of this 
de velopment will be spelled out now. 
In an historical sketch of the development of theory 
of value2 Urban s ays there were two stages.3 The first 
stag e was the psycho-biological stage, which h as already 
been discussed above. Recognition of the insufficiency of 
that viewpoint, he says, g ave rise to the axiological view-
point, the second stage. As psychology served the first 
1. Ibid., 363-364. 
2. "Value rl'heory and Aesthetics, n Philoso1hy Today, ed. E. L. 
Schaub (Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1928 , 54-75. 
3. He writes this as if they were stag es of a general move -
ment, but it is apparent in the article that they are his 
personal stag es at least as much as stag es for anyone else. 
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stag e, log ic and philosophy served the second. The be-
g inning of this stage may be dated from a meeting of the 
F~erican Philosophical Association in Dec ember, 1 915, which 
had as its topic "Value and Existence.u Urban says the meet-
ing itself was not very important but that it spark ed a 
series of articles following it which were important.l 
i. Value as an Objective: The Ar gument of 1916-17. 
This series was a con troversy basic a lly between realists and 
idealists on value theory. Urban himself, as the most pro-
lific of any of the contributors, wrote three articles in 
the debate. Several of the other articles were answers to 
his. His articles in this series are: " Value and Existence,n2 
11Knowledge of Value and the Value Judgment,n3 "Ontological 
Problems of Value, 114 In The Intelligible World5 Urban refers 
to the statement of his value theory in the first of these 
articles as one of his best statements of it, definitely 
more adequate than that given in Valuation. However, the 
other two articles a re really a part of that "best 11 state-
ment and cannot be ignored. Taken together they form a 
more complete and better argued presentation than what he 
g ives on this problem in The Intelligible World and other 
later writings. These three articles form the core of this 
1. "Value Theory and Aesthetics." 
2. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Research, 
XIII (1916), 449-465. 
3. In the s ame journal (1916), 673-687. 
4. In the same journa l, XIV (1917), 309-327. 
5. 135n. 
expos i tion. 1 
Urban b egins his first article by s aying there are 
t hree usages of the term "value." Quoting him: 
The first of these is adjectival: A is valuable 
(or good); and in this the subjective reference 
to feeling or desire is upp e rmost. ll~is i s 
usually taken to be the norma l form of the value 
judgment, and from it the concept of value in 
the n arrower sense (the rela tional) is developed. 
Again it is said: A has value and this form of 
speech lead s to the concept of value a s a quality. 
But finally t h ere is also the judgment, A i s a v a lue. 
This we may call the substantive form. Following 
this clue, there are those who conceive value as an 
entity or a form of obj e ctivity.2 
These three forms of sta tement give rise to three 
different k inds of definition of value.3 
From the first form of value statement arise relational 
definition s such as the fulfillment-of-interest t h eories of 
value, for example, the theory of Ralph Barton Perry.4-
1. F'or the sake of brevity they will be referred to in the 
footnotes following as "First Article," "Second Article," 
and 11 Third Article." 
2. First Article, 450. 
3. Ibid., 452. Urban indicates that a distinction must be 
made between intrinsic a n d extrins ic v a lues and that defi-
nition of value applies only to i ntrinsic value; since ex-
trinsic value means anything that gets its v a lue by contri-
buting to intrinsic value it is not a serious problem for 
definition. 
4. Perry had already expressed his theory at this time in 
an article entitled "The Definition of Value," Journal of 
Philosophy, XI (1914), 141-162. It was l a ter given wide 
circulation in his well-k nown General Theor; of Value 
(New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1~6). It is re-
emphasized in his recent Realm of Values (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Har vard University Press, 1954). 
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Urban rejects this form of theory because he finds it to be 
circular, for one can always ask: Is the interest worthy 
of satisfaction? and,Is the object worthy of interest? 
These questions show that interest theories presuppose 
something which is already of a value nature. They have 
not gone back far enough to reach the most ultimate defi-
nition of value. These theories assume fulfillment is 
better than non-fulfillment; hence, the value "better than" 
is already assumed. Thus these definitions are really of 
extrinsic values.l Besides condemning Perry, Urban is here, 
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of course, condemning his own e arlier view. He thought it 
contained this circularity, that prior to affective-volitional 
meaning there had to be the presupposition of the worth of 
life and knowledge. 
Definitions of this first kind are psychological types; 
as such they are useful but not ultimate. 'I'here is still no 
science of value except that built on psychological analysis. 
But this approach is incomplete in its interpre t ation with-
out the axiological and philosophical analysis.2 At this 
point Urban specifically supports the psychological work he 
did in Valuation; he says that he was concerned there with 
definition and analysis of the consciousness of value. His 
later view does not reject this; it only rejects considering 
this to be the final explanation of values. 
1. Ibid., 453-455. 
2. Ibid., 455n. 
Th e second form of value propositions, A has value, 
leads to theories which hold values to be a quality, for 
example, the views of Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and 
Alexius Meinong (in his later view). Urban rejects this 
approach to definition, too. He says a thing may have its 
full quota of qualities and still not be "worthy to be," 
for example, hell. Furthermore, if value is a quality, to 
say a thing is as it ought to be is a mere tautology; to 
say that it is as it ought not to be is a contradiction.! 
A thing is not valued because of a special value quality 
but precisely bece.use of the qualities that make it what it 
is. Value can only be a predicate in the sense tha t truxh 
is. 2 
Value is ultimately neither relation nor quality. 
Assumption of either subsumes vmue under being , but it 
is really just as ultimate as being and, like being or 
existence, is indefinable, though it can be understood.3 
The third form of value judgment, A is a value, is 
substantive in form. But the value does not really exist 
as a substance. The tendency to substantize value is de-
rived from the recognition that the value predic ate is not 
adjectival but attributive; that is, it does not add a new 
l. Ibid., 4.5.5-4.59. 
2. Ibid., 4.59. 
3. Ibid., 4 60. This is to be distinguished from the view of 
G. E . Moore, Lrrf. his Principia Ethica (Cambridge: The 
University Press, 1903), 5-14/ who speaks of value as an i n -
definable quality; Urban omffs the word "quality." 
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quality to an object.l 
Urban takes his cue for his own view from this ap-
preach . Since value is neither an object nor a qualiv.Y, to 
be objective at all it can only be called an objective or a 
specific form of objectivity. To characterize this view 
he says three points are sufficient. 
(1) Value is ultimately indefinable in the terms 
or categories of matter of fact--as object or 
quality, or relation; (2) the judgment of in-
trinsic value, that an object ought to be, or 
to be so and so, on its awn account apprehends 
all ultimate and irreducible aspects of objects; 
(3) this value is itself not a quale of some 
objects, but is a form of objectivity, in con-
trast with being and existence.2 
Being and value are held here to be separate categories. 
Value cannot be defined in terms of being. " The notion 
of intrinsic value • • • can be expressed only in the 
proposition that the object ••• ought to be so and so 
on its own account ."3 This is not definition any more than 
statements about existence and truth can be definition. 
Value is an indefinable ultimate as existence is; it can only 
be acknowledged, not defined . 
Urban finds Kant denying oughtness to objects, because 
they "have no ear for an imperative.n But Urban thinks 
this is confusion. One can say of past events that they 
1. Ibid., L~hO. 
2 . Ibid., 461. 
3. Ibid . 
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ought not to have been. This is not an imp erative, but 
it is a proper form of spe aking. Hence, the imperative is 
a special case of the category "ought to be." It is not 
the only case. Kant's ob j e ction does not destroy the view.l 
The distinction between object and objective h olds 
also in existential judgments. For example, one can say, 
"The prisoner committed an offense." Here a distinction 
is made between the object (prisoner) and the judgment 
about him , but, the judgment is objective. This distinc -
tion is especially true in ne gat ive existential judgments. 
If a man says, " No disturbance of the p eace has taken place , 11 
it is obvious that the reference is not to an object. Since 
this proposition may be true it must give knowledg e of some-
t h ing. The something here is not an object but an objective.2 
Furthermore, apprehension of intrinsic value is inde-
pendent of whether the object exists Ol" not. IJ:'he relation 
"ought-to-be," which is the equivalent of intrinsic value 
cannot be understood apart from being or non-being, but it 
is necessary to know whether a given object exists to 
know that it ought to exist. It is not even necessary to 
know whether the given object can exist. One can say , for 
example, tlmt perfect happiness is good, that is, tha t it 
ought to be, ~dthout knowing whether it can be. Value judg-
ment gives knowledge of something, but it is not of the 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 462. 
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existence or non-existence of an object. It can be neither a 
relation nor a quality; hence, the only possible conclusion, 
Urban holds, is that it is a unique and independent objec-
ti ve. 1 
Just what the relation of value and existence is must 
yet be deterndned, but this much can be said by way of dis-
tinction: "The feeling of value exists, the relation between 
the . value and the emotional subject subsists, but value it-
self, if we must have a term, is merely tvalid.'"2 
The second of Urbants three articles continues to 
maintain that values are indefinable objectives and adds 
what Urban considers to be two a priori value propositions. 
The first proposition maintains the universality of 
the value category. "To every object--in the widest sense 
of the word--positive or negative value must be predicated."3 
Just as every object is existent or non-existent, 
All objects, as objects, are of interest either 
actually or potentially, and wherever there is 
interest there is value. A wert frei object--
when value is broadly enough conceived--is a 
contradiction in terms.4 
The psychological experience of value is definitely not 
eliminated here. Rather the case is this: The psychological 
1. Ibid., 463-464. 
2. Ibid., 464-465. 
3. Second Article, 675. 
4. Ibid. 
-
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processes cognize the values which occupy an objective 
status prior to experience. The universality of value 
attac~ment to objects is not given immediately in experi-
ence; only individual experiences of interests, feelings, 
and desires are so given. All objects have the value 
predicate log ically prior to experience. Interest and 
volition arise from contact with the value objec t ive already 
there. 1 
The second a priori proposition is that it is 11 in the 
nature of value as such that every value stands in a system 
of higher and lower. 11 2 Values always have references of 
more and less. The only argument for this is that values 
cannot be conceived without these references. ttought to 
be" follows from relations of objects. One thing "ought 
to be only rather than something else •••• An isolated 
value is a contradiction in terms. n3 
On the basis of the two a priori proposi tions, the 
universality of the value predicate and the necessity of 
all values standing in a scale of higher and lower re-
lationship, Urban concludes that the processes of feeling 
and will cannot first create these and that therefore 
values are not objective merely in the social sense, which 
1. Ibid., 677. 
2. Ibid. This is also maintained in later writings, for ex-
ample,-F'undamentals of Ethics (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1930), 376-379. 
3. Second Article, 679-681. 
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he maintained in Valuation, for social objectivity does not 
g et beyond feelings and wills, only beyond individual per-
sons. But, he holds, this is still compatible with the 
subjectivity of the individual experiences of feeling and 
desire. 1 At this point Urban is definitely moving away 
from his position in Valuation. 
In the third article Urban moves on to a consideration 
of the relation of value and existence. In the first 
article he referred to value as an indefinable objective 
not redu cible to being or existence. But just how the two 
are to be related he left unanswered. 
Besides the a priori of value itself Urban finds as a 
starting point for his problem of the r e lation between value 
and existence another a priori, namely, that ex istence is 
better than non-existence. 2 " Better than" is a value con-
cept that shows existence itself has value involved in its 
very arrival at the threshold of being. 
But do values exist? Rickert uses the term "valid" 
in preference to "exist" for values. Urban adopted this 
term at the end of lus first article.3 . Urban says values 
must exist in some sense or else be unreal. He is not fully 
satisfied with Rickert's term because it is not definitive 
1. Ibid., 682-683. 
2. Third Article, 316. This he says is the h e art of the 
ontological proof of God's existence (which proof he favors 
in Humanity and Deity). 
3. cr. above. 
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enough. 
It was shown above that for Urban the objects of value 
do not have to exist or even to have potential existence so 
f a r as men know; furthermore, the values themselves may not 
be said to exist, to have potential existence, nor to sub-
sist. But they are inseparable from reality (as argued 
above) and must in some sense themselves be said to be real. 
How they have their being, or what mode of being they have, 
he considers to be one of the most difficult questions in 
the entire history of thought. 
When one considers the ontolog ical predicate (that is, 
11 being") itself without reg ard to any particular mode of 
being and how it has status in thought, he sees it as being 
only a "prejudice. 111 There is a prejudice in favor of 
reality.2 But this prejudice is not a mere matter of .. liking 
or disliking; 11 it is the sine qua non of all thinking 
uberhaupt." It is an absolute necessity of thought.3 This 
obtains in the realm of thought about v a lue as well as about 
objects. Re a lity cannot be identified ex clusively with ex-
istence,4 potential existence, or subsistence though all of 
these are included in it. Further: 
1. Cf. Chapter I for the meaning of "prejudice" here. 
2. Third Article, 319. 
3. ~., 320. This is the argument for "intelligibility" 
g iven in Chap ter I . Intelligibility presupposes reality. 
4. Existence means physical being. 
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It is clear that the ontological predicate is 
meaningless until we state specifically the 
sphere in which it is applied and that this 
meaning is always determined by some value the 
acknowledgment of which is presupposed. • • • 
/We take a broad view of reality then. Reality 
Eecomes7 a predicate which plain man and philosopher 
alike attribute to objects to which they ascribe a 
special importance.! 
Since reality is here defined as an ascription of 
special importance, this view implies the logical priority 
of value. "We cannot think reality ultimately without 
raising it to the sphere of value."2 As noted above value 
does not necessarily imply the existence of its objects; 
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but existing objects do imply value; existence and being 
always imply value, for value is part of what it takes for an 
object to gain the ontological predicate, that is, be said 
to exist. At least this much must be granted: Though all 
other values may be eliminated from existence truth cannot 
be . The value of truth is the "prejudice" in favor of 
reality itself.3 
Urban finds this to be the view of the imperativism 
of Windelband and Rickert and the view of pragmatism. But 
in spite of his learning much from these views he cannot go 
all the way with them, for he finds a circle in them thus: 
One may say that only true judgments ought to be affirmed. 
But "ought" 
truth. So 
1. Ibid., 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 
here 
what 
321. 
322. 
really means acknowledgment of the value 
he really says is that true judgments are 
those that are true, a plain tautology. Urban adds, however, 
But I ~a inclined to think that the difficulty 
is not present if the conception of value as 
'objective' is maintained . 1ben the judgment 
of truth Qr reality does not spring from the 
acknovrledgment of an ought •••• Prior to the 
obligation is the acknowledgment of the value 
objective •••• Host of the value implication 
can be eliminated, but not all. The 'trans-
cendental minimum' in such judgments is itself 
a value.l 
Urban considers t h is conclusion very important, but he 
is reluctant to hold it due to its troubles. However, he 
is convinced that it must be held in some such form. 
"Reality is itself a value concept.u2 (Doubtless the 
troubles here referred to mean a reluctance to move all the 
way away from the early realism of his scientific view-
point.) 
Urban wards off critics who say that this means the 
world "must satisfy me." It is not so subjective as that. 
Rather it means that "every object has either actually or 
potentially a place in the scale of values."3 It means that 
to hold that something is real is better than to hold that 
nothing is real. There would, in fact, be no intelligi-
bility without the predicate of reality. It means that 
when one says X is real he holds it to be better than y 
which is not real and also that it is in a scale relat ion to 
1. Ibid., 324. 
2. Ibid., 325. 
3. Ibid., 326. 
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other real objects. 
During the exposition of Urban's views as given in the 
three articles published in 1916 and 1917 no injections have 
been made from his other writings supporting the exposition. 
This has been done in order to preserve the continuity of 
the argument given in the three articles. They give the 
best single presentation of the axiological argument. How-
ever, individual points in the argument may be strengthened 
from other writings given after Urban had had still more 
time to develop his arguments. Two points especially need 
further development. They are: the relationship of ex-
istence and values, and the idea that values are absolute. 
They will be taken up in this order. 
Urban's argument thus far may be summarized as follows: 
The purely psychological approach of Urban's early position 
cannot stand because values must be carried back to life, 
but this presupposes that life is already valuable prior to 
any .psychological processes of feeling and will. A similar 
presupposition is necessary in the case of knowledg e for any 
search for true knowledge already presupposes the value of 
knowledge. Hence, values must occupy some kind of trans-
cendent or absolute status. This status is not that of a 
relation nor of a special quality. It is rather that values 
are indefinable objectives, that is, logical primitives. 
There are two a priori propositions pertinent to these ob-
jectives. (1) No object, whether existing or not, is value-
free; the value predicate is universal. (2) Values always 
stand in- a scale of higher and lower. Urban canvasses 
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further the status of "objective." It does not mean exist-
ing or even subsisting, yet it does have some reality status. 
He adopts Rickert's term "valid," but with some hesitancy 
because of its ambiguity. However, when one examines the 
status of "reality" as such, he finds it to be a v a lue-
determined term itself, something to \vhich 11 plain man and 
phi losopher alike" ascribe a special importance; that is, 
the fact an object is called real indicates a significance 
or value ascribed to it which is not ascribed to the unreal. 
The status of reality as objective is logically prior to 
re a lity. Reality is a value concept. 
ii. Existence and Values: Later Additions to the 
Ar gument. Urban maintains t hat values are not merely feel-
ings and desires. They are cognitional; they are cognized 
by feeling s and desires . He argues that unless this is true 
t h ey are simply a subjective addendum to re ality, but if 
they are cognitional they are constituent elements of 
reality. 1 All that has g one before serves to support the 
contention that they a re constitutive. 
Urban finds this contention to be a basic p oint of 
dis tinction between realists and idealists. He says all 
re a lists agree to the idea tha t value is added to existence 
and all idealists agree value is not added but is part of 
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the n a ture of the perceptual, aesthetic, or historical object. 
He says the idealist claim is based on the assumption that 
1. "Value Theory and Aesthetics," Monist, XXXVI (October, 
1926), 613. 
the separation of values and existence is contradictory. 1 
When the realist wants to publish a value scale it is 
a relatively simple ma.tter, since for him values are not 
cognitive. Urban mentions specifically Perry with his con-
tention that values are the creations of interests and are 
not cognitive. Hence, all the realist has to do is to cir-
culate a questionnaire and tabulate the results to see what 
people actually do value. But this process is oversimpli-
fied; it rests on the afore-mentioned petitio principii, 
namely that this already assumes the value of life. Hence, 
this kind of an approach to value cannot claim to be ulti-
mate.2 
This contention that the subjective factor is not the 
ultimate characterization of value, must not, however, be 
interpreted in such a way as to eliminate the subjective 
factor altogether, for "the first and most important con-
dition of ideas and judgments of value lies obviously in 
human desire and feeling, wish and volition. 11 3 This is not 
an inconsistency for Urban; values are cognized through 
the subjective feelings and desires. 
But the essence of value is its worthiness to be or 
that it ought to be. This "is an object solely of acknow-
1. Ibid., 616-617. Urban is definitely allying himself with 
the Iaealists here. 
2. "Value Theory and Aesthetics," 618-619. 
3. The Intelligible World, 135-136. 
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ledgment;" that is, valuation is noetic--not as perception, 
i n tuition, or apprehension of a quale but only as the re-
cognition of a form of objectivity.l 
{ 1). Validity. In The Intelligible vJorld Urban refers 
to this objectivity in the terminology of Rickert as "vali-
dity~n and he is still some1.-rh at dissatisfied with it. But 
he does bring out better the distinction between validity 
and existence. He· contends that setting validity over 
a gainst existence does not neg ate existence. 
To distinguish validity from being , to set 
it in contrast to being, means merely to dis-
close a sphere the peculiar character of wh ich 
is not completely characterized by its deter-
mination as being .2 
This means that there is really no opposition between vali-
dity as a concept and existence. But, further, there is 
a positive argument for validity: 
Every affirmation of being or existence takes 
place from a particular point of view, involves 
the ackno~orledgment of a particular order and a 
particular kind of validity. In the frame of 
this order, however it may be develop e d and 
thought, eve ry affirma tion of existence or non-
existence takes a particular place, and this 
place is validity •••• There is no other 
test between the existent and the non-existent, 
between being and non-being , than the fact that 
we acknowledg e the validity of the distinction.3 
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1. Ibid., 145. This from The I ntellig ible World g iven in 1929 
is the s~me as that g iven above from the 1916 and 1917 articles. 
2. Ibid., 154-155. 
3. Ibid., 155. 
Urban thinks this much must be admitted, but he admits 
it is a highly sophisticated form of speaking and one that 
is not ultimately satisfying. He repeats the quotation 
g iven earlier 
The realm of validity is a hig hly rarefied 
atmosphere. It is necessary to be able to 
breathe this atmosphere, but neither plain 
man nor philosopher can remain long in it. 
In the end we must all talk ontological 
language.l 
The plain man, for example, finds it difficult to be in-
spired by such words as truth and beauty, but the ontologi-
cal word 11 God 11 can easily call out motivation in him. 
Urban says philosophers do not like high abstraction 
much better. So he tries to restate the standpoint of 
validity in ontolog ical terms. Value has meaning only in 
connection with things (that is, existents); validity has 
meaning only in connection with persons. Meaning itself 
has "meaning " only in connection vli th persons. But persons 
never experience things ~dthout some value reference. The 
question, What is the real? is a futile question if being 
is separated from value. 
In other words, the reality or unreality of 
objects will have to b~ called subjective, 
and, conversely, the value of objects must be 
a dmitted to be objective, in any sense that 
their reality is said to be objective, if, 
indeed, their being and their v a lue are not 
in some sense the same thing. It may still 
be asserted that values are subjective and 
1. Ibid., 155-156. 
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conting ent, in the sense that they are valid 
only as the conditions of the world which the 
h uman mind kno~rs, wh ich is the obj e ct of its 
acknowledgment and communication. But, since 
nothing can be categorically affirmed or de-
nied of any other world, the assertion is not 
so much true or false as meaning less. It is 
only within the world of human discourse and 
comraunication that any of these conceptions 
and distinctions have any meaning. Communi-
cation is the ul t i mate presupposition of any 
phi losophy jrrf. Ch apter !7, and is above the 
distinction of idealism and realism LCf. 
Chap ter IIIJ. In such a world--the only in-
tellig ible- world--the inseparability of value 
and reality is axiomatic.l 
The essence of this extended quotation is this: All 
reality as k nown by h umans must be filtered through the 
forms of the human mind for a human mind to know them; the 
human mind can not receive anything in a content form with-
out also receiving it in a value form; therefore value and 
being must always be connected in knowledge, for men can 
have no other kind of k nowledge. It is useless to talk 
of existence without value therefore. Thi s can be done 
only by abstraction; existence does not exist without value 
in the reality that men know. Hence, it is axiomatic that 
value and reality are inseparable. 
(2). The Ultimate Fusion of Value and Being . Just how 
value and being are related is not given in the axiom of in-
separability.2 Hence a dualistic opposition between the 
1. Ibid., 158. 
2. In "Value, Logic, and Reality," Proceeding s of the Sixth 
International Con ress of Philoso h (1927), 293-294, Urban 
o s e re a on o e two is t e most difficult problem 
in the his tory of thought. 
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two tends to persist. Urban finds this to be the most per-
sistent of all dualisms. "The fact that value and validity 
are no strangers to being, and yet opposed, is the final 
antinomy of thought which, in the napure of the case, must 
remain unresolved. 11 1 He finds Windelband saying this is a 
"sacred mystery" which will never be solved. 
For thought and knowledge value and being are rels.ted 
but not identical; they must never be identical, for if they 
were there would be no willing and no event. The will must 
find an object that ought to be but is not in order for it 
to act. He contends that this is the innermost meaning of 
time .2 
But while thought and knowledge cannot fuse being and 
value Urban is convinced that the two can be fused in the 
same experience. This can be done only by fitrenching on 
the mystical."3 The mystical experience ties the two to-
gether, and in this experience value is seen to be "of the 
very substance and essence of the thing.n4 
The idea of "trenching on the mystical" appears in 
many of Urban's later writings. It is most fully developed 
in Humanity and Deity. Some of that discussion is pertinent 
here. He contends that one of the chief functions of thought 
1. The Intelligible World, 158-159. 
2. This will have to be argued in Chapter IV. 
3. Ibid., 159. 
4. Ibid. 
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is to knovl its own limitat i ons; when it arrives a t these 
limitations it a l ways beg ins to trench on the mystical, but 
the mystical experience is certainly a poss i ble source of 
knowledg e. Log ic cannot destroy it, for logic is not a 
source of truth; it is only a syst em to yield correctness 
in the manipulation of concepts. Thought must "conceive" 
from some source other than log ic. The mystical exp erience 
is one such source.l It is a s legitimate as any other 
source. 
A brief digression to look at the problem from 
another prospective would be profitable. This approach is 
from the p oints of vie-v1 of science and relig ion. These 
are two fields of endea vor which are not philosophical in 
their basic approach but which become very much concerned 
with the proper relationship between existence and value; 
this is especially true in attempts to harmonize the two 
fields with each other. Science (particularly natural 
science) is concerned with existenc e . 2 If it g oes beyond 
t h is realm it tends to overreach its own boundaries. Con-
temporary scientific theory interprets science as a system 
of symbolic constructs.3 But these constructs have meani n g 
1. Huraanity and Deity, 449-451. 
2. He says in Humanity and Deitf, 336, physics is the basal 
science, for it is the science o the existent. "Space-time 
is the matrix of existence." 
3. Urban himself has argued this in Languag e and Re a lity and 
in HQmanity and Deity. 
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and v a lidity only with reference to the purp oses f or which 
they are constructed. I mplied in the recognition of this 
fact is the acknowledgment of other ends and values. The 
scientific concep t of nature does not include these values 
and when understood presupposes them. They belong to a 
rea lm which deserves the name Super-nature. This realm is 
the concern of religion.l 
An understanding of reality demands both relig ion and 
science; the two are and must be complementary. 
In order to 'explain' in the sense of science, 
physical c a tegories must be basal and irrever-
sible. But it is equally true that in order to 
'understand' in the sense of religion, spiritual 
categories must be ultimate and irreducible. 
Can we not say that science and relig ion are 
complementary i n that, while science requires 
religion for its ult i mate understanding and 
justification, religion requires science for 
a valid application mf its ideals a nd princi-
ples to life?2 
Science and relig ion as two different forms of truth 
(one representing existence and the other value) do not 
imply that truth is dual. Rather there is diversity of 
expression and at the same time unity of truth. Science 
is not autonomous; it must have religion to complete it.3 
But the two forms demand some principle of primacy if they 
are to be unified instea d of remaining dual. Urban finds 
1. Humanity and Deity, 380. 
2. Ibid., 381. 
3. Ibid., 386. 
107 
traditional European thinkers holding value to be the 
principle of primacy. He names in support of this 
Aristotle, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, and Kant.l 
In the Great Tradition there is no substitution of value 
for existence nor of existence for value, but the Good is 
and must be primary. 
For being, abstracted from the Good, is the 
most empty and meaningless of all concepts. It 
is only when, so to spe ak , existence is clothed 
upon by value that it becomes significant at all. 
It is this, and this alone, that the principle of 
the p rimacy of the axiological affirms.2 
But this reconciliation of the two realms under the 
primacy of value goes beyond reason; it involves "trench-
ing on the mystical." There is a natural mysticism, pre-
sent in some degree in every human soul; it is distinct 
from theolog ical mysticism but closely related; it "manifests 
itself at the limits of all the natura l activities of human 
life, the moral, the artistic and scientific, as well as 
the religious. 11 In science this is apparent in the acknow-
ledgment of something beyond space and time.3 
This "trenching on the mystical 11 as it relates science 
and religion completes the dig ression and leads back to the 
main exposition which had arrived at the point of saying that 
mysticism g oes beyond thought to unite value and being. 
1. Ibid., 387. 
2. Ibid., 389. 
3. Ibid., 391-392. 
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Urban feels it is proper for thought to give way to 
mysticism, especially in the case of the antinomy of value 
and being which thought cannot solve; mysticism comes to 
the rescue here. 
It is the fusion of the Good or Value with 
Being which, while it is never possible by 
wholly intellectual means, is, nevertheless, 
the essential element in all that the mystics 
say. The identity of the sovereign Good with 
absolute Being is the postulate of dogmatic 
theology; the logical necessity of this 
identification is the burden of rational 
theology, and the actuality of this identity 
is the essence of the beatific vision.l 
Urban credits Plato (especially in the Republic and the 
Timaeus) and Plotinus with the original presentation of 
this kind of a view. 
Urban would add to this amount of truth taken from 
the mystical another basic proposition from the same 
source, namely that the reality given in thought is 
the reality that actually exists; man's mind is able to 
grasp a true picture of ultimate reality. This is connected 
with value, too, since the reality of thought is inseparable 
from value. He says, 
The identity of the One and the Good, of value 
and being, remains, as we have said, the 'sacred 
mystery' beyond which thought, as pure thought, 
cannot go. It can be shown that •value is no 
stranger to being.r It can be shown that to 
make the God-idea, however necessary and valid, 
only an idea, is not only to make the life of 
religion an illusion, but the life of reason 
1. Ibid., 431. 
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also. All this thought can indeed shm..r, but 
that is the limit of its showing. The fusion 
of the t~ro (that is, thought and realitx7, the 
blending of which Plato speaks, can be realized 
only in experiences that trench on the mystical 
and can be told only in language which bears the 
indelible mark of such experience.l 
He further contends that philosophy has always trenched 
on the WJStical and that its best exponents have always 
shown this • 2 
{3). The Philosophy of Value and Metaphysic~. The 
mystical experience gives direct insight into the union of 
value and being. This is Urban's final validation of the 
axiom of the inseparability of value and being. This leads 
directly to metaphysics. He concludes therefore that 
The philosopht of value is not a way to avoid 
metaphysics,ut necessarily passes over into 
metaphysics, when the nature of metaphysics 
is properly understood.3 
Some object that metapnysics is the movement of thought 
to an object beyond all experience, that is, toward pure 
being abstracted from all value, but they do not realize 
that this is an impossibility for the human mind. "The 
natural metaphysic of the human mind has always been 
1. Ibid., 452. The mystical and its complete meaning for 
metaphysics wi 11 be developed further in Chapter :--v. 
2. Ibid. 
3. The Intelligible World, 159-160. Urban considers this con-
clusion very important, for the italics are his; also he 
says this is the main contention of his entire Chapter IV, 
entitled "Metaphysics and Value Theory." 
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oriented tm-1ards value. Metaphy sics is simply the system-
atic interpretation of experience with all its implica tions. " l 
The i mplications do go beyond experience in some sense but 
not beyond the kinds of conceptions that the hLuna n mind is 
oriented tow ard. Rather they are "precisely those absolute 
values and validities wh ich must be acknowled g ed if intelli-
g ible communication of our experience is to be possible. 11 2 
Metaphysics, in other words, i s founded he avily u p on values. 
There are t h ose who object that this v i ew would t a ke 
away the scientific, the theoretical, character of philoso-
p hy and reduce it to subjective opinion or moonshine. Urban 
is convinced that most objections to his view are reducible 
to t h is one, and that all who hold to this k ind of an ob-
jection d o so bec ause they are still caught in the meshes of 
"the old idea of value as an addendum, and ultimately as 
merely psychical in character."3 In this kind of view 
v a lue is subjective, but Urban feels he has shown the in-
adequ acy of this kind of view, having once held it himself 
and then having moved on fro m it. Rather than eliminating 
the scientific and theoretical character of valid thought 
t h e value attitude establishes it. "It is the very 'value 
character of t he theoretical' itself that makes philosophy 
ultimately value theory ••• An intelligible world is 
1. Ibid., 163. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 164. 
always a world of values. ul 
iii. Values as Absolute. Urban hints in a number of 
p laces that values must ultimately be absolute, but he never 
really presents a clear. picture of what h is concept of abso-
lute value means or how it is to be philosophically supported. 
However, the direction his thinking must logically take on 
absolute values is apparent in the final solution of the 
relation between being and value just given. 
In an article published in 19322 Urban suggests his 
answer. He says the problem of the status of values is not 
whether they are objective, for most people except posi-
tivists agree that they are; the problem is rather in what 
manner they exist, or, to put it otherwise, Ho\v are they 
there? He adds, and this is the important point, tha t 
some conception of God1 s mind, or an Absolute seems necessary. 
In one of his last articles he s ays essentially the same 
thing.3 After stating again that Rickert's view of value as 
validity, though near the proper view of value, has never 
been stated in such a way as to be convincing and without 
basic difficulties, he moves on to say with apparent ap-
proval that some find themselves forced back to the old 
1. Ibid., 167. This is the contention of Urban presented in 
Chap~I of the present exposition. 
2. "The Philosophy of Spirit: Idealism and the Philosophy of 
Value," Contemporary Idealism in .America, ed. Clifford Barrett 
(New York: The 1·1acmillan Co., 1932), 122. 
3. "Axiology," Twentieth Century Philosothy, (ed.) Dagobert 
D. Runes (New York: The Philosophical Li rary, 1947), 65-69. 
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f a s hioned notion of values subsisting in the mind of God. 
In Fundamentals of Ethicsl Urban , in talking about 
the conventions of society as norms, says 
/The basic conventions of societx7 are conventions . 
because they are agreements, but they are also norms 
bec ause they are acknowledg ed. There may be an ex-
istence of such norms--li·ke the famous ideas of 
Plato--apart from the consciousness of man. Per-
sona lly I believe this to be true ••• Moral laws 
are somehow laws of nature--part of the nature of 
thi n g s, as it were. 
In Languag e and Reality, while defending the validity 
of value propositions a g ainst the emotive theory of value 
of the positivists, Urban says t h at value propositions do 
have objective reference. 
They do refer to something, and that not to 
observable entities of either a physic a l or 
psychologica l character, but to essenc e s or 
universals.a 
He adds tha t a doctrine of values as essences is full of 
difficulties, but he drops the subject there. He never 
rea lly picks it up anywhere from this point of view a g ain. 
Although Urban does not g ive any full p resentation of 
a doctrine of values as absolute such a doctrine is clearly 
implied in the fore going pass ages. Hm-fever, before p re-
senting this doctrine explicit~~ it is necessary to g ive 
further consideration to one more problem, the prob lem of 
1. 391-392. 
2. Langua g e and Reality, 166. 
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the relationship of values as experienced psychologically 
and values as such. This is the old problem that Urban 
faced with so much frustration in Valuation, the problem 
that caused him to change his general approach to the 
value problem. 
In a development of a definition of value in Funda-
mentals of EtP~csl Urban gives as his final for.m of defini-
tion the following: W;That alone is ultimately and in-
trinsically valuable that leads to the development of selves 
or to self-realization." Obviously the implication here 
is that values cannot be divorced from valuers, that is, 
selves which can have value experiences; these could only 
be in a psychological form. In the context of one of the 
passages quoted above from the same work he says the norms, 
like the Ideas of Plato, may exist apart from human con-
sciousness. "Personally I believe this to be true. But the 
fact remains that they are first discovered in the life and 
intercourse of men."2 He adds further that they have ex-
istence only as they are acknowledged by mankind.3 
In Language and Reality he speaks about the relation 
of the psychology of valuation and values as such. This is 
1. Fundamentals of Ethics, 17-18. 
2. Ibid., 391. 
3. This last statement seems to be too strong to be a part 
of his later view; it is suggestive of the view expressed 
in Valuation. However, interpreted in the context and in 
the light of the other passages about the existence of values 
in the . mind of God this would seem to be only an attempt to 
make sure the psychology of value is properly considered. 
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the same context mentioned above in which Urban is defending 
his view from the value nominalism of the positivists, that 
is, the emotive theory of value. He calls his view at this 
point "value realism. 11 He says: 
Phenomenological analysis /his own analysis here7 
can and must distinguish between the value appre-
hended and the feeling towards that value, yet 
the only way in which a value can be apprehended 
is through emotion and emotional intuition of the 
value. were it possible by a violent abstraction 
to conceive of beings of a purely intellectual 
cast, minds in which the processes of nature and 
the actions of men were mirrored without any 
emotion, the qualities which we have called value 
qualities, even if they were present, would be 
wholly absent in so far as these beings were con-
cerned. They would lack the conditions necessary 
to such apprehension, just as the absence of cer-
tain sense organs, with their sense intuition, 
would make impossible the a~prehension of other 
aspects of reality •••• /But7 the fact that the 
value qualities cannot be experienced other than 
emotionally does not mean that they themselves 
are these emotions.l 
He further argues that there is an independent variability 
between value qualities and feelings; for example, two 
people may look at a proud action with different emotional 
response; the one may like it, the other not; but both 
still refer to it as proud. 
These passages sh o\·l that in Urban's later view the 
psychology of valuation still has its place, but it is no 
longer central. Values are intuited through feeli.ng 
and desire, but the values themselves . are objectively 
real--hence, Urban's terminology "value realism." · The values 
1. Language and Reality, 164-165. 
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are "there," and the emotions intuit them in much the same 
fashion as the eye intuits light which is already uthere."l 
There is an intuitive content in value experience, but this 
points to something beyond itself, something objective. 
Although values are intuited through emotions, Urban denies 
that this is an emotive theory of value; the emotive meaning 
is distinct from the intuited meaning. The emotions are not 
the value qualities. The two are independently variable 
as noted above; a proud action may be recognized as such 
independently of liking or disliking it.2 
Urban is careful to distinguish his view from a moral-
consciousness or intuitionist view. He specifically rejects 
such a view as untenable by modern psychology.3 Urban wants 
to maintain here only that values per se are intuited by 
emotions. Judgment as to their goodness or badness, judgment 
as to their location in a value scale, is not intuited. The 
judgment is a product of mutual acknowledgement of mankind.4 
This is the only authentication of values. 
Urban says that if his analysis of value as emotionally 
apprehended is correct thenvalue words must refer to some-
thing. This cannot be to entities of either a physical or a 
psychological character but to essences or universals. He 
admits difficulties here but thinks he is working in the right 
1. ~., 216. 
2. Ibid., 164-165. 
3. Fundamentals of Ethics, 364-371, 376-379. 
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4. Ibid., 391. Cf. also discussion of presupposition in Chapter 
I where mutual acknowledgement is the only justification given. 
direction. He says: 
The entire doctrine of values as essences, like 
the conception of an emotional intuition of 
these essences, is full of difficulties. Here 
• • • a general theory of value would have to 
raise the question of the nature of these essences 
and their relation to other types of universals. 
Here our point is merely that analysis does dis-
close this reference of value words and indicates 
the direction in which a theory of the nature of 
these referenda must proceed.l 
Unfortunately Urban drops the subject here without giving 
answers to the questions he raises. Neither does he suggest 
how it is possible to know a universal through an emotion. 
Are universals intuited directly as in Plato or are only 
particulars directly intuited? There is much confusion in 
his whole point of view here. One can ask still further 
questions. Concerning "mutual acknowledge:qLent," mentioned 
above as authenticating or confirming values: is "mutual 
acknowledgement" based on empirical constructs from emotions 
or is it a direct apprehension of value objectives (essences)? 
How is it related to emotional intuition of values? Urban 
leaves the relation among emotional intuition, value objec-
tives (essences), and mutual acknowledgement unclear. Fur-
thermore he first arrives at values as objectives by pre-
supposition. How presupposition is related to value cogni-
tion is not clear. Because Urban does not clarify the re-
lations of these various factors, the reader is left 
bewildered; he is led to suspect that Urban cannot relate 
them adequately. There is a conflict between the empirical 
1. Language and Reality, 166. 
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(emotional intuition) and the rational (mutual acknowledge-
ment based on presuppositions) in Urban's thought here. 
Or one may also suspect "mutual acknowledgement" of being a 
moral consciousness approach even though Urban specifically 
rejects this view. 
The passages given above which speak of values as like 
Plato's ideas, as norms in the mind of God, as universals, 
considered in the light of the doctrine of emotional intui-
tion would suggest the following general interpretation of 
Urban: 
There are individual value experiences which operate 
at the level of value intuition; each might be called in-
dividually a 11 value datum;" but these refer beyond them-
selves to objective essences or universals which have their 
being as universals in the mind of God. The essences are 
absolutes, and they are normative. They are the final mean-
ing of what Urban has all along found so difficult to ex-
press; they are what he is trying to speclfy when he talks 
over and over again about values as indefinably objective, 
about values as ought-to-be, about values as worthy-to-be, 
about the unsatisfactory and unconvincing word "validity." 
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The vague, difficult terms lead to a concept that is not so 
hard to state after all, when it is stated metaphysically. 
This, of course, Urban recognizes for he stated in his dis-
cussion of validity, as a term that is not fully satisfactory, 
that one must push beyond it to metaphysics. 
The difficulty, of course, he would say, lies in the 
fact that thought cannot arrive at the conclusion of a mind 
of God in which values inhere; it is only the mystical 
vision that can yield this. Urban is clearly under the in-
fluence here of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant 
the pure theoretical reason cannot yield any proof of God; 
it can have only the God-idea as a necessary regulative idea. 
But one need not stop here, for the practical reason can 
and must postulate the actual existence of God. Whether the 
practical reason, with its license to postulate whatever is 
necessary to its operation, is "yrenching on the mystical" 
is largely a matter of definition or convention. Many have 
not thought of it as such. There is good precedent in the 
history of thought for referring to it as the speculative 
function of philosophy or of reason. This, however, is not 
to deny the mystical element in the experiencing of God and 
of Him as the foundation of value, the Giver of "every good 
gift and every perfect gi.ft."l 
3. EVALUATION 
Urban's first major work, Valuation, soon became a 
well-known book. In fact it is more popular than some of 
his later works; this is due, of course, to the .fact that 
the psycho-biological point of view has had a large follow-
ing in general in the twentieth century by positivists and 
naturalists. Others, too, have found Valuation to be a work 
of significance, for example, F. R. Tennant, who says he is 
1. James 1:17. 
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taking up a position similar to Urbants based on psychology 
and experience.! As a work on the psychology of valuation 
the book is doubtless a significant contribution; however, 
Urban saw correctly that this is not enough for a philoso-
phical account of value. 
In Valuation itself Urban began to suspect inadequacies 
in his method; so even there he proposed the axiological 
point of view, which reached its ru11 development later. In 
its full form it holds that values are objective. To dis-
cover and state clearly how they are objective is a problem 
that gave Urban much difficulty. 
Urban's attack on this problem may be summarized as 
follows: Life is assumed to have value when we seek to 
ground our values. The values of life here acknowledge value 
as something already known. It is logically primitive, not 
to be defined in terms of anything else. In logical values 
this is true also; any intelligible discourse presupposes its 
own significance or value. The values of life and knowledge 
are antecedent to psychological processes. Hence their value 
must be absolute, that is, prior to psychological processes. 
!Absolute values have an objective status of validity. They 
do not "exist." The predicate "existence" itself, as applied 
to any given object, depends upon a "special significance" 
assigned to that object by a person; that is, it is value 
conditioned by what an intelligent being chooses to call 
1. Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: The University Press, 
1928), Vol. I, 138-160. 
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truth. But this does not exhaust the meaning of existence. 
Being in some form is primitive, too, ·for values themselves 
must have some kind of reality status. Psychological pro-
cesses are not to be eliminated from value; rather they are 
to be subordinated. In Valuation they were primary, but in 
Urban's later view they are secondary; there absolute values 
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are apprehended in value judgments which are mutually acknow-
ledged. There are two a priori propositions to be made about 
value. First, no object is ever value-free; all objects have 
the value predicate prior to experience; no object can hold any 
kind of status, whether existence or subsistence, without the 
value predicate being appropriate to · it. It always has a status 
of "ought-to-be" or 11 ought-not-to-be. 11 Value and being are in-
separable. Urban cannot tell how or why, but intelligibility 
demands this. It is a priori. The second a priori proposi-
tion is this: It is of the nature of value to stand in an 
order scale of higher and lower, because value cannot be con-
ceived without this scale reference. Value and being must 
be inseparable; intelligibility demands it. So metaphysics 
postulates it. Metaphysics is the totality of experience 
together with its co-implicates, that is, those implications 
that are necessary to make experience intelligible. The in-
separability of being and value is such a co-implicate. How 
they can be related can never be given by reason, but that 
they are actually bound together in one Absolute Being is the 
deliverance of the mystical vision. When one moves from 
axiology into metaphysics, as he is forced to do for the 
relation of value and being, the difficult problem of giving 
the status of absolute values is resolved, for one can move 
from the "rarefied air" of mere objective validity to see 
that values have metaphysical being in the mind of God. 
In order to evaluate Urban's view better it may be 
compared to another, more adequate analysis of the problems 
of value. The analysis must start from experience, for 
this furnishes the basic data for value. 
Brightman defines value thus: 
Value means whatever is actually liked, prized, 
esteemed, desired, approved, or enjoyed by any-
one at any time. It is the actual experience 
of enjoying a desired object or activity.l 
This is subjective, for value is here defined in terms of 
the experience of a person. ·The actual experience of liki~, 
desiring, and so forth, is based upon human psychology; it 
has its foundations in the drives and appreciative nature 
of persons. If an object cannot appeal in a particular way 
to a person, then it can have no value in that particular 
mode. Urban actually allows for this in his ethics text 
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but does not develop its philosophical implications completely. 
What he shows is that a proper table of values must be con-
nected with what he calls the "instincts. 11 "Instincts" here 
mean drives. He has actually worked out a table correlating 
broadly the instincts and the corresponding values.2 Be-
sides the basic drives of persons values may also arise out 
1. E. s. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion (New York: 
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1940), 88. 
2. Fundamentals of Ethics, lo6-169. 
of developed attitudes, habits, and motivations. Such moti-
vations are likely to be combinations of basic drives devel-
oped to a level where they are somewhat autonomous.l 
However, the fact that value is basically an experience 
does not cut it off from external objects any more than 
sensation, a subjective experience, is cut off from objects. 
Something "out there" gives rise to the experience expressed 
by ouch. More properly speaking the experience is a product 
of both the object and the subject. The quality red is not 
in the red pencil; rather there is a condition in the pencil 
such that when light of the general wave length of 6600-7400 
angstroms is reflected from it into an eye (backed by a 
brain and a mind) the experience red arises in the person 
whose eye has "seen" the pencil. Value experience is ana-
logous. Conditions capable of giving rise to value ex-
periences in persons exist in external reality. These condi-
tions Dr. Bertocci calls 11value-possibilities. 11 2 The desired 
experiences of value he calls "value-claims," following Dr. 
Brightman. He says, in harmony with the explanation just 
given, that it is really the experience, not an object which 
is desired. He shows the implications of this view thus: 
It is clear, then, that things and people 
value-possibilities for me and 
that these value- ossibilities 
do no 
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1. Cf. Gordon w. Allport, Personalitt: A Ps,chological Inter-
pretation (New York: Henry Holt and ~o., 193 ), chapter VII. 
2. peter A. Bertocci, Introduction to the Philosophy of Reli-
gion (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), 256ft. 
also clear that if these value-possibilities 
in me, in the physical world, and in other 
persons did not exist, there would be no 
satisfying value-claims. We do not make up 
the basic value-possibilities in the world. 
This, it seems to us, is the essential truth 
in the claim of the objectivists, namely, that 
the values which men experience do not depend 
upon their wants alone; it appears that unless 
there was support for their value-claims in 
the value-possibilities in things, there 
could be no continuing value-satisfaction 
and correction.l 
This might be called axiologic dualism analogous to 
epistemic dualism. In the epistemic situation knowledge 
arises out of a relationship between subject and object. 
A subject experiences data that he did not will; he infers 
therefore that it was caused by something external to him-
self. This something he calls an object. Metaphysical 
objects (in the sense of things as they are without refer-
ences to human knowers) are knowledge-possibilities. The 
mind receives the data, through modes of perception charac-
teristic of itself, and further interprets the data through 
modes of conception characteristic of itself. What these 
particular modes of perception and conception are, whether 
Kantian forms of the intuition and categories of the under-
standing or not, is beyond the ken of ·this essay. Suffice 
it to say here that the mind receives the data caused by 
the object through its own forms, which are in addition to 
the stimulus from the object. Out of a combination of the 
l. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 256-258. A 
similar view Is expressed by Iredell Jenkins in an excellent 
article entitled "Present State of the Problem of Value," 
Review of Metaphysics, IV (1950), 85-110. 
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contributions of the object and of the subject an experi-
ence arises in the subject which might be called a knowledge-
claim. 
On analogy from this we may speak of axiologic dualism. 
Here the object (independent of the valuer's mind) is a 
value-possibility. The subject has within himself what 
Bertocci calls "value-potentialities." The stinrulus from 
the object has imposed upon it contributions of the mind. 
The interaction of the value-possibilities and the value-
potentialities gives rise to a value experience called a 
value-claim. 
In the case of knowledge the lowest level of contribu-
tions is perceptual in character; this is the level of immedi-
ate experience and might be called perceptual intuition. In 
the case of value, on the beginning level the mind contributes 
feeling and/or desire potentialities; when these are stimu-
lated by objects, that is, value-possibilities, actual value 
experience of feeling and/or desire takes place; this level 
of immediate value experience may be called value intuition. 
But both knowledge and value move on to a higher level. 
In the case of knowledge this is called conception. The mind 
interprets the data of perception in the light of its own 
categories and previously held knowledge. This is a synoptic 
and creative process of the mind. The end of this conceptual 
process is usually identification with previous conceptions 
and consequent naming. This is what happens, for example, 
when a person looks at a certain object and says ''chair.'' 
In the case of value the mind moves on from mere feeling 
and/or desire to conceptualize the experience and to identify 
it with previous value concepts; thus it may be named "love~" 
This is a synoptic and creative process of the mind. Con-
cepts in knowledge would be called truth-claims; concepts in 
value would be called value-claims. Both of these would be 
subjecy to the test of coherence. If passed in epistemology 
the result would be ''truth;" if passed in axiology the result 
would be "true-value.nl 
At this point it must be noted that Urban is correct in 
maintaining the inseparability of being and value, but for 
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the wrong reason. For him it is an a priori necessity of 
intelligible thought. But here it may be shown to be empiri-
cal. For experience shows that any object is capable of 
serving as a knowledge-possibility or a value possibility, and 
it is a matter of experience that there is always both. How-
ever, the mind is free to choose whether it will emphasize 
or de-emphasize either one or both. This fact in itself 
vhows purpose (a value term) at work in all experience. 
Further, it is a matter of experience that values always 
operate at the conceptual level, for purpose or some possible 
purpose is always a part of the meaning of a concept. 
"Chair," for example, has as a central part of its meaning 
"for the purpose of sitting." Even "stone" as a natural 
object, unaltered for specific human purposes, still has an 
overlay of value meaning attached to it of "good for building" 
1. Cf. E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, 93. 
or for something else. If no special value has been assigned 
to it yet, the mind still notes its qualities and interprets 
them, its hardness, for example, in terms of these qualities 
in other value settings. In any case the stone furnished, 
at the very least knowledge, or truth-value. 
But the conceptual level in both epistemology and axi-
ology is only the beginning level of universalization. Wider 
levels must be constructed in order to give full understand-
ing of the contextual relations of objects. In the case of 
knowledge these are called natural laws; they are descrip-
tive universals; they state the 11 is. 11 In axiology similar 
universals are called norms; they state what ought to be. 
In Valuation Urban maintained that norras were empirical 
constructs; in his later view he considered them to be valid 
objectives, absolute demands imposed on men by God. They 
are real, not as existing or subsisting, but as "objective." 
In value experience the psychological processes of feeling 
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and desire intuit them. In this later position Urban still 
retained a place for experience but he had abandoned it as 
central, for the emotional apprehension of values does not show 
their validity. This is apprehended by presuppositions 
mutually acknowledged. It is unclear whether to think of this 
approach as basically a rationalistic or a moral consciousness 
approach. He would think of it as more the former since he 
specifically rejects the latter. It is evident from the 
discussion in Chapter I on intelligibility, and now in 
this chapter on the rela.tion of value and existence, that 
value theory is for Urban the single most determinative 
factor in his whole int erpretation of re a lity. Therefore 
it may nov.r be said that Urban• s presuppositional method 
emphasized at the expense of experience, rather than getting 
a full grounding in experience, is a fundamental diffi-
culty in Urban's entire system of metaphysical inter-
pretation of reality. This will become more apparent in 
other connections later in the presentation of this investi-
g ation. Here it is only necessary to see that Urban's value 
empiricism is cut short in that value universals are not con-
structed from experience. Values are experienced through 
emotions, but his interpretation of value is not really 
based on this experience. The interpretation and full devel-
opment of value theory is based upon the rationalistic pre-
suppositional method. 
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It is necessary to say more about norms. They, like 
natural laws, are human constructs. This, however, does not 
leave them on a purely subjective basis. They are a joint 
product of "discovery and invention" to use a terminology 
suggested by the writer's colleague, Dr. Daryl Williams. 
The discovered pa~t is the data of experience. Proper inter-
pretation of this takes due note of both the value-potenti-
alities in human nature and the value-possibilities from 
objects, it also takes note of the way these are related in 
experience. Coherent interpretation of these is able to 
ferret out the harmonious from the disharmonious kinds of 
value experience; it is able to find which experiences contri-
bute most to the full development and enjoyment of personality. 
These are then constructed into coherent universals. These 
have an element of' "invention" as is the case with all con-
structs. In Valuation Urban urged this kind of' construction; 
he referred to these constructs as representing "the permanent 
aspects of' desire.n The present analysis would move a step 
beyond Valuation and say these constructs represent the 
permanent aspects of' coherent interpretation of' value-poten-
tialities in creative interaction with value-possibilities.l 
''Value-potentialities" here is roughly equivalent to Urban's 
"permanent aspects of' desire." 
On this analysis value as experienced is basic, but 
Urban makes the rationally conceived value essences basic. 
His universals are based on presuppositions rather than ex-
perience. Presupposition, not experience, is the basis i'or 
value judgments. 
Since empirical constructs represent the most coherent 
and most permanent aspects of' the value situation, that is, 
since they are the best way to produce the greatest values, 
greatest both in kind and in volume, they serve as standards 
or norms i'or evaluating further value experience. Any value-
claim which is i'ound to be coherent with them has passed its 
test and may be called a true-value. Any which is not co-
herent is a i'alse-value; or value error. For Urban value 
error is to be judged by "mutual acknowledgment," but he 
leaves no way to persuade anyone who does not acknowledge the 
smae values as the group.2 
1. Ci'. Bertocci, ibid., 2621'1'. 
2. "Value Propositions and Verifiability," Journal of' 
Philosophy, XXXIV (1937), 599-600. 
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The status of values on the view here being compared to 
Urban's view may be given thus: Value-potentialities are 
aspects of human nature; in the individual they might be 
called subjective since they are aspects of a subject; many 
of them, however, are common among individuals and therefore 
have a certain over-individual, or social objectivity, as 
Urban held in Valuation. Value-possibilities are objective. 
But neither value-potentialities nor value-possibilities 
are values. Actual values are the experiences of values, 
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that is, value-claims; these are always subjective, the pri-
vate experiences of individuals. Norms, as coherent constructs, 
are objective in precisely the same sense as are natural laws, 
for example, the law of gravitation; the differance between 
the two is in function. Norms function as standards of what. 
experience ought to be actualized. Natural laws function as 
descriptive standards of what is and of what will be the 
case, given the pertinent conditions. Natural law functions 
in a determinative system; norms function in a setting of 
freedom. 
In one aspect norms are not like natural laws. They lay 
the foundation and point the direction of creative value 
activity. For example, one norm is: a person ought to grow 
in knowledge and ability. Other norms dictate specific kinds 
of knowledge and abilities. From these as objective guides 
the human mind may create a complex value structure, called 
a college for the purpose of producing growth in knowledge 
and abilities. The fabrication of the structure is a crea-
tive activity; also the functioning of the college is a 
creative activity. In the realm of natural law, that is, 
science, it is true that something analogous to this may take 
place; the descriptive activity of pure science may lead on 
to applied science, or engineering, but here the crucial point 
which must be seen is that engineering is a value activity im-
posed upon science; engineering is a free creative activity. 
In all this it may be seen that knowing and valuing are 
closely related. What this close relationship signifies is 
that the two function together in one person, who is a unit 
that ca.nnot be divided into knowing and valuing parts; he 
can only be analized into knowing and valuing activities. 
These, however, never take place in complete separation from 
each other, although in any given instance one may be empha-
sized more than the other. 
There is also another ingredient of experience which 
cannot be o~tted from this picture. It is the experience 
of obligation, which is experienced sui generis. However, 
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it is always attached to some value. It is native to ex-
perience, but the feeling "I ought" is always attached to some 
value which is considered the highest available in a given 
situation. so the full experience is I ought to actualize 
value X, as the best I know, instead of V and z. 1 
One more question needs to be asked; what is the meta-
physical status of values? Value-potentialities in man and 
1. Cf. P. A. Bertocci, "The Authority of Ethical Ideals," 
Journal of Philosophy, XXXIII (1936), 271. He expresses this 
view also in Introduction to the Philosoph of Reli ion and 
in Free Will, Respons y, an New ngdon 
Press, 1957), and in other places. 
value-possibilities in the world, may be thought of as created 
by God. Norms have metaphysical status by being rooted in 
the nature of God. Two quotations from E . s. Bri&Ltman are 
illustrative: 
Personalists see in man's most rational values 
a disclosure and revelation of God's power on 
the leve l of purpose, just as they see in man's 
sensations a disclosure and revelation of God's 
power on the level of nature.l 
A person's values must be subjective; they can 
exist only in him. But his true norms may be 
acknowledged by any thinking mind. • • • Norms 
(metaphysically speaking) would be God's ack-
nowledgement that love and justice, truth and beauty, 
ought to be. God1 s values would be his own obedi-
ence to and realization of these norms in acts of 
love and justice, truth and beauty. Our values 
would be our realization of norms. Norms unrealized 
by anyone are not values at all. They are merely 
excellent blueprints of value.2 
A coherent interpretation of the meaning of man1 s values 
suggests that they are a revelation of God 1 s purposes; man's 
norms have as their ultimate status their acknowledgment by 
God as "excellent blueprints of value." 
How is Urban's later view to be seen in comparison with 
the view of value just presented? 
1. It has already been pointed out that Urban has built 
his theory from a presuppositional base rather than an 
empirical base. Although experience of value is con-
sidered it is not clearly related to presupposed value 
1. E. S. Brightman, Nature and Values (New York: Abingdon-
Cokesbury, 1945), 12. 
2. E. s. Brightman, Persons and Values (Boston: Boston Uni-
versity Press, 1952), 18-19. 
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objectives. 
2. Urban's view in Valuation is more empirical. 
There he recognizes value-potentialities as the "permanent 
aspects of desire." He also recognizes value-possibilities, 
for he maintains affective-volitional meanings never arise 
except in connection with objects. However, he has not been 
able to give there a stable presentation of empirically 
derived norms. Because of this instability he never devel-
oped a doctrine of true values, coherently tested by norms. 
Still Urban is closer to a proper view of norms in Valuation 
than later. 
3. Value and being are inseparable in experience, and 
a coherent interpretation of this experience argues for a 
metaphysical inseparability. Urban holds to inseparability 
but he grounds it in an a priori of intelligibility in his 
later view. 
4. Urban was led to his later view by finding a circu-
larity in his early view thus: When one seeks to ground 
values in life he already assumes that life itself is a 
value; it "ought to be." However, this is an assumption that 
need not be made, for it is doubtful whether life is valu-
able abstracted from any value experiences; life is good for 
the individual experiences of truth, beauty, and goodness 
which arise for the living; and even if one does consider 
life to have value in itself it would have to be experienced 
value, not assumed value. Urban finds a similar circularity 
in intelligible discourse; it presupposes its own value, that 
it "ought to be." This again need not be so, for its value 
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is an experienced, rather than an assumed value. After norm 
construction, empirically grounded, it is proper to say in-
telligible discourse ought to be carried out. What is at 
stake in this statement might be put thus: "If you would 
have the value experience of meaning and truth, then you 
must use discourse; meaning and truth are highly valuable 
experiences both intrinsically and extrinsically; therefore, 
use discourse and all the norms appropriate to making it in-
telligible." 
5. Urban's later view holds to absolute value objectives 
or essences. This is unempirical and unneeded in the light 
of empirical norms. Values are not experienced as absolutes 
or essences; they are creative experiences resulting from 
interaction between a person with value-potentialities and 
a world of value-possibilities. 
6. Urban never became so unempirical as to get rid of 
psychological process in value theory, but he did not harmo-
nize it adequately :with philosophical interpretation; he 
never {in his later view) adequately drew the distinction 
between experienced value and normative demand. 
7. Urban confused the issue by his terminology "ought 
to be" and "worthiness to be. 11 This terminology s'uggests 
thetvalue is in the object instead of in the experience. 
But "ought" is really a word which implies obligation; to 
apply it to objects is confusing. Kant is right when he 
rejects this usage of the word for the reason that objects 
have no ear for an imperative. Ordinary language often uses 
the form n·A ought to be," but it is appropriate only in an 
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accomodated sense. To say a certain event in history ought 
not to have beenl can literally mean only that people who 
could have prevented it were at the time under obligation 
to do so but failed in their obligation and that if the eve~ 
had not occurred there would be better value experiences 
available to concerned persons. Literally the "ought" cannot 
apply to the object or event, only to persons, meaning they 
have obligation to actualize certain values. 
8. A coherent interpretation of norms would suggest 
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they are grounded in the foundation of reality; that is, they 
are in the mind of God according to E. s. Brightman.2 This 
would suggest that God implanted His purposes in reality by 
cr~ation of value-possibilities and value-potentialities. The 
nor.ms have metaphysical status in the mind of God as He ack-
nowledges them to be good patterns for value experiences. 
Hence, one need not trench on the mystical in order to 
find a metaphysical status for value, as Urban does; that is 
one need not abandon reason at this point. However, this 
need not deny a mystical experience in which a man can come 
face to face with God. 
9. Urban is correct in saying value problems lead one 
directly into metaphysics. Value has as much to say about 
metaphysics as does being. 
1. As Urban does say in "Value and Existence," 462. 
2. cr. quotation above. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SYNTHESIS OF REALISM AND IDEALISM 
In Chapter I Wilbur Urban's presuppositional or dialec-
tical method was shown; it is the method of seeking the 
implications of intelligibility. 'l'he assumptions necessary 
Urban found to be basically value assumpt i ons. Knowledge 
is a construction built up of intuitive data plus the value 
presupp ositions. In Chapter II the value emphasis is con-
tinued; it sets forth the experience of value and the status 
of value in a world of reality. 'I'his status, it was shown, 
is a.t the heart of reality for Urban. Values are ab solutes 
which have their own kind of reality status, called ob -
jective validity. These are cognized by the psychological 
processes of feelings and desire in Urban's later view. 
But this is not all, for Urban finds a value comp onent even 
in the ontolog ical predicates themselves, predicates of 
being, reality, existence, and even the predicate of truth. 
overall is Urban's '' axiom of' intelligibility,'' the in-
separability of oeing and v alue. For Urban then there can 
b e no doubt that value is central to the universe. 
Since the significance of value for knowledge and meta-
physics has always been a determinative contention of ideal-
ists, it is evident that Urban is an idealist in some sense. 
Furthermore, he freely admits thi s. n owever, he feels t hat 
he is als o a realist. One of the great pass ions of his in-
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tellectual life has long been the reconciliation of ideal-
ism and realism. His position is "be yond realism and 
idealism."l The opposition between the t wo, he f e e ls, 
has been crippling to the advance of philosophy. The 
idealists and realists have been f ighting each other in-
stead of recognizing their common ground and fighting 
their common enemies, the philosophic modernists against 
whom Urb an had so much to say in his The Intelligible 
World. 2 
Urban's basic questions in this area are: 
How is it possib le that an opposition of this 
eort--so· fatal to philosophical advance, ani 
in a way so unnecessary, should have arisen? 
••• Why is it that if it is a problem capa-
ble of solution--like other problems of matter 
of fact and logic--that the debate is intermi-
nable and neither convinces the other?3 
To the first question he answers that the conflict is 
a product of modern sensationalistic empiricism which be-
gan with Locke and Hume. The classical European philoso-
phy, the philosophia perennis, is above this battle. 4 
To the secon:l of his basic questions Urban answers 
that the two positions are not contradictory but comple-
mentary. Hence debate between the two is a wrong approach. 
1. This is a title used by Urban far an early article and 
a recent book: "Beyond Realism ani Idealisn vs. Two 
Types of Ideal isn, 11 Philosophical Review, XXVII (Jan. 
1918), 63-71; Beyoni Realism airl IdeBl ism (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1949). 
2. Cf. Chapter I of this exposition. 
3. Beyond Realism and Ideal isn, 6. 
4. Ibid., 6. 
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Philosophia Perennis shows no such conflict.l This, of 
course, is not evident immediately; proof of this thesis 
is the main burden of his Beyond Realism and Idealism. 
If men are able to transcend the tension between these 
two views, Urban foresees two very important results. In 
the first place the energies of philosophers will be freed 
for the genuine problems of speculative thought; too much 
energy has been wasted as a struggle among friends. 
Secondly, there can be a reunion of present-day thought 
with that of traditional philosophy. This is significant 
because Western cultural foundations are the Greco-
Christian tradition.2 Skepticism of reason and knowledge 
is the root of skepticism in morals and religion. 3 The 
burden of Urban's thinking on the problem of realism and 
idealism is that there is a genuine synthesis oi' the two 
in the ontological world, that the synthesis is not a mere 
eclecticism. 
The problem of understanding idealism and realism, as 
given by the history of thought, and of trying to find the 
1. Ibid.' 6-7. 
2. IDI<I., 239-241. 
3. I"bTcf., 241. Urban argues this point admirably in Funda-
mentals of Ethics, Chapter XVI, for both the ancient 
skepticism of the Sophists and modern skepticism. Urban 
is a man of deep interest in high ethical and religious 
standards. It should be remembered in this connection 
that his father, by whom he professes to be greatly in-
fluenced, was a clergyman in the Protestant Episcopal 
Church, and his brother is currently the dean of' an 
Episcopal seminary. 
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legitimate claims to truth in each has been complicated 
by the shirting meanings or the terms in history. The 
shirt has been so great that at times the terms have actu-
ally been reversed. This makes logical derinition im-
possible and lays bare the dialectical character of the 
opposition. This shifting of meanings has made it easy 
for either side to "refute" and make trivial the opposite 
side but at the same time fail to be convincing. 
The quarrel is not an issue of fact or logic but or 
cognitive meanings and values. It is an axiological 
problem. The problem or knowledge is itself basically 
axiological as Urban points out in the following quotation: 
The problem of knowledge, it has been said, is 
tpart of the problem of values at large,' and, 
properly understood this is not only true, but 
the only way in which the problem of knowledge 
can be understood. The very fact that we know, 
and that we recognize and acknowledge that 
•must,• indicates that prior to the activity of 
knowledge, that which constitutes its very driving 
force, is the acknowledgement of truth as a value 
and of the obligation to seek it as one of the 
supreme goods of life.l 
The conflict arises because of contrasting ideals of 
knowledge. These, of course, are value norms. Urban main-
tains that both idealism and realism rest upon empirically 
and logically unsupported judgments of value.2 He con-
tends that if this is true, the problem can never be 
solved by reasoned arguments, because each side reasons on 
1. Ibid., 16-17. 
2. 'I"55'Cf., 17. 
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the basis of its own value presuppositions, which are 
themselves un-neutral; so the solution depends on an ex-
amination of them. Hence the problem demands dialectical 
examination. 
Urban's dialectical, or presuppositional, method was 
explained in Ghapter I. A brief summary of the method is 
in place here. 'l 'he method seeks out the basic presuppo-
sitions of opposing points of view on a problem. Then it 
makes them clearly explicit. Ultimate presuppositions can 
never be supported by logic, for they are value judgments 
taken up as prior to log ic. t hey are value judgments b e-
cause they seek to make experience intellig ible. This pre-
supposes intelligibility as a basic value worth seek ing. 
Since presuppositions are of this character log ic is ir-
relevant. The only k ind of argume nt is persuasion t o 
mu"Cual. aclmowledgment. This is what dialectic seeks to do. 
As already noted, its f irst step i s to clarify and make ex-
plicit the presuppositions; its next step is to seek a 
synthesis that will bring together harmoniously the pre-
supp ositions. If value presuppositions are at the heart 
of the conflict between idealism and realism dialectic is 
the only solution. Urban proceeds to the dialectic. He 
seeks first to find the presuppositions of idealism, then 
the presuppositions of realism, then a proper synthesis. 
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1. TEE IDEALISTIC MINIIYlUM 
When one reflects on idealiw in the different 
stages of one's life something like the follow-
ing usually happens. At first, as a youth, we 
smile over its silliness; somewhat further on 
the way we find the idea interesting, clever, 
and for g ivable--we di~cuss it readily and 
gladly with people who are still, according to 
their a ge and development, in an earlier stage. 
With maturity we are likely to find it meaning-
ful, to annoy ourselves and others with it, but 
on the whole scarcely worth disproving, and 
contrary to nature. It is hardly worth the 
trouble of further thinking because we feel 
that we have bhought often enough about it 
already. But later, and with more earnest re-
flection and more extensive knowledge of human 
life and its interests, idealism acquires a 
strength which it is difficult to overcome.l 
Thus does Urban begin his chap ter on ideal ism; he 
finds this to be as true today for many as when it was 
first written. 
What is this idealism that has such a growing appeal? 
Mr . Urban gives a series of definitions of idealism. · His 
general definition is 11 any theory which maintains that 
the universe is throughout the work or embodiment of 
mind." He quotes approvingly Dean Inge, "Idealism is 
most satisfactorily defined as interpretation of the 
world according to a scale of value or, in Plato's phrase, 
the Idea of the Good. 11 He approves Brightman's statement, 
"Any philosophy may be called idealistic if it embodies 
the reasoned conviction that ideals and the values they 
1. I b id., 38 . Paraphrased from a paper written by 
Lichtenberg in 1853. 
presuppose belong to the very objective structure of the 
universe."1 Urban finds certain motivations to idealism. 
He feels that the natural man is both a realist and an 
idealist; the world he lives in contains both the "furni-
ture of earth" and the "choir of heaven. n2 But in his 
great moments of experience such things as love, empire, 
fame, justice, God, are the things that stand out as most 
real. "All these have their reality not only, nor indeed 
principally , in their necessity, but still more in their 
worthiness to be."3 This is the first motivation to 
idealism. There are two others. The second is that the 
sense world is not the real world. This really begins to 
strike a person when he first finds sense yielding de-
ception, as for example, in the case of the bent oar in 
the water. He begins to think that the sense world is just 
the world of opinion, and that the real world is the world 
of ideas.4 The third motive appears on a more sophist:i.-
cated level than the man on the street, (although it does 
find a covert primitive expression in animism) . It is the 
notion of' intelligibility--'' only that which is akin to 
mind can really be known.n5 
l. Beyond Realism and Idealism, 39. 
2 . Ibid., 40. 
3. Ibid., 40-41. 
4. Ibid., 41. 
5. Ibid., 42. 
Historically one finds idealiam initiated by Plato. 
He was the first to state that the sense world is the 
realm of opinion and that the world of forms or ideas is 
the real world. This is especially true when Plato made 
the Idea of the Good to be the highest and all-embracing 
idea. Plato "formulates in his own way the idea of a 
self-realizing end which is the heart of metaphysical 
idealism. nl Urban finds Aristotle really continuing in 
the same path as Plato by his emphasis on teleological ex-
planation rather than mechanical explanation. Urban agrees 
with Leibniz in calling both Plato and Aristotle ideal-
ists.2 St. Thomas continues this tradition by his 
doctrine ratio est ca.pabilis: 11 reason can know being be-
cause b eing itself is an embodiment of reason, of the 
Divine Logos. u3 Urban would put Descartes and Leibniz in 
this tradition also.4 In fact, he feels that practically 
the whole of the European philosophical tradition until 
the time of Locke belongs here--hence, his application of 
the term philosophia perennis to this tradition. 
In this great tradition Urban finds four kinds of 
idealism. They are: i. subjective idealism or mentalism, 
ii. critical or transcendental idealism, iii. logical or 
absolute idealism, and iv. axiological idealism or the 
1. Ibid., 43. 
2. '!"6""d., 44. 
3. Ibid., 44. 
4. Ibid., 45. 
idealism of values.l These he proceeds to analyze to find 
the common elements. 
i. Subjective Idealism. Berkeley is, of course, the 
chief representative of this type. Berkeley's ground for 
this view is that idealism is necessary to make things in-
telligible. He objects to the unintelligibility of natural 
or physical realism.2 Urban says that most idealists feel 
that Berkeley has over-reached in making sense data mind-
dependent.3 But no one really seems to have refuted 
Berkeley's subjectivism; most just do not care to believe 
it.4 
ii. Critical or Transcendental Idealism. Kant could 
not go along with Berkeley's subjectivism nor with Hume, 
who said that internal states are the only certainties. 
In fact, Kant tried to refute both of these views~ Kant 
held that the self is conscious of its own changing states 
only by reference to an objective existent.5 In other words, 
Urban interprets, Kant was holding the unintelligibility 
of not postulating objective existents, but Kant was forced 
also to see that genuine knowledge is in some way mind-
dependent, for intelligibility can only be given in terms 
1. Ibid., 46. 
2. !Ora., 48-50. 
3. !13I'a'.' 50. 
4. 'I"6''<<. ' 51. 
5. I"6''CT. ' 53. 
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of mind. Critical idealism means postulation of mind-
independent objects in order to be able to account for 
meaning and intelligibility.l The essence of Kant, and 
all idealists since his time, is that knowledge is under-
standable only in terms of a knower which transcends 
nature. 2 Urban also finds Kant 1 s pure reason to be tied 
to values. For Kant pure reason without reference to ends 
or values is non capabilis. Hence, all the way through 
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft the primacy of the "practical 
reason" is asserted, for thus ratio est capabilis. Here 
is the primacy of the . Good.3 Urban concludes then that 
Kant really holds to both ideal ism an:i realism and may as 
well be called a critical realist as a critical idealist. 
Kant t s position is "beyond realism and idealism. " 4 
iii. Log ical or Absolute Idealism. 'I'his is the ideal-
ism of Hegel, Bradley, Jj Osanquet, and others. It states 
that all genuine knowledge must be knowledge of the whole, 
and that the nature of the whole must be of the nature of 
mind. It g oes further and says that all things must be in-
ternally related. ~ven the relation between knower and 
known must be an internal rel a tion, which Urban implies is 
epistemological monism.5 Urban finds the driving core of 
1. Ibid., 54. 
2. Ibid., 56. 
3. 1'51d.' 56. 
4. "'"5TcT • , 57 . 
5. I b id., 58-61. 
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this movement to be this: "Only that which is akin to 
mind is really intellig ible. 11 l But the doctrine of in-
ternal relations Urban finds untenable both for many 
idealists and realists because it is based on a petitio 
..___ ---
principii; it begs the question of the nature of genuine 
knowledge.2 
iv • .Axiolog ical Idealism. "Axiology" is a word of 
Urba n's own invention which quickly attained wide adoption.3 
However, h e says there are many representatives, and he 
chooses Pringle-Pattison to s peak for his purposes here. 
Pringle-Pattison finds it morally impossible to think of 
any t h ing devoid of value as ultimately real and self-
subsistent. This, he thinks, is the driving p ower of 
idealism. Urban agrees.4 Meaning is not merely an em-
pirical or log ical category; it has a value comp onent as 
·well. Axiological ideal ism recognizes this; it further 
holds " that intelligibility end value are insep arable. " 5 
Besides the implications here for epistemological i dealism, 
metaphysical ideal is also implied, because v a lue cannot be 
sep ar a ted from mind. Pringle-Pattison finds all idealisms 
---·---
1. Ibid • , 60 • 
2 . Ibid., 62. 
3. W. -M. Urban, "The Philosophy of Spirit: Idealism and the 
Philoso phy of Value, 11 Con~~m.,porary Idealism ~n ~e r:_ica, 
ed. Clifford Barrett (New Yo~Macmillan Co., 193:~ ), 
36ln. 
4. Beyond Realism and Idealism, 64. 
5. Ib~~·, 64. 
resting on a logically unsupported judgment of value, "a 
judgment which affirms an end of intrinsic worth and ac-
cepts thereby a standard of unconditional obligation."l 
But although this is logically unsupported it is not there-
fore without support, for it is supported by "moral 
assurance."2 
Moral necessity for the sake of intelligibility is 
the judgment of value which Urban finds as the driving pre-
supposition in all idealism; he finds it implied within all 
the forms of idealism and finally made explicit in axio-
logical idealism.3 He quotes Kant: uThe ideal of the 
highest good is the determining ground of the ultimate end 
of pure reason itself.u4 Berkeley objected to the un-
intelligibility of natural or physical realism. The abso-
lute idealists find nothing intelligible except what is 
akin to mind; their doctrine of internal relations is only 
an attempt to make knowledge intelligibly grounded. 
By "logically unsupported judgment of value 111 Pringle-
Pattison (and Urban) mean a presupposition held prior to 
logic and experience as necessary to make experience in-
telligible. In the light of the criticism of Urban's value 
theory given in Chapter II above, it may be doubted whether 
1. Ibid., 64. 
2. rora., quoted p. 65. 
3 • 'Il5Tci. ' 66 • 
4. !Cia., quoted from Critique of Pure Reason, A804-B832. 
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such judgments need be unsupported by logic and experience; 
there it was held that value standards are themselves to be 
empirically grounded and coherently tested. This does not 
mean, however, that Urban is wrong in finding a value 
judgment at the heart of idealism. 
Urban turns next to the search for the realistic 
minimum. 
2. THE REALISTIC MINIMUM 
11 The realist thinks genuine knowledge is impossible 
unless the thing known is independent of the knower. ttl 
Thus does Urban state in a preliminary way the realistic 
minimum. Later he says that the ground of truth is in 
antecedent reality.2 But this is anticipating the answer 
without seeing the argument. 
To begin we must see that realism is the party of the 
opposition. As such most of its approach is negative; that 
is, it spends a major part of its energies refuting idealism. 
Because of this negative approach its types are not we l l-
defined. 3 Also on account of the negative viewpoint of· 
realism Urban does not describe its core as a "driving 
force 11 as he does that of idealism, but rather he speaks of 
the "resistance of realism. n4 
1. Ibid., 27. 
2. i151(l". , 250. 
3. Ibid., 72. 
4. This is the title of Chapter III of Beyond Realism and 
Idealism. 
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Urban takes as a working definition of realism one 
~iven by Loewenberg: 
When technical disguises are laid aside realism 
appears to consist in the conviction that re-
ality is prior to the knowledge of it, and that 
consequently mind has a status which is deriva-
tive and not pivotal. It is misleading, I 
think, to state the case for realism by saying 
that reality is independent of being known. • • 
Every philosophy, to be philosophy at all, must 
rest upon the supposition that between being 
and knowing there is some linkage. What dis-
tinguishes realism from other views is not in-
sulation but emancipation of being from know-
ing •••• Not in extruding from reality all 
relations consists the work of realism, but 
rather in investing it in respect of knowledge 
with a particular kind of relation, the re-
lation of priority.l 
Urban agrees with Loewenberg that priority is common to 
all forms of realism from the most naive to the most so-
phisticated, but he denies that mind is derivative in all 
realisms; rather he assigns this to modern naturalism, 
"with which epistemological realism has become increasingly 
associated. 11 2 
Urban proceeds to defend priority of reality to 
knowledge of it as the only common element in realism. He 
does so b oth historically and by types. He finds this kind 
of realism in Plato, Aristotle, the Scholastics, Descartes, 
Leibniz, and Kant. The break into the other meaning , that 
1. Ibid., Quoted 73 from J. Loewenberg, "Problematic Real-
ism, 11 Contem orar .American Philoso h , ed. George P. 
Adams and W. P. Montague New York: Macmillan Co., 1930), 
II, 55-56 . 
2. Beyond Realism and Idealism, 73. 
is, the non-pivotal nature of mind, started with Locke 
and is wholly modern.l 
Modern realism Urban finds to consist of four types: 
i. Common sense or natural or naive realism, ii. Repr•e-
sentative realism, iii. Critical realism, iv. Platonlc 
realism.2 
i. Common Sense Realism. This is the realism of the 
man on the street. If anyone proposed to this man that; his 
perceptions cannot be trusted to give him a clear and c:om-
plete picture of things, he would think that man to be de-
mented. Naive realism takes sensation to be perception of 
a complete, externally existing thing. It assumes the 
psychological priority of sense data and moves directly 
from there to ontological priority. This is taking the 
actual world to be just the same as it first appears. 
Urban says this is little more than "animal faith," to use 
Santayana's terminology.3 But the distinction made between 
primary and secondary qualities, which anyone can see to 
be true by a moment's reflection on the subject, has f<>r-
ever spoiled this kind of realism for the thinking man~4 
After this became clear realism moved on to the representa-
tive form. 
ii. Representative Realism. "Once the dualism between 
1. Ibid., 74-76. 
2. rm., 11. 
3. IOia., 77-78. 
4. !'l5"fCf. , 79. 
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ideas and things has been created, knowledge can be 
thought of only as a copying or representative function.nl 
Urban finds this form of realism coming to flower in 
Berkeley and Hume but already germinating in Descartes, 
Malebranche, Leibniz, and others. Descartes has a real-
istic 11 conviction, " but bases it on the "goodness of God, " 
rather than any proof.2 Leibniz rejects Descartes' 
reason b ut does hold to realiam because of God. Leibniz . 
and Descartes really hold that belief in an external 
world has only moral certainty; this is Leibniz's termi-
nology. Locke also admits there is no demonstration of 
the external world but holds it to be an assurance that 
should be called knowledge.3 These men all held to real-
ism for moral reasons, and what is more they all recog-
nized their assurance to be moral and not empirical or 
logical. They base it in God the same as Plato bases 
knowledge on the Good.4 
1. Ibid., 80. 
2. IOTa., 81. The author found this same argument coming 
I'rom a student; said he, 11 It would not be very sporting 
of God to make us think there is a real world out there 
and not put it there. n This seems to support Urban's 
thesis that realism rests on a logically unsupported 
conviction, an "animal faith. 11 
3. Ibid., 81-82. 
4. Ibid., 82-83.0ne is reminded of E instein's statements 
that the most incomprehensible thing about the world is 
that it is comprehensible. He even proposed this as a 
basis for religion.(Cf.Albert Einstein, Out of My Later 
Years, New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 21-30,59-63.) 
Einstein was really wrestling here with epistemology 
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Naive realism, with its animal faith, has here led into 
the representational or copy form of realism with a 
"moral f aith." This view in turn gave way to a critical 
realism. 
iii. Critical Realism. Urban uses 11 critical 11 for all 
realists since Kant, including himself. The term is here 
not to be identified with the twentieth century group who 
called themselves Critical Realists. All forms of realism 
within this group bring thought to a place far removed from 
the realism of the plain man. This is not now the world 
men live in as the plain man wants it, but it is in many 
respects a..'Yl artificial world. It is at least as highly 
sophisticated as the world of idealisms. Urban thinks 
science, the mainstay for realists, is really now as much 
idealistic as it is realistic, because science is now large-
ly a matter of constructs.l This is illustrated by much of 
the literature in the field of philosophy of science. The 
title of one of Carnap' s books is illustrative: Der log-
ische Aufbau der Welt.2 
" Transfigured" is a word that shows the common element 
in all critical realism. "The contents of consciousness 
are not reality and do not resemble it but rather symbol-
when he thought he was handling religion. There is, of 
course, a co~~ection between the two but it would hardly 
be at the point of the very essence, where he puts it. 
1. Ibid.' 84. 
2. Rudolph Carnap, Der lo~ische Aufbau der Welt, (Berlin: 
Weltkreis-Verlag, 1928 • 
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ize it.l Reality has been transfigured into symbols. 
The copy has here been exchanged for the symb ol. The copy 
or representative type of realism was dropped because of 
its false assumptions: that sensations and sensa are identi-
cal and that sense perception is identical with absolute 
knowledg e. "The idea. that sense perception g ives us a 
literal copy of the physical object seems everywhere to be 
a thing of the past. 11 2 With modern developments in science 
we find that any realism to be possible must be of the 
critical or symbolical type. Symbolic rep resentation is 
one of the most outstanding characteristics of the new 
epistemology of physical science.3 
Knowledge has now become an affair of Judgment. 'l'his 
is due to the devastating critique of the copy theory b y 
idealists. A mere animal faith is now no longer possib le 
for thoughtful minds; in its stead is now a reasoned faith 
in all that is possible, since knowledge is an affair of 
judgment. 
Although it still has its roots in animal faith, 
that faith has now been transformed into a 
conscious p ostulate--into a judgment of cognitive 
1. Ibid., 85. Cf. discussion of Urban's doctrine of symbol-
rsm-in Chap ter I of this investig ation. 
2. Ibid., 86-8 7. That the copy theory is dead is an over-
statement, f or the Neo-Thomists, a very live contemporary 
group, have not entirely g iven it up. 
3. Ibid., 85 and Chapter VI. 
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value which, while itself logically unsupported, 
is itself the support of the entire theory of 
knowledge.l 
Many, especially among scientists, would probably admit 
the unsupported character of their realism; Einstein 
certainly does.2 
iv. The New or Platonic Realism. To this form Urban 
assigns G. E. Moore, Meinong, Husserl, Frege, and the 
self-styled New Realists of Britain and America.3 This 
type of realism arose as a protest against Berkeleyan 
mentalism and especially against Hegelianism via Bradley. 
It holds to the "independence of the immanent," that is, 
universals, essences, values. It is a logical reaction 
against the doctrine of internal relations of the absolute 
idealists. For this group relations are external. All 
the objects of thinking and speaking are mind-independent, 
even fictions and errors; apparently even these have the 
status of real existent universals .4 Everything that we cs_n 
think or talk about is discovered, not created; all is ex-
ternal. Here we have given, in opposition to Berkeley' s 
pan-subjectivism, a pan-objectivism. As mentalism tends to 
solipsism of the subject this view tends to solipsism of 
the object.5 
1. Ibid., 88. 
2. ~of My Later Years, 21-30, 59-63. 
3. Belond Realism and Idealism, 88-89. 4. rh a., 88-89. 
s. rora., 9o. 
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With the independence of the immanent the new rea ism 
links another doctrine, that of epistemological monism;: 
this marks a clear break with all previous realism. The 
universals or essences are neutral entities, neither physi-
cal nor mental. They can enter into external relations 
with either mind or objects. This relation unites them 
into an epistemological unity for the moment of knowing.l 
Urban sees this as a tour de force. He feels that 
much of it will pass away, but that the violent reaction 
against subjectivism, which made for the tour de force,. is 
based on the 11 axiom of independence,'' which will stand •. 
This axiom or postulate is the condition of all communi-
cation among men. It is nonsense to deny transcendent 
being, not because this would be contradictory as the new 
realists say, but because this is the condition of intelli-
gible discourse. This converts the reason for independence 
into a value argument instead of the empirical or logical 
one that the realists think it is. Denial of transcendent 
being then is 11 immoral. 'i Thus for realism, e.s for idealism, 
its root is moral, not logical certainty. This is the mean-
ing of the animal faith of natural realism, the moral faith 
of representative realism, the rational faith of critical 
realism, and the axiom of independence of the new and most 
sophisticated realism. There is an unsupported judgment of 
value at the heart of all realism. 2 
1. Ibid., 90-91. 
2. Ibid., 91-94. 
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The realistic minimum, its irrefutab le element, yea, 
its last stand, then, is the axiom of independence "which 
must be acknowledged if knowledge itself is to retain its 
meaning and value. ul This is brought out in all realistic 
11 refutationsrt of idealism. Urban says that all these refu-
tations are refinements of the original by Dr. Johnson, who 
said while kicking a stone, "I disprove it thus. 11 2 This is 
an argumentum ad hominem,3 really a dialectical argument 
from value. It begs the question to be proved because it 
assumes an acknowledgment on the part of the opponent of 
the thing to be proved. But such question begging or 
circular reasoning is valuable because it shows that we 
cannot get out of the circle. To get out is to destroy the 
roots of intelligence.4 Independence of the object, then, 
is a necessary minimum of realism in any "theory of 
knowledge worth the name. 11 5 Thus realism as well as ideal-
ism has as its foundation a logically unsupported judgment 
of value. 
Urban holds that realism as such is not metaphysics 
1. Ibid • , 94 • 
2. I'bid., 95. 
3. Urban uses this expression frequently, but he usually 
does not mean it as a deliberate logical fallacy in 
attempting to discredit an argument by an appeal to 
the man. Rather he means there is a necessary appeal 
to value as a presupposition necessary to human in-
telligence. 
4. Ibid., 95-96. 
5. Ibid., 97. 
156 
but purely epistemology. All forms of it fall back upo:n a 
conviction that the ground of truth is antecedent reality.l 
But Urban holds there can be no proof of this; it is a 
value conviction. 
This is Urban's analysis of realism; he finds its 
least common denominator to be "mind independence," or 
"mind transcendence. 11 What does he mean by it? Indep endenee 
of the mind of the individual knower? Independence of any 
and all mind? 
The first clue to this problem may be found above in 
the statement, "Independence of the object, then, is a 
necessary minimum of realism in any 'theory of knowledge 
worth the name.' n2 This means that there must be a dis ·-
tinction between the subject and object; that is to say 
Urban holds there must be a dualism in epistemology. This 
is consistent with all the kinds of realism Urban has ex-
amined except the new realism, which holds an epistemic 
monism. Here there is independence of the object from t he 
mind, but there is not independence of the mind from the 
object; so mind independence is still maintained. However, 
Urban rejects the monism of the new realism, for there must 
also be an idealistic minimum of mind-dependence in know-
ledge. It appears, then, that all Urban is contending for 
in the examination of realism is epistemic dualism; indeed, 
1. Ibid., 250. 
2. rora., 97, quoted from the preceding page of the present 
work:--
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as noted ab ove, he feels the only common ground in all 
realisms is in the realm of epistemology. 
If this is all he means b y it, it is hard to under-
stand why he labors the p oint so much, for many idealists 
recognize the necessity of a dualistic epistemology. --t 
is chief ly the absolute idealists, not the whole group of 
idealists, who would maintain a monistic epistemology. 
Furthermore, if epistimic dualism is all Urban wants from 
realism wh y is it necessary to contend that the independ-
ence of the ob ject is merely a matter of moral faith, a 
log ic ally unsupported judgment of value? He himself 
argues, as will be shown below, that error is not expl a in-
able e x cep t on the basis of independence. Does this leave 
independence as merely a value p resupposition? It mi ght 
r athe r b e said that independence of the ob ject from the 
knowi ng sub ject is the most coherent interpretation of error 
and o f t h e fact that the sub ject cannot control the ob ject 
at will; this is a rational a r gument, not a value pre-
supposition. 
The r e is a second clue to Urban's me aning o f "mind 
independence." It is in the rejection of Berkeleyanism 
without argument; he merely say s that few care to believe 
Berkeley any more. This is to indulg e in a g ross k i nd of 
value approach. He has rejected the accusation that the 
axiolog ical p oint of view demands that re ality be pleasing 
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to men.l Yet here the only argument is that Berkeley is 
not pleasing; this is hardly an adequate argument. Now 
in this rejection Urban cannot properly argue that 
Berkeley was completely subjective, for oerkeley certainly 
allowed a means for the object to be independent of the 
finite knower . He held that the perception of God provided 
the foundation in the objective world for human perception. 
Human percept ion does not create its own objects; it re-
cognizes the objects that God puts there. The only thing 
that Berkeley is interested in maintaining is that the ob-
jects are mental in character, that they are not physical 
objects existing independent of all mind. 
Hence, it is apparent that Urban is not carrying on a 
purely epistemological argument after all; he has stepped 
into ontological dualism. For this kind of argument can 
be interpreted in only two ways: either he does not realize 
the consequence of his rejection of Berkeley , or he wants to 
hold to physical objects existentially distinc~ from a11 
mind . Since , as noted above, he recognizes that Berkeley's 
chief reason for holding his view is the unintellig ibility 
of natural or physical objects he evidently realizes what 
he is doing. Hence, Urban must have held to the existen-
tial independence from e.ll minds of physical objects. He 
does not make such a doctrine explicit in Beyond Realism 
1. Cf. Chapter I. 
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and Idealism; there he maintains that t h e issues are a 1 
epistemological . However, the conse quence of his arg~unent 
is ontolog ic al duali sm. 
Though he d oes not emphasize it as a me taphysi cal view 
it will be shown b elow that Urban does h old to an onto-
log ical dualism of t wo distinct k ind s of reality -- mind 
a nd matter. Urban is trying to harmonize i dealism and 
realism e p istemolog ically but he has here stepped outside 
his method and has quietly and unwittingly slipped into 
metaphys ics. 
But this is anticipating the solution before Urban's 
full, deliberate argument is g iven. Thus it is necessary, 
now that the irreducible elements of both idealism and 
realism h ave b een presented to turn to the problem of their 
harmonization. 
3 . THE RECONCILIATION OF IDEALISM AND REALISM 
Urban attempts to show that neither idealism nor real-
ism can either be proven or refuted, that the two do not 
usually clash directly , and that therefore the possibility 
of reconciliation must be shifted outside the method of 
either. 
i. The Impossibility of Proof or Refutation. Both 
realism and ideali&~ have a persistency in life that in-
dicates their deep-rootedness. 
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Idealism is the best refuted thesis in the world 
and the damnable heresy continues to flourish 
all the more, invading even the sacred precincts 
of physics itself--to the scandal of many phi-
losophers .1 
If ideal ism is persistent so is realism, for the idealists 
have attempted to refute realism with no better results. 
Both are natural to life.2 
Many realists now admit that ideal ism cannot be re-
futed, b ut they do not "choose" to accept it. This sup-
ports Urban's claim that the rejection is for value reasons. 
Urban holds that there are no p ossible experiences that are 
relevant to the proof of either realism or idealism, and 
that by the same token there are none that can refute 
either. Furtheftnore, there are no logical p rocedures 
tha t can either demonstrate or refute either idealism or 
realism. 3 
The famous refutations, then, do not really refute. 
At best they can only refute special forms, and even here 
their refutation is doubtful. G. E . Moore wrote one of 
the most famous "refutations" of idealism.4 Moore's 
strategy is first to reduce idealism to esse is perc~pi 
as the necessary core of all idealism, and then to destroy 
1. Ibid., 107. 
2. I'5id., 98. 
3. IDid., 101-102. 
4. G. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism,u Mind, XII 
(1903), 433-453. 
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this. Since Urban thinks most idealists reject this, he 
therefore thinks that Moore is not really attacking ideal-
ism in its strength. But even where Moore does attack he 
does not destroy. He tries empirical proof, but there is 
no experience relevant. Then he says that it is self-
contradictory to say that a thing exists when it is ex-
perienced but not when it is not experienced. Now this 
may be hard to believe, but there is no contradiction in 
it.l 
Urban uses Stace's attempted refutation of realism as 
typical of the idealistic attack on realism. stace says 
there is no empirical evidence to verify the belief that 
an object exists when it is not in someone 1 s experience; 
he says therefore we ought not to believe it.2 Urban 
agrees with the premise, but he thinks the conclusion of 
stace does not necessarily follow. All Stace has shown is 
that the empirical criterion is inappropriate in a meta-
physical proposition.3 
Neither side of the argument can either disprove its 
opponent nor establish demonstrably its own positions. In 
this respect the arguments of Moore and Stace are typical. 
1. 
2. 
of 
3. 
Belond Realism and Idealism, 
Ib a., 108, taken f'rom W. T. 
Realism," Mind, XLIII (1934). 
Ibid., 10-g:-
103-107. 
Stace, "The Refutation 
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Instead of the ostensive empirical and log ical arguments 
one is r eally confronted with attitudes, that is, value 
judgments. So Urban maintains that the argument is 
dialectical.1 
ii. Unneutral Log ics. Both sides have tried logical 
proof, but this can never resolve the problem, because 
each side uses an unneutral log ic, a logic which assumes 
the point of view to be proven. Ideal ism appeals to the 
log ic of internal relations and appeals to wholes, whieh 
has as its foundation the mind's synoptic bent. Hence it 
is sure to support an idealistic theory. Realism, on the 
other hand uses a logic of external relations; external 
relations means mind-independence, which is virtually ~:~. 
tautology for realism;2 idealism is here omitted by pre-
supposition, not by logical proof. 
iii. Necessity of Using Dialectic for a Solution. 
Neither side can solve the problem with its own self-
favoring me thai. Dialectic is the only approprie.te method 
here with its argument to presuppositions and its synthesis 
of these. 
At this point no doubt some realist will say, 11 But 
dialectic is the tool of idealism with its emphasis on 
organic wholes. " That is true of the synthesizing stag e 
1. Ibid., 110-111. 
2. Ibid., 113-115. 
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of the dialectic. The realist should not, however, ob-
ject to the first two stages of dialectic, the clarifi-· 
cation stages, if he wants to be philosophical at all. 
Even the third stage is not out of harmony with him, for 
it does not deny the realistic minimum; it : only asserts 
the idealistic minimum. This will be developed below. 
The dialectic of realism says that real:lty transcends 
the individual's knowledge of it and that consequences from 
the g_iven follow which the individual does not create a.nd 
which he cannot alter by his interests and purposes.l 
This much must be accepted from realism: "On no other 
supposition is error possible and no theory of knowledge 
can be made intelligible which does not allow for error."2 
The essential postulate of realism is antecedence, the 
givenness of the given. The idealist never really den:tes 
this.3 
The dialectic of idealism demands mind-dependence as 
a sine qua non of any intelligible theory of knowledge.4 
This means that knowledge must be relative to mind; it also 
means the immediately given is mediated through the cate-
gories of the mind by means of which judgments about the 
given are made possible.5 It was shown in Chapter I that 
1. Ibid., 139. 
2. I"6"'U.; 136-140. 
3. I"6Tcf.:, 139. 
4. I'E5'Id.' 140. 
5. I'13'I<f.' 140. 
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Urban holds to the idea that all knowledge has a value 
intent built into it. In chapter II it was shown that he 
holds even the term 11 real i ty11 it sell to have a value 
orientation. In Chap ter IV it will be shown that the cate-
gories, too, are value determined for Urban . Chapter II 
also shows that values are absolutes, cognized psycho-
logically and supported by presuppositions. All of this 
is clearly mental in nature and is without doubt in his 
meaning here. "Truth is an ideal and not a thing, and in 
this fact is found the irrefutable element in all ideal -
ism.11 Transcendence of the object is necessary.l 
There is really no incompatibility between mind-
independence and mind-dependence. There is room for both. 
Both are minimal requirements of knowledge; hence, both 
are necessary. "Between a sufficiently critical idealism 
and a sufficiently critical realism there are, I believe, 
no issues except .false issues. 11 2 The alternatives are 
.false alternatives, which have arisen from the fallacies 
of a copy theory of knowledge; tbe se in turn are based on 
treating knowledge as a thing and its relation to an object 
as a relation of things.3 But truth is an ideal, not a 
thing--an ideal of meaning and rationality.4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Ibid., 
I'6Td., 
I'6"Id., 
Ibid., 
141. 
143. 
143. 
141. 
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i v. Science and the Synthesis. Urban finds no con·-
flict with this synthesis in contemporary science, even 
though a ppeal to science has always been the strength of 
realism. Science is really beyond realism and idealism 
now as always. Science is a method, not a philosophy. 
The changes are coming about because of the elusiveness 
of matter, relativity, and the merely statistical charac-
ter of continuity, causality, and natural laws.1 The new 
methodology of ideal constructions in science has tended 
to idealism. Urban quotes Eddington's presidential ad-
dress to the b ritish Association, 1934, to show the con-
struct nature of scientific concepts: 
~~ere science has progressed the farthest, 
the mind has but regained from nature what 
the mind has put into nature. We have found 
a strange footprint on the shores of the un-
known. We have devised profound theories 
one after another to account for its origin. 
At last we have succeeded in reconstructing 
the creature that has made the footprint, 
and lo, it is our own.2 
In the new scientific epistemology concepts are no 
longer thought to have a one to one correspondence with 
reality; rather they are thought of as symbolical of 
reality. Hence the only realism possible on this new 
scientific basis is a critical realism.3 The symbolic 
1. Ibid., 166. 
2. IDIG., quoted on 169. 
3. Ibid., 169-170. 
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character of the concepts and the development of ideal 
constructs are the two elements in the new scientii'ic 
epistemology.l 
It is b eyond science to b e able to say that these 
constructs either exist or not; this is the realm of meta-
physics. The old scientific epistemology saw the rainbow 
to b e a phenomenon and the colorless molecules to be re-
ality. But the new sees the constituents also to be ap-
pearances. The facts of physics are not now things, but 
a thr ead of mercury, a shift in the spectrum, that is, 
sense data. 2 These facts are no new proofs of idealism. 
The facts of physics can only lead to physical theory. ~i 
Physics, as such, has no philosophy; it is a method. 
To scientific method as such idealism and realism are 
not pertinent, but when science is considered a part of' 
knowledge as a whole both are pertinent; both are implied 
in the new epistemology. Constructs show mind-dependence; 
giveness shows mind-independence. Scientific method ex-
1. Ibid., 171. Symbolism is discussed in Chapter I. 
2. 1'5'I<i'., 174-1?6. Cf. in this connection P . w. Bridgman, 
~Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1927), in which he introduces and defends "operational 
definitions" as a method of clarification of meanings 
in scientific vocabulary. Scientists are now dealing 
with so much data that are only indirectly observab le 
that the operations yielding the observations is about 
all that can be passed on to the scientific community 
intellig ibly by its members. 
3. Ibid., 176-177. 
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eludes values, but the new science has made more room for 
them than the old mechanistic variety.l Physical science 
is compatib le with tbe proposed synthesis of' realism and 
idealism. 
In the Geisteswissenschaf'ten (Urban uses ('Geiste-
swissenschaften»to refer to psychology, history, sociology, 
economics--what Americans generally refer to as social 
science) idealism has traditionally been dominant. In re-
cent decades, however, there has been a tendency toward 
realism and naturalism due to the application of the con-
cept of naturalistic evolution to this field.2 But chang es 
in evolution in the direction of creative or emergent evo-
lution are causing some switch back again. It can now be 
seen that even evolution cannot b e regarded as mechanical.3 
Furthermore the autonomy of life and the essence of wholes 
in b iology cannot be explained me chanistically . The auton-
omy of the mental, with its intentionality and meaning, is 
asserting itself via Gestalt psychology strongly against 
the mechanism of behaviorism.4 All of these thing s indi-
cate that a new epistemology is emerg ing in this realm, too. 
There are two phases of it: A. These sciences have an ob-
ject and method that is unique, not like that of the natural 
1. roid., 184-188. 
2. rora., 189-190. 
3. I b id., 194-195. 
4. Ibid., 195-196 . 
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sciences; this has brought about a decentralization bf 
the sciences. b . In this sphere science seeks understand-
ing instead of mere descriptive explanation; this means 
that these sciences are ve_lue sciences. This first carne 
to light in history; it became more a nd more obvious that 
a hist orian, whether consciously or not, a l ways selects 
the materia l and the organization of his work according to 
certain values he has in mind.l In these s ciences, too, 
there is both mind-dependence and givenness. Hence, here 
as well as in the physical sciences Urban holds that there 
is really no proof for either idealism or realism. The 
sciences are, then, all compatib le with the synthesis. 
but what shall be the actua l form of the synthesis? 'l'hat 
is the next p roblem. 
v. Philosophia Perennis. If no s a ne philoso phy can 
ever b e exclusively realistic or idealistic, Urban think s 
it is time men quit trying such exclusiveness. The diffi-
culties at affecting a s :;nthesis, h e fee ls, arise from 
emotion and habit , from the instability of app arently ec-
lectic positions, and from the tyranny of names. 
The whole of the ir•'estern tradition, until Locke's in-
traduction of the physiology of knowl edge, and until the 
naturalization of the intelligence culminated in evolu-
1 • Ib id • , 19 9- 20 1. 
2. Ibid., 216-217. 
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tionary naturalism, was really a s y nthesis of idealism and 
reali sm . This is the grani perennial philosophy. Some 
see t he b reak inthe philosophica l tradition coming with 
Descartes, but in respect to this p roblem it did not come 
until much later. ;l'he p roofs for the existence of God 
g i ven by Descartes, Kant, and He gel are evidence that 
these belong in t h e tradition.l 
Back of all the thinkers in the g reat tradition was 
the presupp osition of intellig ibility. In support or this 
Urb an n ames as examples Rrigina, Anselm, Abelard, Albert, 
Duns Scotus, William of Occam, Averroes, and Thomas. St. 
Thomas is especially outstaniing as one who saw clearly 
the p resupp ositions of the tradition.2 
The presupp ositions assmned by the intellig ibility 
approach of philoso phia perennis are three as Urban sees 
them. 'rhe y are: 1. The assumption of antecedent being. 
2. The ass~~ption that ratio est capabilis, that is, 
that t h ere is a relat ion betwe en mind and b eing such t h at 
being can b e k nown. This means t h at being is rational, that 
the g iven is meaningful. The g iven can b e translated into 
the categ ories of human experience and knowledge. 3. The 
third assumption is closely related to the first two; it 
is that value and being are insep arable.3 This last is 
1. Ibid • , 24 2. 
2. Ibid., 243-244. 
3. Ibid., All the assump tions are fro m 246-247. 
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what Urban calls "the axiom of intelligibility .nl 
This philosophy lives on; it is perennis. Those who 
deny it, that is, violate intelligibility, will be buried 
by it.2 It is the natural metaphysic of the human mind 
and cannot be destroyed.3 Reality is the expression of 
the highest logos or divine spirit.4 
In the union of idealism and real1.sm idealism has 
the primacy with Urban. His synthesis is an "Idealism 
along Realistic lines." The dialectic does not demand 
equality of thesis and antithesis in the synthesis; in 
fact they are usually not equal. In spite of his leaning 
toward idealism Urban does not intend to make philosophia 
perennis chiefly an idealism. Rather he restricts the 
meaning of it to the meaning of rationality and intelli-
gibility.5 Idealism, he holds, has been the best recent 
expression of philosophia perennis in its stand against 
naturalism, but Urban does not make a plea for idealism to 
lead the future, nor does he plea for a return to the "good 
1. Ibid., 247. This terminology is very important in The 
rntelli~ible World. Cf. Chapters I and II. 
2. Ibid., 46. 
3. I"6''d., 255. 
4. Ibid., 250. 
5. IDIO., 262. This means that his use of the term does not 
mean the Thomistic synthesis as it is usually used to 
mean. For Catholics and some others philosophia perennis 
means Thomism; for Urban Thomism is only part of it. 
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old days" of philosophia perennis. He only asks that the 
future include the presuppositions of intelligibility and 
changes sufficient to meet the development of knowledge 
through science. 
'I'his is where Urban leaves his synthesis in Beyond 
Realism and Idealism. His chapter on the synthesisl in 
which he gives promise of developing an idealistic phi-
losophy along realistic lines, is sorely disappointing. 
It is basically a chapter devoted to opposition to natural-
ism; this is proper, but one would like to know more about 
the positive side. His positive statements amount to this: 
the object must in some way lie outside the subject (this 
is merely epistemological dualism); value and being are in-
separable;2 being and mind must be so related that being 
can be known through the categories of human experience and 
knowledge. The first of these is the contribution of real-
ism and the other two the contributions of idealism. The 
whole result here is epistemological. 
However, when one examines Urbsn' s treatment of 
Berkeley, as was done above, metaphysical implications be-
come apparent. This is only implied in Beyond Realism and 
Idealism. 
1. Chapter IX. 
2. Cf. C~~pters I and II for more discussion of this. 
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It must be noted here that Urban mentions in most of 
his major works that he believes a synthesis of idealism 
and realism is both possible and desirable.l However, only 
in Beyond Realism and Idealism does he give a full exami-
nation to the problem, but in spite of this his full view 
must draw on other sources. 
In The Intelligible World Urban shows himself clearly 
to be holding to a metaphysical dualism. ~n the argument 
against Berkeley above this was implicit; here it is ex-
plicit. He says: 
Qualitative dualism is the 'most certain of all 
facts,' for the reason that the antithesis, or 
dichotomy, it represents, far from being super-
ficial, the necessary condition of intelligible 
communication of our meanings and values. 'l'he 
category of substance or essence • • • is the 
development of the values of existence. These 
values cannot be developed without this anti-
thesis, and the insistence upon two irreducible 
substances is but the acknowledgment of these 
values. 2 
In the context just previous to this quotation Urban says 
that a methodological materialism conjoined with a meGa-
physically invalid view of materialism is not sufficient. 
In other words, he insists that matter must have a real 
existence independent of mind if knowledge of the external 
is to be intelligible. He says, "The philosophy that 
1. Of., for example, The Intelligible Norld, p. 2, and 
Language and Reality, p. 375. 
2. The Intelligible World, 297. For a full development of 
the doctrine of substance cf. Chapter IV. 
173 
attempted it L!eduction of matter to spirit? would always 
find itself unintelligible."l 
It is now apparent that mind and matter both have a 
reality status, that there is a dualism in reality. How-
ever, the human mind can never allow dualism to stand as 
ultimate, for it leaves reality bifurcated and cannot ex-
plain experienced interaction of the two, and it cannot 
explain knowledge. So Urban cannot stay ultimately with 
dualism. Recognizing this Urban says that one of the two 
sides of the dualism must be given privileged position. 
Since they are held separate in the first place for the 
sake of the value of intelligibility value must take pri-
ority over existence (meaning ma. terial existence). "Value 
is more ultimate than existence, for any judgment of ex-
istence involves the acknowledgment of meanings and values 
which themselves do not exist, but are merely valid. 11 2 As 
was shown in Chapter II the validity of values for Urban 
ultimately rests on their absolute status in the divine 
mind. Matter is a creation of God.3 
Here then is the full meaning of the synthesis of 
realism and idealism into an "idealistic philosophy along 
realistic lines." Urban maintains this is the general 
drive of philosophia perennis; he uses this term to mean 
1. Ibid. 
2. !'13IO., 298. 
3. ~doctrine of God and His relation to reality will 
be discussed in Chapter V. 
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the f ull metaphys ic a l tradition i n the his tory of thought, 
n ot merely the Aristotelean-Thomistic tradition a s the term 
is us e d b y Catholic thinkers. However, it now appears h e is 
closer to iden tification with the Thomis ts than he wants to 
admit, for the ir tradition is the g reat and persistent 
(that is, perennial) dualism in the history of thought. 
Horveve r, when the instability of dualian drives him toward 
idealism he g oes beyond that tradition toward an absolute 
idealism; this will be shown fully in the last chapter of 
this exp osition. 
Before moving to a full evaluation of this view it 
is neces s ary to consider one more topic, the enemies of 
philosophia perennis, for their opposition furnishes the 
motivation back of Urban's reconciliation of idealism and 
realism. 
vi. The Enemies of Philosophia Perennis. With the 
introduction of tbe physiology of knowledge and the develop-
ment of this into the naturalization of the intelligence 
via Locke, Hume, and naturalistic evolution, the real oppo-
sition in modern philosophy has become a conflict between 
idealism and naturalism, not between idealisn and realism, 
where the issues are reconcilable .1 Naturalism, with its 
various relatives, humanism, positivism, mechanistic de-
terminism, behaviorism, and pragmatimn, has been the chief 
1. Beyond Realism and Ideal ism, 56. 
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enemy a g ainst which Urban fought most of his life. It 
be g an when he read in his younger days Nietszche's Zur 
Genealogie der lVioral. Nietszche challenged him, not be-
cause he a g reed with Nietzsche, but because Nietzsche 
forced him to re-examine his own foundations and to make 
them more firm. Hence, we see Urban fighting the same 
basic foes in Beyond Realism and Idealism as he did in 
The Intellig ible World and Language and Reality. In Be-
yond Realism and Idealism he is makirg a plea for the non-
naturalistic realists to quit fi ghting the idealists and 
join them in an alliance to meet the common foe. 
Naturalism in a sense is a hard enemy to fight be-
cause it is hard to locate. Naturalists do not seem to 
like to define nature. The best that ore is able to get 
in the way of definition is that nature is the totality of 
all that is.l The only plank that naturalists seem to 
a gree on is the primacy of the scientific method.2 But 
even here there is a fundamental ambiguity. They embrace 
scientific method with all of its accompanying prestige, 
and then, seeking to show their friendliness to humanity, 
and even to religion in some cases, they virtually abandon 
scientific methcd.3 How can one fight such a slippery foe? 
1. Ibid., 231. Urban's argument and definition here is al-
most the same as Brightman's in Nature and Values. 
2. Ibid., 232. 
3. Ibid., 233. 
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Whitehead and .Alexander have tried to synthesize ideali.sm 
and naturalism, but in reading values down into the con-
stituent elements of the universe they have really made 
naturalism primary and mind derivative.l This is largely 
true, but one cannot agree with Urb a n entirely, because 
Whitehead, by his pan-psychistic approach does read mind 
down into the constituent elements as well as matter. 
Some pan-psychistic idealists may fird Whitehead palatable; 
certainly he has much to say of interest to idealists. 
Besides its Emphasis on the scientific methcd nat ural-
ism has one other presupposition that it leans heavily upon. 
That is the derivative status of mind. Urban argues that 
this cannot be attributed to epistemology but to Darwinian 
evolution.2 But to derive mind from matter is for the 
scientist to cut off the limb on which he is sitting, for 
he uses mind in primitive experience to locate matter and 
then to give it the ·primacy. Urban's argument at this point 
is conclusive; he says: 
In thus deriving mini and knowledge from nature, 
as science conceives it, he ~he scientis!7 must 
assume that his own account Of nature is true. 
But on his premises, the truth of this account, 
like that of any other bit of knowledge, is 
merely the function of the adjustment of the 
organism to its environment, and thus has no 
more significance than any other adjustment. 
l. Ibid., 233-234. 
2. roid., 235. 
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Its sole value is survival value. This entire 
concep tion of k nowledge refutes itself' and is, 
t h eref ore, widersinnig .l 
In his Fundrunen tals of Ethics2 Urban expands and strengthens 
this argument. He says natur alistic scientists (he has 
behavioristic p sychologists in mind particularly) hold, 
that if all the facts were in, everyone would see clearly 
that mind is basically mechanistic and biological; pre-
diction and control could be complete and exact. But this 
is just the trouble; very few facts, comp ared to the numb er 
pertinent, are actually in. Th e scientists' statement then 
is an unwarranted assumption. }'urthermore the mind that is 
supp osed to predict and control, and that reaches the 
mech anistic conclusion , is itself a determined part of the 
system. Who is deceiving whom? This is evidently argument 
in a circle. 
Urban finds that the limits of tbe scientific method 
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are re a ched when one beg ins to consider knowledge and value.3 
Knowledge is only possible on the presupposition of freedom, 
for reason is oriented toward the good.4 He argues this 
point more elaborately in his article on Kant.5 He finds 
1. Ibid., 236. 
2. Fbna~entals of Ethics, 409 ff. 
3. Beyond Realism and Idealism, 237 . 
4. Ibid., 258 . 
5. 1T"JGiilt and Modern Axiology," The Heritage of Kant, ed. 
G. T. Whitney and D. F'. Bowers (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1939), 301-320. 
Kant saying that t ·reedom is the postulate of value and 
obligation; but Urban believes that this holds for knowl-
edge also at least implicitly in Kant . 1 Urban thinks Kant 
is trying to say that the distinctions in reason between 
pure and p ractical are . really abstractions, that the two 
are really from one cloth. The speculative reason goes 
beyond the pure scientific reason to postulate the regu-
lative ideas, but the point is that these re gulative ideas 
(really value norms) are regulative of the pure reason as 
it develops science. Hence even science is value oriented.2 
Kemp Smith thinks that the categories in Transcendental 
Analytic are constitutive and the ideas in the Trans-
cendent al Dialectic are regulative and that the distinction 
cannot be nullified.3 Urban admits that Kant did not mean 
to nullify the distinction but thinks he actually tended to 
d o so by his usage. 4 11\Thatever the case with Kant Urban 
holds that science is subject to regulative ideas which 
are value norms. 
Urban has struck, then, a hard blow against naturalism 
in pointing out the limitations of the scientific method 
1. Ibid., 310-311; from Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
A800-B828. 
2. Ibid., 313. 
3 . Norman Kemp Smith , A Commentary to Kant 's Critique of 
Pure Reason (2d ed. rev. and enlarged; London: Macmillan 
& co., Ltd ., 1 923) , 554nl .; Urban , ibid., 316. 
4 . Ibid., 3 l o . 
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and in pointing out that the derivative status of mind is 
self-refuting. He has, however, failed to destroy natural-
ism and establish in its stead his own idealistic philoso-
phy along realistic lines for one very important reason. 
Urban has not analyzed carefully the problem of disvalue 
or evil. That problem seems to the present writer to be 
one or the strongest points on which a naturalist can 
stand. Nature often seems indif":t'erent to man's values. 
This is not to say that there are no grounds in . nature for 
belief in some kind of objective status for values; it is 
to say instead that along with values an apparently un-· 
intelligible quantity of disvalue is to be found. Natt~al­
ists can say that values are objective only in the sense of 
providing the conditions for man's life. This ts the 
"value-possibilities" of Chapter II. But this is hardly a 
complete account of values. With this kind of objectivity 
only naturalists can go ahead and assert that the disvalue 
is there because neither nature nor anything else back of 
it has any interest in man and his problems. Any ideal-
istic position, to stand against naturalism, must be able 
to account for tne problem of evil better than this. It 
is a difficult task. Urban has failed in it. His failure 
to cope with this problem is a serious inadequacy. 
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4. EVALUATION OF THE SYNTHESIS 
In this section it is necessary to bring together 
several evaluations, some of which have already been 
mentioned or implied. 
(1). Urban uses a method of dialectic. The attempt 
to get back of the arguments of realism and idealia~ to 
presuppositions is certainly proper; however, it may be 
doubted whether these need to be logically and empiri-
cally unsupported as he maintains. Experienced error, 
unpredictability, and uncontrollability of much of the 
intuitive data of experience are evidences which support 
belief in the independence of the object from the subject 
when they are coherently interpreted. It is hard to see how 
Urban can maintain that this is logically and empirically 
unsupported. In Chapter II it was maintained that value 
norms are coherent constructs built up from experience; 
this holds also for the norms of intelligibility. Hence, 
the idealistic contribution, too, is supported by both 
logic and experience. 
(2). Given the two minima from idealism and realism, 
with mind-independent interpreted to mean only objectivity, 
Urban has an effective synthesis, but it is purely episte-
mological and is already held by many idealists and many 
realists--those who hold epistemic dualism. Urban's 
synthesis adds nothing if it is purely epistemological; 
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it only wi thstani s epi stemic monism in both forms, pan-
subjectivism and panobjectivism. 
(3). If, however, mind-independence means the in-
dependent existence of physical objects Urban has stepped 
into the realm of metaphysics and metaphysical idealists 
will refuse to follow. Although Urban does not verbalize 
it in Beyond Realism and Idealism, it was shown, on the 
basis of implications there and explicit statement else-
where, that he does hold to an ontological dualism. All 
his argument really necessitates is the independence of 
the object from the human knower, not all mind. But Urban 
rejects Berkeley's interpretation for the very unphilosophi-
cal reason that he does not like it. This truly is a 
logically and empirically unsupported judgment of value. 
Urban has neither justified his metaphysical dualism; nor 
does his synthesis demand it. His argument basically j_s 
in support oi' an epistemic dualism. 
(4). In his attempt to unite idealists and episte-
mological realists against naturalism Urban is doing a 
real service. They need to see their common g round and 
to see that positivism and metaphysical naturalism are the 
real enemies, to see that they should fight each other less 
in order to unite in the more important struggle. Here is 
where the real issues lie--the area of metaphysics; on the 
one side is metaphysical idealism (to which Urb1:m ul ti·-
mately commits himself by his primacy of value); on the 
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other side is metaphysical realism, that is, naturalism, 
and anti-metaphysical positivism. Urban dealt a significant 
blow against naturalism in pointing out its circular ch arac-
ter; it is regrettable that he did not strengthen his argu-
ment still further by answering the problem of evil. 
(5). In spite of its defects Urban's Beyond Realism 
and Idealism is penetrating in epistemological issues and 
it deserves more attention than it appears to have re-
ceived.l If for no other reason it deserves attention 
for its insight into the large area held in common by the 
bulk of the metaphy sical tradition in western thought. 
But a full picture of Urban's "ideal is tic philosophy 
along realistic lines" has not yet been g iven. To the 
task of developing such a picture in the next chapter 
it is necessary now to turn. 
1. This author has found very little interest in it in 
current literature; it is not even reviewed in many 
journals. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CATEGORIES 
Metaphysics is simply the systematic interpre-
tation of experience with all its implications.l 
/Metaphysic~ is the language of max~um con-
text, the language which alone makes intelli-
gible our other languages •••• Metaphysics 
••• is precisely that activity which seeks 
to round out our experience and to make it 
intelligible. In this sphere intelligibility 
and truth are synonomous.2 
Metaphysics is the totality of intelligible 
discourse.3 
These quotations illustrate what Urban understands meta-
physics to be. This meaning is back of practically all that 
he writes. His subject may be intelligibility, philosophy 
of language, or something else in any particular writing, 
but most of it is a defence of metaphysics so conceived, and 
more particularly of what he believes to be the traditional 
metaphysics, that is, philosophia perennis, which fits into 
this definition. Philosophia perennis has maintained a 
certain form which Urban holds to be a "natural metaphysic of 
the human mind. n4 In this form alone can the world be made 
intelligible; he considers it to be a priori.5 He does not 
conceive philosophia perennis to be any one metaphysics from 
the past as the Thomi sts do but a broad area of general 
1. The Intelligible World, 163. 
2. Language and Reality, 365-366. 
3. ~., 686. 
4. The Intelligible \.Vorld, 207. He s~ys this phrase is 
Bergson's. cr. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. 
Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, Random House, 
1944)' 354. 
5. Ibid. 
184 
agreement by all the great philosophers of the past. 
Before moving on to the development of the content of 
philosophia perennis it is necessary to take up the existence 
of other persons and the language of metaphysics, since for 
Urban all knowledge arises in connnunication.l This is es:-
pecially true of metaphysics, which is the totality of in-
telligible discourse. 
1. THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER PERSONS AND THE 
METAPHYSICAL SPEECH COMMUNITY 
Urban holds that the only possible way of verifying that 
other selves exist is by acts of communication.2 Knowing 
other minds is a matter of sharing meanings, intentions, ,and 
values. Comrrru.nicating with other minds completes one's own 
full meaning and inner reality.3 This must be true for Urban 
in the light of the discussion in Chapter I of the present 
exposition on communication and truth. There it was shown 
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that, for Urban, co~~nication is absolutely necessary for 
knowledge and that truth is defined as "adequacy of expression." 
Thus truth only arises in communication. 
The truth of the existence of other minds; however, 
appears to arise in communication for Urban in a way different 
from other truth, for the matter communicated is ordinarily 
what is at stake for verification as truth in communication. 
Here, however, it is not the matter; it is the communicator. 
1. Cf. Chapter I. 
2. "The Dialectic of Meaning and Truth," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, IV (March, 1944), 380. 
3. "The Knowledge of Other Selves and the Problem of Meaning 
and Value," Philosophical Review, XXVI (May, 1917), 287-294. 
---- -~-
Urban may be interpreted here to mean that other minds are 
really known by dialectic as one of the presuppositions or 
"co-implicates" of experience.l As such, the existence of 
other minds is a part of metaphysics, for metaphysics is 
the systematic interpretation of experience and its impli-
cations. In order to interpret experience intelligibly the 
existence of other minds must be presupposed. 
Indeed the existence of other minds takes on still 
broader metaphysical implications, for he thinks that there 
must be a "metaphysical speech community" if there is to be 
discourse at a11.2 In Language and Reality Urban says that 
intelligible communication has reference both to objects 
and to a universe of discourse, or a systematic context.3 
The existence of other minds is a part of the universe of 
discourse, for without them there is no discourse. He holds 
to a transcendental theory of communication, which says 
there must be a transcendental Self or over-individual 
society of minds (it makes no difference which here) be-
cause there must be a ground for the unity of common experi-
ence and the possibility of communication •. 4 There is a 
1. Cf. "Intelligible Communication: Its Nature and Condi-
tions," Philosophical Review, XLVII (1938), 590. Cf. also 
Chapter I of the present exposition. 
2. "Intelligible Coii1111U.Ilication: Its Nature and Conditions, n; 
58lff. 
3. Language and Reality, 232. 
4. Ibid., 255. 
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community of mind, that is, a community of mutuality.l This 
unity of mind is not empirically verifiable but is a trans-
cendental requirement of intelligible communication. For 
Urban, given his definition of metaphysics as stated at the 
beginning of this chapter, this gives it a metaphysical 
status. In this view Urban finds such men as Vossler, 
Husserl, and Royce agreeing with him.2 
If this discussion of a transcendental metaphysical 
speech community leaves the reader confused it is because 
Urban himself does not clarify the issues involved. He 
leaves open two possible interpretations: a transcendental 
Self or a transcendental society of selves. Some kind of 
transcendental unity is necessary to provide mutuality of 
mind without which knowledge and its communication are im-
possible. He says, 
Whether for the unity thus symbolized we use 
the ttmyth" of an over-individual self or of 
an over-individual community is, from the 
present point of view, a matter of relative 
indifference. I do not much care in the 
present context whether one thinks of an 
all-embracing mind in which finite minds 
live and move and have their being, or of 
an individual society of minds.3 
He grants that in other contexts the difference in the alter-
natives is significant. 
1. Ibid., 244. 
2. Ibid., 258. 
3 • Ibid • , 25 5 • 
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But what can a transcendental society of selves mean? 
It may mean merely that other selves than onets own self 
exist and have experiences s i milar to his or it may refer 
to one overall Absolute Self not yet seen in its unity. The 
latter is what it means in Hegel and Royce, and Urban claims 
support from this tradition. If Urban chooses a transcen-
dental Self he is already deeply involved in the monist:l.c 
tradition. In many places he shows a strong absolutistlc 
tendency. For example, in a rare discussion of social philo-
sophy he agrees quite generally with Hegel and Bosanquet on 
the idea of monistic, tightly organized state. He says the 
state has an "over-individual" mystical soul of its own .• 
Consistent with this he stands strongly for extension of 
state control.l 
Regardless of which choice Urban takes here the very 
presupposition of transcendental unity of some kind, whtch 
he insists on calling a metaphysical speech community, :ts 
highly suggestive of a metaphysical monism. Also, since 
its very existence is presupposed for the purpose of pro-
viding community of mutuality, one might suspect here a 
latent epistemological monism as well. 
Communication, for Urban, is essential to all knowledge. 
1. "'Nature of the Community," Philosophical Review, XXVIII 
(November, 1919), 547-561. 
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Communication has many different universes of discourse;: 
he speaks of each of these as having its own language, for 
example, the language of science, the language of religion, 
and the language of art. The language that is of immediate 
concern here is the language of maximum context, that is, 
the language of metaphysics. All the other languages make 
contributions of content to it, but it in turn makes contri-
bution to all of them as a presupposition of their intel li-
gibility or full meaning and truth. It is necessary no1-r to 
turn to a discussion of the characteristics of that central 
language that is so all important. 
2. THE LANGUAGE OF METAPHYSICS 
The quotations given at the beginning of this chapter 
indicate that the reason for metaphysics is the necessity to 
round out experience and make it intelligible. This becomes 
the guide in determining the categories. In Chapter I in-
telligibility was discussed as the foundation for a doctrine 
of cognition. so long as one is operating on the level of 
knowledge of particulars and limited universes o:f discourse 
this is epistemology, but when one moves to maximum cont ext, 
intelligibility and truth become synonomous. This means 
that epistemology and metaphysics converge at the level of 
the basic categories. The language of metaphysics then is 
the language of intelligibility. 
Since Urban believes philosophia perennis he proposes 
to examine its language to discover the characteristics of 
a proper metaphysics. Berore the categories can be dis-· 
covered in that language it is necessary to see the sym-· 
bolic character or metaphysical terms. 
Metaphysical language is a symbolic language. Science 
today is necessarily symbolic. Its objects are constructs; 
they are made up or a combination or intuitive content end 
interpretation in the light or hypotheses. Hence, scienti-
ric terms are not completely literal; rather they are sym-
bols. Literal or copy theories or scientiric concepts have 
broken down today. This is true also or the objects in the 
rields or art and religion. It is even more true or the 
language or metaphysics. Hence, symbolism is the only possi-
ble approach to metapbysics.l 
The symbolism of metaphysics is difrerent rrom that or 
the specialized fields because metaphysics seeks to throw 
light on existence in its totality; it seeks to show the 
inner essence of existence. The language or metaphysics 
is necessary to make all other languages complete and in-
telligible.2 
The subject terms of metaphysical propositions are 
always metempirical;3 they are not given directly in ex-
~ perience but are the presuppositions or necessary co-impli-
1. Cf. General discussion or symbolism in Chapter I. 
2. Ibid., 654-656. 
3. Language and Reality, 635. 
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cates of experience. Th e subject terms of metaphysical 
propositions are wholes because the metaphysical function 
of reason is a unifying function, because unity is a met a-
physical presupposition of intelligibility.l Therefore 
they come from beyond experience. 
The predicates come from some particular form of 
experience and are applied metaphorically.2 The meta-
phorical character of the predicate is not enough to 
distinguish it from the specialized fields, for even there 
a predicate may be taken from one field and applied meta-
phorically to another. For example the term "organic" as 
applied in an organic theory of the state is not literally 
applied; it belongs literally to biology, but there is an 
intuitive insight into the term as it applies there which 
carries over into social philosophy metaphorically.3 
The subject to which the predication applies deter·-
mines the difference in the way the predicate applies fJ:>om 
one field to the next. If such a term is taken from "the 
primary and irreducible domains of experience" and appli ed 
to a metaphysical subject Urban calls it a fundamental meta-
phor. An organicist metaphysics illustrates f'unda.mental 
metaphor; it might, for example, use the irreducible cate-
gory of' life metaphorically to apply to reality as a whole. 
1. Cf. Chapter I for discussion of~ as a presupposi tion. 
2. Metaphor is explained in Chapter I and also below. 
3. Ibid., 657-658. 
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An idealistic metaphysics would do the same for the category 
of mind. The following passage should help to clarify this 
concept: 
The metaphysical symbol, as fundamental meta-
phor, differs, then, in important respects from 
every other type of symbol, poetic, scientific, 
and even religious. These differences are due 
to the fact that it is fundamental. It is funda-
mental in the sense, first, that the subject of 
analogous predication is the omnitudo realitatis, 
and secondly in that, because of this fact, the 
predicates must of necessity be of a certain 
character.l 
The special nature of metaphysical subjects lies i n 
the fact that they are wholes; they are of omni tudo reali tati s. 
such subjects are indeed metempirical, but the terms used 
are derived from empirical language; hence, they are not 
completely literal terms.2 The subjects of many scientific 
propositions are partial wholes and therefore share this in-
ability to refer to their objects completely literally. 
However, as one moves up the scale of wholeness to greater 
and greater wholeness until omnitudo realitatis is reached 
the literal becomes less and the metaphorical more. A 
fundamental presupposition of historical judgments, for 
example, is the idea of a completed series, but this cru2 
never be completely literal since there are no completed 
1. ~., 659. 
2. "Literal" for Urban means terms derived from and used 
in the area of sense experience; hence all languages except 
the language of sense empiricism have a non-literal element. 
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series. Metaphysical propositions are even more symbolic.l 
The predicates of metaphysical sentences are differ·ent 
from other predicates because of the nature of their sub-
jects. All predicates are to be taken from experience. In 
metaphysics they must be taken from the most: pervasive and 
most fundamental aspects of experience. But since the subjects 
are metempirical the predicates must be "moulded" or dis-
torted from their literal meanings to a more metaphorical or 
symbolic meaning. Moulding is necessary in all symbolization, 
but it is carried further in metaphysics than elsewhere. 
Characteristic of the moulding in metaphysics is the de-· 
spatialization and de-temporalization of the predicates •. 
Urban points out Schopenhauer's metaphysics as an example. 
l . Vhen Schopenhauer says "The world is Will," the will meant 
is spaceless and timeless; otherwise one would have to inter-
pret Schopenhauer as panpsychistic.2 Also: 
"The world is will" is a meaningful symbolic 
sentence. It has no literal significance--
and indeed cannot have--but it is a funda-
mental metaphor which, by giving a privileged 
position to some fUndamental aspect of experi-
ence, enables us to express in some degree the 
meaning of "reality." It is this that I meant 
by saying that by reason of the very nature of 
the metaphysical subject the predicate is sym-
bolic in a "different way."3 
1. ~., 659-661. 
2. Ibid., 66l-b63. 
3. Ibid., 663. 
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Literal propositions in metaphysics are impossible since the 
subjects are metempirical wholes and the predicates are meta-
phorically distorted. 
Metaphysical symbols are metempirical entities pos t u-
lated to round out experience; they are necessary to make 
knowledge intelligible. But when one examines the experi-
ence to be rounded out he finds that it contains not only 
reality references but also value references. Hence, meta-
physical symbols as fundamental must include both the real 
and the valuable. The symbols are not fundamental, are not 
adequate, without being value-charged. Urban holds that in 
the great tradition of European philosophy there has always 
been primacy of value in metaphysical symbols. This means 
that axiological (or anthropological, for they are based 
on human value experience) categories must be given privi-
leged position in metaphysics.l 
Urban has said that metaphysical symbols are not llteral 
but metaphorical. But this does not mean that they are purely 
sJ~bolic. The metaphysical co-implicates, or presuppos i tions 
of experience, are in part non-symbolic. They are given in-
directly in experience, but the point is that they are ~iven. 
There is an element of content that must be there before it 
can be represented by symbolization. Kant saw these obJects 
as necessary to experience but he held that they are merely 
regulative; Urban disagrees. He believes metaphysical co-
1. ~-~ 664-666. 
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implicates to be constitutive as well as regulative.l 
The non-symbolic elements in metaphysics have been re-
ferred to in the Great Tradition as intellectual intuition 
and as a priori or intuitive knowledge. Sensationalistic 
empiricism should (and does in Hume) consistently deny the 
existence of co-implicates and of intellectual intuition.2 
The existence of metaphysical objects is not verifiable 
by sensational empiricism because as wholes they are not so 
to be experienced. They are rather to be verified in communi-
cation. The evidence that supports them is the fact that they 
are necessary postulates for intelligible discourse. The 
demand for intelligibility and for metaphysics is, at the 
level of a comprehensive view of reality, the same thing. 
Hetaphysical verification is by dialectic; that is, it is 
by persuasion to the acknowledgement of mutual presupposi-
tions.3 
Knowledge4 is triadic. It is on the following three 
levels: acquaintance, description, and interpretation. 
The first two levels involve interpretation somewhat, but 
metaphysics is entirely on the interpretative level. As know-
ledge which seeks to interpret the whole of life, metaphysics 
is the "science" of maximum context. Because it is thus 
1. ~., 669. 
2. Ibid., 669-670. 
3. Ibid., 670-677. 
4. As explained in Chapter I. 
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comprehensive, at this level truth and meaning coincideo 
Hence, it can be said that the totality of intelligible 
discourse is the truth. 1 Metaphysics is necessary to relate 
the different (and partial) languages of limited contents, 
the languages of science, poetry, history, and so forth •. 
Verifiability here is identical with the intelligibility of 
experience as a whole.2 Urban summarizes the view thus: 
This position may be stated in another way. Man 
is so made that he cannot help trying to under-
stand the world or universe in which he lives. 
Knowledge, in the sense of science , begins when 
he wonders about some particular object and 
tries to see how it fits into its surround-
ings of space-time. Even science cannot, 
however, ••• wholly escape asking questions 
about the whole and making propositions about 
it. Science passes into -explicit philosophy 
when the inquirer goes on to ask for meaning 
in the universe he is studying. Until the 
"how" passes over into the "why" all our 
previous inquiry is stultified. The only con-
ceivable end to this process is the discovery 
of reality as self-authenticating, as that 
which we acknowledge as intrinsically signi-
ficant and meaningful. In short, intrinsic 
intelligibility, self-authenticating rationa-
lity, is the only meaning of truth possible in 
this maximum con text. 3 
This quotation is saying essentially that the proper meta-
physics is that interpretation of the total of reality or 
experience which is self-authenticated to be the most 
coherent. 
1. Cf. Hegel's, "Das Wahre ist das Ganze." 
2. ~., 679-682. 
3. Ibid., 682. 
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3. THE CATEGORIES IN GENERAL 
The only criterion for metaphysical truth is "intrinsic 
intelligibility, self-authenticating rationality." This 
means it is necessary to select those terms which are neces-
sary to round out experience and arrange them in an intelli-
gible system. The terms in metaphysics are the categories, 
and the system is the schema or relation of the categories. 
Urban is not very clear in his selection of categories. 
He uses the term a great deal, but he uses it very loosely 
at times. In various places all of the following are called 
categories: being, value, substance, cause, purpose, origin, 
destiny, finality, potentiality, evolution, space, time, 
matter, life, mind, spirit. Some of these are synonyms; 
others are subordinate.l It will be necessary to consider 
carefully the criterion of intelligibility to discover which 
are primary categories. 
The first demand of intelligibility, as evidenced 
throughout this essay, Urban holds to be the inseparability 
of being and value--the axiom of intelligibility. The 
second demand is conformity to natural language, for 11 th~ 
only way to determine being or reality is in those forms in 
which statements about it are possible."2 For Urban this 
1. Which are synonyms and which subordinate will be apparent 
in the exposition of the individual categories to follow. 
2. Language and Reality, 350; italics are Urban's. 
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means that metaphysical categories are, in maximum context, 
derived from knowledge categories, which are in turn der ived 
from linguistic categories.l He holds that both Aristo 'l:;le 
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and Kant derived their metaphysical categories from linguistic 
categories.2 This is proper, Urban holds, because the natural 
metaphysics of the human mind is revealed in natural lru1guage. 
The third demand of a category is that it be broadly 
applicable, that is, that it belong to maximum context. 
Urban's best discussion of categories in general is 
given in an unpublished manuscript entitled God and the 
Historians. Here he criticizes Kant for limiting categories 
to science.3 In a context in which he is developing a doc-
trine of historical categories he says there are two levels 
of categori es, primary and supervenient. He lists as pri mary 
categories substance, causality, space, and time. He adds 
that these do not vary; on them are built scientific con-
structs called superveni ent categories. These include in 
physics, for example, such things as inertia, mass, element, 
atom, energy, and others. These a.re useful only to the ex-
tent they give scientific intelligibility--simplicity, unity, 
and continuity. They may vary and cannot yield ultimate in-
telligibility. They rather presuppose the unchanging pri-
mary categories. This is true also of historical categories 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., 157-158. 
3. God and the Historians, Appendix, 1. 
or the categories that belong to any particular field. 1 
Only in terms of substance or essence, as the 
ultimate core of being, of causality as effi-
cient and final activity, of restless becoming 
and self-contained being--only .in such terms 
can the mind apprehend and communicate its own 
life, and ultimately the meaning of the world 
in which that life is lived. In fine, what-
ever modifications men may make in connection 
with the correlation and control of phenomena, 
the earlier remain what they have always been, 
the a priori of an intelligible world and to 
these one who seeks to make it intelligible 
must continually return.2 
This quotation confirms the statements above that eate-
gories are those forms which satisfy the primary demands of 
the mind for intelligibility. But these have also been shown 
to be the forms of reality. It is apparent that the system 
of categories, the system of intelligibility (in maximum con-
text) and the system of metaphysics are all the same thi ng. 
They are merely different ways of approaching the language of 
maximum context which is necessary to round out experience. 
The quotation says more. Interpreted in the light of 
other passages it implies that there are two basic divisions 
of reality, namely, being and value. Elsewhere these are 
called categories.3 These are also given in the axiom of 
intelligibility. Substance is seen in the quotation to be 
1. Ibid., 2-3. 
2. Ibid., 3. The first half of this quotation is used ver-
batum:from The Intelligible World, 214. 
3. "Value and Existence," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, 
and scientific Method, XIII (1916), 461. 
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the basic category in the division of being and causalit y 
the basic category in the division of value. Causality here 
means both efficient and final causality. This means that 
it is telic; it is value at work. It is value activity push-
ing forward; it is the "restless becoming" of the quotation. 
"Self-contained" being in the quotation refers to substance. 
Just a few pages after the quotation1 Urban says the 
categories or concepts of the mind fall into a scheme of 
levels: matter, life, mind, spirit. In the light of the 
discussion above of these as levels of existence these may 
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be seen to be categories of being rather than value categories. 
But this does not mean that they have nothing to do with 
value, for it has been shown2 that value is a determining 
factor of anything which is called real. The idea that these 
are levels is also a value concept. Further, the level 
of spirit is really the intellect in value activity. But 
basically these four are conceived of as existence levels 
in distinction from the more specifically value categories 
which are conceived of as telic activity or telic potenti-
ality. 
Urban adds that each of these levels has its own dis-
tinctive categories. These would be the beginning of the 
supervenient categories. 
Urban's discussion of categories is not systematic; he 
1. God and the Historians, Appendix, 5. 
2. Chapters I and II. 
never provides an organized table of categories in spite of 
his frequent usage of the term and in spite of his demand 
that metaphysics, to be so at all, must be systematic. How-
ever, the discussion of categories in general just given 
shows an implied organization which will become the organi-
zation for the discussion of the specific categories to 
follow below. First to be discussed are the c a tegories of 
being. Substance is the primary category of being. Dis-
cussion of it will be followed by a discussion of the four 
categories or levels of existence. Then will follow the 
value categories conceived under causality as the most basic 
and comprehensive form of value and of value striving. Then 
the supervenient categories will be considered in connection 
with the sub-division of knowledge. Finally an attempt will 
be given at constructing a table or schema of the categories 
for Urban as it appears to be implicit in his unsystematic 
presentation. 
All the categories, however, must be distinguished from 
the primary objects of metaphysics, wh ich are the soul, the 
world, and God.l These will be discussed in the next chapter. 
4. SUBSTANCE 
Substance is a central part of the "natural metaphysic 
of the human mind." It is evident in natural language which 
always has a subject-predicate form. The subject-predicate 
form of language is really the substance-attribute form of 
natural metaphysics. It is the only form that speaks an 
1. Language and Reality, 691. 
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intelligible language. 1 
Substance arises by virtue of the subject terms of 
metaphysical propositions. In order to speak of reality at 
all one must speak of something and predicate something of 
it. Hence, substance is a demand of intelligible discourse 
about reality. Against Whitehead Urban asserts that dynamic 
categories are unsatisfactory; "becoming" will not do as 
the foundation of metaphysics; something must become.2 
Here is the old problem of the permanent and the changing 
that caused the ancient Greeks so much trouble. Urban chooses 
to align himself with Plato and Aristotle and the others who 
sought a synthesis in which the unchanging is the base. His 
objection to Whitehead is to the Heraclitean tradition, which 
has found new life in recent thought in Whitehead, Bergson, 
and other dynamists. 
For Urban substance means the "ultimate core of be:tng, 
the independent individuality. 11 3 It also carries the con-
notation of essence.4 This means that the concrete, indivi-
dual thing is substance. This meaning of substance is vir-
tually that of Aristotle and St. Thomas. It includes AJ:>is-
1. ~., 1.5. 
2. "Whitehead's Philosophy of Language and Its Relation to 
His Metaphysics, 11 The Philo sop of Alfred North Whitehead, 
Vol. III of the Li~r~a~ry~~o~~rv~~~P~~o~s~o~p~~e~r~s-,~p~a~u~-r----
Schilpp (ed.), 301-327. 
3. The Intelligible World, 213. 
4. Ibid., 284. 
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totle's primary sense of the individual and his secondary 
sense of the universal. As such the individual substance is 
made up of its class characteristics, or essence, and its 
own individual differences from the class. There is a high-
ly existential connotation to this concept of substance 9 
but there is more than existence in it, for substance is 
partly value-determined. Both the meaning and value of 
"individual" are determined by the values of existence; 
this is true also of the universal, which is the basis of 
substance in its sense of essence.l In substance value and 
reality are inseparable as the axiom of intelligibility 
demands. 
Urban summarizes the meaning of substance in its empha-
sis on individuality thus: 
/Substance? gives unity to any entity which can 
Eecome the subject of intelligible discourse ••• 
• To say of a being or entity that it is a sub-
stance is to assert that it remains one and the 
same among its multiple changes.2 
This unity is not perceived by sense but by intellect oJ:a 
reason, which always applies axiological as well as existen-
tial ca.tegori es .3 
Since value is a part of the substance notion Urban 
1. Ibid., 283-284. Cf. Chapter II, where it was noted 
that-existence is a predicate the mind assigns to something 
of very "special significance." 
2. Language and Reality, 696-b97. 
3. Ibid., b97. 
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says the substance idea is not wholly literal. This he says 
because by "literal" he has reference to the world of space-
time. He says metaphysical terms come from spatio-temporal 
language and are progressively filled with spiritual con-
tent; that is, they become metaphorically symbolic. 
Urban admits that the substance idea is ambiguous be-
cause it has reference to the individual and also to the 
universal. But he holds it to be necessary to intelligible 
thought. Since it reaches both for the individual and the 
universal, it is the bridge that builds the hierarchy of 
being and points to the ultimate substance at the top of 
the hierarchy, which is ens realissimum. He says, 
Retention of the concept of ultimate substance, 
as of ultimate origination, with which it is 
closely connected, is the sine qua non of all 
further intelligible thought. It is a neces-
aary sta?e in the development of the Idea, or 
the mean1ng of reality, and in the interpreta-
tion and communication of that meaning.l 
Urban's doctrine of substance is much like that of 
Aristotle. But Aristotle's treatment of substance in the 
sense of the individual is lacking a criterion of indiv:l.-
duality. Urban correctly sees that there is such a cri·· 
terion implicit in Aristotle; the logical and epistemological 
values of the knower determine individuality. This means 
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that the unity of the individual thing is not primarily in the 
thing but in the perceiver. It is imposed upon the thing. 
1. The Intelligible World, 285. 
This is a distinct improvement over Aristotle who distin-
guished individuals so easily that he thought the indivi-
duality was actually in them. 
However, Urban is still tied too closely to Aristotle 
for his principle of unity is not intrinsic. Leibniz m~~es 
a distinction between individual unities that are merely 
conventional and those that are intrinsic or natural uni.ties. 
Urban's individuals that are determined by value would fall 
into the category of conventional unities. There is no 
doubt that there is a certain pragmatic usefulness to con-
cepts so constructed. They are all the more useful in that 
they can be constructed from a variety of points of view. 
For example, a given object may be regarded as a piece of 
paper, a legal document, a part of a pile of paper, a mass 
of atomic activity, fuel, or many other things, depending on 
the value perspective of the subject that is referring to it. 
This variety is useful; it makes possible subjects for sen-
tences in conventional linguistic usages, but it is too un-
stable (it is subjectively determined) to become the basis 
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of a metaphysical doctrine of substance. When one sees that 
Urban's individuals are really only conventional, subjectively 
determined, unities one finds it difficult to see how Urban 
can hold to as much realism as he does, for realists need 
natural unities. 
If Urban is interpreting experience and its co-implicates 
he should be more empirical; he should start with the experi-
enced individual unity of the self, an experienced intrinsic 
unity. When one looks at the self, he finds a unity whi.ch 
is not merely conventional or value-constructed for the pur-
pose at hand. Personality or selfhood is a principle of 
individual unity which can be used as a metaphysical building 
block. Further, besides meeting Leibniz's criterion of in-
trinsic unity it also meets Bergson's demand that reality 
be seen as active (because it is always experienced as active 
and flowing), for a person is a unity of activity, not a 
mere static substance. Further, even Urban's own demand. that 
substance be more than mere becoming, that there be something 
to become, is satisfied, for the person does persist through 
his activity and change. Thus a principle of substance can 
be found which meets the demands of metaphysics that . it 
round out experience without violating experience. It 
accounts for both permanence and change. Urban actua l ly 
comes close to a personalistic view sometimes when he is 
thinking axiologically; for example, he says at one point, 
"The only thing that is intrinsically intelligible ••• is 
a will oriented towards values," but he fails to follow the 
pluralistic idealism implicit in this statement.l 
If Urban had used such an intrinsic unity as the self 
as primary substance, then he could have followed it with 
his own doctrine of substance, using it in a secondary sense, 
and still have saved the subject-predicate linguistic form, 
which he considers a priori to intelligibility. 
1. The Intelligible World, 210. 
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But Urban cannot allow any such doctrine of substance 
for other reasons than those already stated, for he denies 
any ultimate significance to time and change. For him the 
ens realissimum is also the ens perfectissimum which is an 
absolutely perfect and unchangeable God. This means that 
God, eternity, infinity are all qualitatively distinct from 
experienced reality, which by implication is mere appear•ance. 
Urban, however, is too much of a realist to admit this im-
plication. Urbants God dwells in an eternal now, a static 
state, similar to Aristotle's Prime Mover who is Pure .ctu-
ality and cannot move lest his movement be toward imperfec-
tion. 
But this is jumping ahead to the climax of Urban's 
metaphysics. His doctrines of time and God must wait for 
their fuller development. 
Substances are individuals, but there are many kinds of 
individuals; an examination of these kinds is necessary now. 
5. THE LEVELS OF BEING . 
When the mind examines the various substances Urban 
finds it dividing them into four large divisions: Matter, 
life, mind, and spirit. Urban thinks that all intelligible 
philosophies must recognize these divisions.l These terms 
are basic and indefinable. Instead of being defined in other 
terms they are the terms in which other ideas and concepts are 
understandable.2 They form an interrelated hierarchy in the 
1. Ibid., 441. 
2. Ibid., 441-41+2. 
207 
order given. Each has its own distinctive categories not 
reducible to the level below it. The interrelation is given 
in what Urban calls the law of the categorial scheme;l it 
is expressed thus: 
The different sciences or spheres of knowledge 
correspond to different levels of reality and 
each level is a natural one in that it possesses 
its own language and categories which, while not 
completely independent of the other levels, are 
largely so, and that, in consequence, they have 
coordinate reality. In the second place, while 
the higher level may be said to be relatively 
independent of the lower, it is not wholly so. 
It is independent in so far as there are aspects 
of the higher not exhaustively expressible in the 
categories of the lower and therefore not reducible 
to them; but they are dependent, in the sense that 
the categories of the higher can not negate those 
of the lower.2 
A very important consequence of these levels and of 
the categorial scheme is that there is also a hierarchy of 
the sciences as well as of the categories.3 Sciences here 
must be interpreted to mean all the fields of knowledge in-
cluding the following and in this hierarchical order: the 
physical sciences, the life sciences, the social sciences, 
and the humanities. Metaphysics determines this order of 
the sciences and places them in philosophic system.4 
Each of the four levels develops out of the level below 
it, and the level below is not fully understood without the 
level above it. Urban finds Aristotle putting it thus: Life 
l. cr. below for development of the categorial scheme. 
2. God and the Historians, Appendix, 5. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 9. 
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is the entelechy of matter, mind the entelechy of life, and 
spirit the entelechy of mind. Hegel, speaking of the same 
thing, said life is the truth of matter, mind the truth of life, 
and spirit the truth of mind.l Urban elsewhere2 uses his own 
terminology; he says matter is intelligible only through life, 
life through mind, and so forth. His term "intelligible" 
shows that he is conceiving the levels to be axiologically 
determined. 
Spirit is the top category of existence. By spirit 
Urban means "something within ourselves, not sense, that per-
ceives and va.lues them fValues7."3 Mind as intellect with-
out spirit is oriented toward space and matter. But mind can-
not really be separated from spirit except in thought. The 
two are united in experience. Hence, the mind always has pur-
posive direction and is to be understood through values. 
Spirit is mind in value orientation. Urban thinks he has the 
support of both Aristotle and Hegel in this view of mind and 
spiri t.4 
Spirit as the top level is really the category that makes 
it possible to account for the others and to understand the 
others. It is much easier to move in understanding from the 
top down rather than from the bottom up.5 Traditional philo-
1. "1The Philosophy of Spirit: Idealism and the Philosophy 
of Value," Contemporary Idealism in America, ed. Clifford 
Barrett (New YorK: The Macmillan Co., 1932), 122. 
2. The Intelligible World, 442. 
3. "The Philosophy of Spirit: Idealism and the Philosophy 
of Value , 11 108 • 
4. Ibid., 118. 
5. Ibid., 123. 
sophy holds it to be an a priori axiological principle that 
there can be procedure in the direction of the more to the 
less but never the reverse. The tradition says, "Ex minimo 
maximum non fit,n and back of this is the assumption~ 
nihilo nihil fit.l 
Urban finds that much of philosophic modernism agrees 
with him on the four categories of existence, but the modern-
ists do not see them as levels. He mentions specifically 
Alexander, who finds no greater reality, no greater perfec-
tion in one than another.2 Urban finds all emergent doc-
trines, such as Alexander1 s, inadequate, for the levels 
do not emerge one from the other. The one was not poten.ti-
ally in the other as the principle of the more giving rise 
to the less demands. Modernisms tend to make time causal, 
but time itself can bring forth nothing. Nothing can come 
from nothing. As a matter of fact there is no such thing 
as nothing. Rather the term refers to the null point as 
the low limit in a series of which the other limit is perfec-
tion or the "all. 11 3 
For metaphysical explanation the controversy over levels 
really reduces to the bottom and the top level, matter and 
1. "Metaphysics and History," The Review of Metaphysic~, 
III (1950), 293. 
2. The Intelli~ible World, 44b. He refers to Samuel Alex-
ander, Space, T me and Deity (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1920), Vol. II, Chapter IX, Section F, alsop. 410. · 
3. The Intelligible World, 291-292. 
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spirit. All philosophies divide over which of these shall 
be given the privileged position in metaphysical explana-
tion. This is the most fundamental gulf in philosophy.l 
Modernisms tend to choose matter and see spirit arise from 
it; this violates the whole of the Great Tradition which can 
see the lesser arising from the greater, never the reverse. 
Urban, of course agrees with the Tradition. 
In so agreeing Urban holds that this does not mean that 
matter. is reduced to spirit. He sees rather a dualism of 
the two. In rather strong language for one who has so much 
sympathy for idealism he says: 
Qualitative dualism is the "most certain of 
all facts," for the reason that the anti-
thesis, or dichotomy, it represents, far 
from being superficial, represents the neces-
sary condition of intelligible communication 
of our meanings and values. The category 
of substance or essence, we have seen, is the 
development of the values of existence. These 
values cannot be developed without this anti-
thesis, and the insistence upon two irreduci-
ble substances is but the acknowledgement of 
these values.2 
Urban is committing himself here to an ontological 
dualism. This passage gives a good deal of insight into 
the kind of a synthesis of realism and idealism he would set 
forth. In the discussion of this synthesis3 it was shown 
1. Ibid., 293. 
2. Ibid., 297. 
3. Cf. Chapter III. 
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that the part of realism he insists on is the "mind inde-
pendence" of objects, that is, that the objects are real, 
antecedent to being known by subjects·. If by this Urban 
means only antecedent to being known by human subjects the 
path is still open for a basic idealism, but if it means 
antecedent to all knowers then he is stressing realism. 
The former discussion and the passage just quoted here both 
indicate he is holding to a dualistic realism. In this he 
is very close to Thomism which finds two kinds of sub-
stances, matter and mind, both equally real. 
But Urban holds to a doctrine of degrees of reality.l 
This is implied in his insistence that the categories of 
existence are levels of existence and that they are a devel-
opment from nothing to perfection. Hence, matter and mind 
(meaning intellect plus spirit) are not equally significant. 
One cannot be reduced to the other, but one must assume the 
privileged position for the sake of explanation and for the 
sake of metaphysical unity. Both orders are constitutive 
of reality, and they mutually involve each other. But if 
the world is to be a unity it must be so under one or the 
other.2 Naturalism and materiali~m choose matter. Urban 
(and philosophia perennis) chooses spirit. He maintains 
that the value character of the theoretical and the axiolo-
gical conception of the totality of all are determinative. 
1. ~., 446. 
2. ~., Cf. 297-298 and 454. 
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He says: 
From this point of view value is more ultimate 
than existence /that is, matter7, for any judg -
men t of existence involves the- acknowledgment 
of meaning s and values 1...rhich thems e lves do not 
e x i st but are mere ly v a lid.l 
Here spirit is defin:i.tely g iven the privileg ed posi-
tion . 11 The key value • • • is the ir.1.manent activity of . 
Spirit--that intrinsic intelligibility of intellect directed 
tow a r d s the g ood or value. 11 2 The lower le,vels of existence 
h a.ve not risen up from. nothing ; rather they are lovJer by 
defect or neg ation from the highest level.3 
In thus g iving privileg e to mind through value and 
emphasizing t ha t intellect is moved to activity by valu e 
Urban is clo ser to idealism, closer to the view urg ed above 
in criticism of his doctrine of substance in g enere l. But 
h e does not see cle '-.rly that his doctrine of substance 
would be more coherent if it were restricted to minds. 
r.tlinds t h roug h value, even on his o-vm vj_evr, g ive to other 
substances the unity they have; their unity (that is, their 
ind i v i duality ) is not intrinsic. But persons have an in-
trinsic individuality and tmi ty . \'lhy then must Ur b an use 
e. doctrine of substa nce b ased upon imposed individuality, 
a doctrine Hhich leaves highly unstable individu al uni t 5_e s ? 
1. Ibid ., 298 . 
2. I bid . , 443. 
3. Ibid . 
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Now that substance in general has been discussed and its 
levels set forth, it is necessary to discuss the specifi.cally 
value categories. The most comprehensive and most basic of 
these, as Urban sees it, is causality conceived as both effi-
cient and final. After causality is seen in its full impli-
cations it will be possible then to return to a consider·ation 
of each of the levels of existence separately and the fields 
of knowledge to which each gives rise. But since causality 
is immanent in each of these fields it is necessary to under-
stand it first. 
6. CAUSALITY 
In what Urban refers to as . his "metaphysical creed"l 
his first article is the inseparability 0f value and reality. 
The second arti.cle grows out of the first; it says that the 
inseparability shows that origin and destiny cannot be 
separated from value. These are the trtime forms of value." 
This means that any intelligible doctrine of causality 
must be teleological. Efficient and final causality are 
bound together ultimately. Efficient causality can be 
seen by itself without the value reference of final causality, 
but it is not ultimate when so seen; it is not metaphysi·-
cal, because it has been isolated from "maximum context." 
Maximum context al~ys shows purposive direction to 
causality. Efficient and final causality are ultimately 
the same, for all ultimate reasons are possible only in terms 
1. "Metaphysics and Value," 375. 
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of aim toward values.l 
Historical origins do not necessarily determine the 
meaning and value of things. When the empirically-deter-
mined origin of things is offered as the total explanation 
of them there is a dangerous fallacy, which Urban calls 
the ''genetic fallacy." But consideration of ultimate origin 
is quite a different thing. Metaphysical origin takes into 
consideration purposive intent, that is, meanings and values.2 
Modernists offer evolution as a category in place of 
a value conception of metaphysical origin. When they mean 
by this a reality that creates itself they are completely 
unintelligible because it is a priori that the more does 
not come from the less. Urban finds creative and emergent 
forms of evolution guilty at this point when they make time, 
as such, causal and supreme. Evolution can be intelligible. 
It is so when it ft conceived as teleological. Teleology 
itself needs no proof; it is a necessary presupposition of 
thought. In teleological evolution there is a greater gradu-
ally revealing its fullness in development; here the less 
is emerging from the greater, and the development is an: un-
folding of the values contained in the universe. Teleolo-
gical evolution is the time form of' value. The universe it-
self cannot be said to evolve or even to change. Only in-
dividuals and totalities within the world can change, for the 
1. Language and Reality, 693. 
2. Cf. Humanity and Deity, 270. 
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11 uni verse u rrru.st include the whole--all that can be, as well 
as all that is. If God is p erfect in the beg inning, devel-
opment can only be manifestation of His being in time; if 
He is finite His progress is not of' the whole .l 
Urban also speaks sometimes of the category of poten-
tiality. It is closely rele.ted to both origin and evolu-
tion. Potentiality means that the new levels that develop 
are, before their development, i1nmanent in t he total pro-
cess; the nisus is already within the whole.2 This is im-
plied in ex minima maximum non fit. 
Causali ty as ultimate and metaphysical is the concept 
of unc aused Cause or causa sui. The natural metaphysics of 
the hmnan mind a lways comes to this concept. It is necessary 
for int e llig ibility and is implied also in ex minimo maximum 
non fit . Even modernism is guilty of holding to it when 
it talks of a reality that crea tes itself gradually. Some-
thing must exist itself of necessity before anything con -
tingent can e xist and become the cause of' other existences. 
The causal chain must have its orig in in a self-caused 
Cause . P~y other explanation denies the value-interpretation 
of' causality and becomes unintellig ible.3 It mus t be remem-
bered that Urben gives value the privileg ed position in 
metaphysical explanation. 
1. The Intelligible World, 299-332. 
2. Ibid., 279-280 , 308-310. 
3. Ibid., 287. 
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As no t ed above causality is both efficient and final. 
In other v.rords, contained in it rrmst be both the category 
of orig in and the category of finality or destiny. Finality 
is very closely related to orig in, since in a teleological 
view of re a lity purpose i s back of and causal to both. 
Finality has its own dialectical support. The argument runs 
thus: It is a priori that given any values at all they 
must be in a scale of more or less. This does not mean any 
particular scale. A second a priori of value is t h at the 
better ought to be chosen rather then the worse. By exten-
sion this means that the overall best, tha t is, the ~~ 
bontun, is demanded. Reality makes this demand of men. If 
so reality itself ~ust show finality in the sense of in-
creasing purpose, for ree,li ty to demand maximization of value 
of men without finality in itself would be axiolog ically in-
tolerable and to this extent unintelligible.l "As the axi-
olog ic a lly intolerable is the unintellig ible and ultimately 
the metaphysically impossible, so the axiologically a priori 
is the metaphysically necessary. n2 
Urban conceives destiny to be a bit different tnom 
finality. Finality is the g oal to..,rard which the potentiality 
develops; destiny is the termination of the development. It 
is to be reached in finite time. JvleEcning and valu e cannot 
be separated from either origin or destiny. Modernists deny 
1. Ibid., 338-343. 
2. Ibid~, 344. 
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both; they speak of values that "come from nothing and come 
to nothing." But this cannot be. The future of anything is 
a necessary part of its nature and meaning. Without destiny 
there would be infinite regress in the future direction.l 
But Urban finds a difficult paradox in his doctrine 
of finality. On the one hand there must be endings to in-
dividual lives and social histories, for it would other-
wise be impossible to realize or communicate the meanings 
of these. On the other hand the overall meanings seeking 
expression are universal. 
This is, indeed, the final metaphysical 
problem of life--that life is, in its 
very essence, at once limited individuality 
and limitless continuity. It is meaning-
ful also only if every finite end is trans-
cended. The innermost meaning of time is 
just this inalienable difference between 
what is and what ought to be--between the 
imperishable goal and its consummation. No 
thought can bridge this difference--no pure-
ly conceptual terms can rationalize this 
paradox, and yet it is constantly being 
solved in experience. In every perfect 
realization of life, however fleeting, the 
contradiction is resolved.2 
Urban does not tell in this context just how the contradic-
tion is resolved, but it is evident from other contexts that 
his final answer is that it is resolved by "trenching on 
the mystical. 11 3 
1. Ibid., 359-367, 
2. Ibid., 365. 
3. Further discussion of this concept is given in the next 
chapter. 
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Involved in this paradox is Urban 1 s whole doctrine of 
absolute values and the doctrine of the necessity of believ-
ing in an ens realissimum identical with an ens perfect-
issimum. He holds that any value points through a series 
of degrees to perfection. There must be a perfect to make 
possible the less than perfect. Thus, the ontological 
argument is central for him. But all this is not immedi-
ately apparent. Many thinkers have h ad trouble accepting 
the ontological argument. Urban is here holding to an 
assumption without proof, or, using his o~m methodology, 
without adequate persuasion. This problem culminates in the 
doctrine of God, and to the discussion of that doctrine 
later in the next chapter the reader must be referred for its 
full coverage. 
This section on causality shows that Urban's concept 
of cause is deeply imbued with value. Value is the moti-
vation of efficient cause ultimately and is the goal in 
final causality. Hence, the categories of origin and poten-
tiality and of finality and destiny are really axiological 
categories, and they are all implied in the more general 
category of causality. 
The last quotation suggested another category that is 
related to value for Urban. He said there, "The innermost 
meaning of time is just this inalienabie difference between 
what is and what ought to be--between the imperishable goal 
and its con summation." Here is the problem of the category 
of time. It is necessary now to look further into its 
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meaning. The category of space will be considered with 
time since Urban ties the two very closely together and 
since much of what he says for one he holds for the other 
also. 
7. TIME AND SPACE 
Urban holds that traditional philosophy has uniformly 
held that the intelligible world is ultimately non-spatial 
and non-temporal.l But in the phenomenal world space and 
time are necessary. In de~cription (both physical and 
mental description) a place is necessary and a time is 
necessary. For descriptive science the point-instant is 
the unit of manipulation. Space-time is externality and is 
a necessary condition of intelligible description. 2 This 
is as much true for a science that is basically temporal, 
such as history, as it is for physics.3 
It can be seen from the pre.ceding paragraph that space 
and time are very closely related for Urban. This is be-
cause of his view of existence. Existence, as has been 
noted before, is limited to spatia-temporal being. Hence 
Urban can say: 
The past, whether it be astronomical, geological, 
biological or historical, can ••• be conceived 
only as the spatial deposit of the temporal. It 
1. The Intelligible World, 233. 
2. Ibid., 238. 
3. Ibid., 241-243. 
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is by the foot-prints on the sands of time 
that the past is known, and both foot-prints 
and sands involve the spatial. 1be recogni-
tion of the inseparab le relation between 
space and time constitutes the condition of 
the understanding of the historical wherever 
found.l 
Urban's justification for holding that time and space 
are inseparable is the physical doctrine of relativity with 
its consideration of time as a fourth dimension of space 
and its emphasis on describing all physical phenomena in 
terms of space-time coordinates.2 
Urban speaks of the law of necessary times; it takes 
time to make anything . Similarly, the law of necessary 
spaces holds that it takes space in which to make anything . 3 
Neither can do without the o ther ; each always has reference 
to the other and without it is nothing but an empty ab-
straction . But out of their combination concrete reality 
arises . 4 "Space-time consti t utes the all~pervasive form 
of everything that 1 is 1 in the sense of our definition of 
existence . "5 It should be noted that space-time is a neces-
sary form of things. It is not creative or causal; Urban 
rejects Alexander ' s doctrine of space - time as creative.6 
1 . God and the Hist orians, Chapter III, 4 . 
2 . Ibid . 
3 . Ibid . , 5. 
4 . Ibid., 9 . 
5. Ibid., 6. 
6. Ibid., 11 . 
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Space Urban conceives to be the principle of indivi-
duation that makes things mutually external in their in-
dividuation. In operation not only does space externalize 
but it tends to segregate. Hence in planets the tendency 
is for metallic centers to be segregated from stony crusts; 
among men segregation is noted by the tendency of men to 
crowd tog ether in towns. In biology segregation is noted 
in the fixation of species.l 
As noted in the preceding section Urban holds that the 
"inmost meaning of time is the inalienable difference be-
t1.veen that which is and that which ought to be. n2 'l'ime is 
a form through which value is realized, but space, as 
closely related to time, also has a value aspect. Signifi-
cance or value is derived in part at least from a fact be-
ing in one position and one time rather than another . 3 
But space and time get their significance from some-
thing outside themselves . 4 Urban must hold to this be-
cause of his doctrine that values are transcendent and ab-
solute. Hence, he says5 that the space-time problem must 
if 
find its solution in axiology. Both space and time are but 
the distances between what is and what ought to be."6 But 
1. Ibid ., 7 . 
2. The Intelligible 1'forld, 247. 
J . Ibid . , 246 . 
4. Ibid ., 256. 
5 . Ibid . , 257. 
6 . I bid., 262. 
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distances have meaning only instrumentally in the realiza-
tion of values. They point to ultimate, intrinsic values. 
Hence, Urban concludes that the space-time order is only 
phenomenal or symbolic of an ultimate non-spatial and non-
temporal metaphysical order.l This is held because of his 
belief that any value scale must ultimately point to an 
ens perfectissimum. 
In some of his discussions of the transcendent order 
of value, which is the real and which gives meaning to the 
realm of space and time, Urban neglects to speak much about 
space. Most of the discussion concerns time. This seems 
inconsistent in the light of the discussion just given in 
which he strongly contends for the inseparability of the 
two. It may be that he was beginning to suspect that they 
could be separated with time taking the priority. However, 
he never admits this. At any rate the reader will notice 
that there has not been an adequate distinction made between 
time and space, or, in other words, that space and time 
are inseparably bonded together in Urban's thought without 
anpradequate justification of the bonding. 
Space was mentioned as the principle of individuation. 
This could easily be confused with substance, which was also 
called the principle of individuation. Here is a distinction 
which Urban has failed to work out. He does say that space 
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is individuati on by mutual externality; this helps some but is 
1. ~., 262, 263. 
not completely adequate. It does not show hovi value and 
space contribute to, and cooperate in, individuality. Space 
and time are left with even less distinction than space and 
substance. For eventually he speaks of both space and time 
as the distance between the 11 is 11 and the "ought." One must 
ask, Are they the same kind of distance? The obvious answer 
of experience is No. Then what is it? Urban bypasses this 
problem. 
i. The Infinite and Time. Continuing the investigation 
of the relation of value and temporal reality one finds that 
time for Urban is a phenomenal realization of the goals of 
the Infinite as men experience the value movement of the In-
finite, but the Infinite is eternally accomplishing and has 
eternally accomplished its goals. Urban has to hold this 
224 
because he holds to God as ens perfectissimum. Urban holds 
that a perfect being cannot move through time without moving 
away from perfection, for that is the only possible direction. 
Urban feels Hegel has the best statement of a solution to the 
problem. He quotes the following passage from Hegel with 
his own approval of its meaning: 
Within the range of the finite we can never see 
or experience that the end has been really se-
cured. The consummation of the infinite end, 
therefore, consists merely in removing the illu-
sion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The 
Good, the Absolutely Good, is eternally accomplish-
ing itself in the world, and the result is that it 
needs not wait upon us, but is already by implica-
tion, as well as in full actuality accomplished. 
This is the illusion under which we live. It alone 
supplies at the same time the actualizing force on 
which the interest in the world depends. In the 
course of its process, the idea creates that illu-
sion by setting an antithesis to confront itself, and 
its action consists in getting rid of the illusion 
which it has created.l 
Urban admits that some find this passage from Hegel to 
be a "spectacular performance" little better than make-
believe, but Urban finds it to be a good expression. He finds 
the contradiction between "accomplishing" and "accomplished" 
resolved by making time merely phenomenal and eternity qual-
itatively distinct from it. Urban says, 
The place of events in time is determined by 
their relations and their total world of 
events is itself without place in time, since 
there is nothing outside it to determine that 
place.2 
Time, then, is nothing but the order of the relations 
of events; without the events it is nothing.3 Similarly 
space is an order of relations; it is nothing without bodies 
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but the possibility of placing them in relations. He concludes: 
Things, events, happenings, movements, etc., are 
in space and time but their meaning lies outside 
space and time • • • • All of which suggests that 
a merely historical view of things ••• cannot 
be ultimate and that in the historical itself 
there is that which goes beyond history •••• 
The historical itself is under~tandable only in 
terms of the super-historical.4 
1. Quoted in God and the Historians, Chapter VI, 29-30, from 
Hegel's Encyclopaedie, section 212, Zusatz; it may be found 
in Wallace's translation, The Logic of' Hegel (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1892), 351-352. 
2. God and the Historians, Chapter, VI, 35. 
3. Ibid., 37. 
4. Ibid., 38. 
This super-historical is a timeless Absolute, an Infinite 
God of perfection. He provides the values and meanings that 
belong to space and time. Values are realized through time, 
but they are absolutes which come from beyond time. 
But some will ask, Are not perfection and development 
contradictory? Urban's answer is No. "Development implies 
perfection and perfection, in so far as it is related to 
time, is manifested in development." 1 Development is a 
negation of perfection, but it is a negation of privation 
and not of exclusion. This means that one must know in some 
sense what is lacking in order to realize lack or privation. 
And in order to know it, it must be potentially present in 
experience; 2 this is the same as to say ex minima maximum 
non fit and ex nihilo nihil fit. Hence, Urban concludes 
that perfection already exists in an Infinite being beyond 
space and time. 
As development is related to perfection so also is time 
related to eternity. Eternity is for God a timeless pres-
ent; for God nothing passes, nothing endures, for He is 
perfect and perfection has no need of duration; duration is 
only the movement through development from privation to per-
fection, from the 11 isn to the "ought." Duration is the 
means by which finite creatures experience the eternal. 
1. "Metaphysics and History," The Review of Meta!hysics, 
III (1950), 291. This article is 81so chapter VII of God 
and the Historians. ---
2. Ibid., 293. Cf. also the discussion of potentiality 
above:--
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Urban claims Augustine and St. Thomas for support of his 
view of the relation of time and eterni ty. He also interprets 
this to be central in the Christian doctrine of incarnation; 
the incarnation is a fact in history, but in a sense it is 
before all worlds and all time. Time is in the universe; the 
universe is not in time.l God is the all-embracing being; 
He is the beginning and the end comprehending all in a time-
less present, which is eternity. 
ii. Progress. This doctrine of time necessitates for 
Urban a doctrine of movement since time is the distance be-
tween what is and what ought to be. The combination of the 
scale of values with time dictates value movement. It is 
possible for value movement to be progress or regress, but in 
an absolute sense regress is unintelligible, because movement 
gets its meaning from the top of the scale, that is, from 
perfection, from an absolute standard, not from the null point 
at the opposite end. This is the a priori of progress; it is 
necessary to all that endures. 2 All that exists, both nature 
and man, has a teleological movement toward a perfect goal 
built into it.3 Hence, Urban contends that progress is a 
necessary postulate of an intelligible world.4 
A point at which this becomes crucial is in the intelli-
gibility of human morality. The prospect of ultimate failure, 
l. Ibid., 293-296. 
2. The Intelligible \>lorld, 377-379. 
3. God and the Historians, ChaEter III, 2-3. 
4. The Intelligible World, 373. 
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even though that failure be millions of years away, would 
make morality intolerable and unintelligible. nThe •world 
bank1 is the one bahk of which it may be said, that if it 
is ultimately insolvent it has always been so • 11 1 Urban holds 
this belief because of his doctrine of values as absolute in 
God; it is the doctrine of ens perfectissimum.2 There is a 
timeless scale of perfections back of time and operating in 
time to give meaning to time and ultimate progress through 
time. Individual finite beings make progress as they find 
an objective value that ought to be but is not and actualize 
that value through the operations of their wills. Value is 
in time in the sense that it cannot be actualized except by 
being in time; it is beyond time as an absolute that gives 
meanings to time. "Man both makes and is made by history. 11 3 
But as necessary as the concept of progress is, it has 
its troubles, for there is a paradox in it as there is in 
finality. The idea of progress in human thought "vacillates 
between the idea of an ever-increasing purpose and the idea 
of a limit towards which we tend. 114 This limit is imposed 
from outside progress itself; further progress would not be 
1. Fundamentals of Ethics, 442. The quotation itself seems 
to be a favorite of Urban's. It appears in many other places 
in his later writings, especially in God and the Historians. 
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2. Urban's argument for this will be given in the next chapter. 
3. "Metaphysics and History," The Review of Meta~hysics, 
III (19.50), 27.5. Cf. also the doctrine above ofaccomplishing" 
and "accomplished." 
4. The Intelligible World, 390. 
meaningful if there were no limit to provide a termination. 
He who lives a purposeful and significant life must find 
consummation of goals to make his life purposeful and signi-
ficant; without attainments and endings of ventures his life 
vwuld not be significant; to set before one's self a goal 
incapable of attainment is futile.l This means that there 
must be endings in life. It means more; it means that 
lives themselves must come to an end. Death is necessary 
to both individuals and cultures in order to conserve their 
values. For example, the death of Greek culture was the 
condition of its im.'llortality.2 "The bearers of the torch 
change and die, but the light itself remains deathless and 
unchanged."3 This quotation at once eloquently states the 
position and suggests Urban's solution of the paradox. It 
is not mere duration of the individual or the culture that 
is significant of life for either but the content. The 
time may be a decade, a century, or a millenium without 
affecting the quality of the life. The Greek culture did 
not abide as long as the Roman culture, and it has long 
since been dead, but neither its duration nor the time since 
its death affects the quality and significance of that 
culture; the value content alone gives the significance, 
and one of the essentials of the value content is that the 
1. Ibid., 390-391. 
2. God and the Historians, Chapter IV, 29. 
3. Ibid., 30. 
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culture died, thus giving a unitary value package.l 
This paradox is really the same paradox noted in the 
preceding section concerning finality. Hence, here also 
Urbants final answer is that the mystical experience can 
form the synthesis, but he does at this point suggest a 
rational solution. He implies that it is the Absolute only 
that is ultimately valuable and not the individuals them-
selves. The individuals are only the carriers through 
which the Infinite realizes itself in the phenomenal, or 
space-time, world.2 "Every epoch /Or individual? is, in 
its own way, t in touch w1 th the absolute.' nJ This paradox 
and its solution sound very Hegelian, and indeed Urban says 
that Hegel has done the best job of solving the paradox.4 
In the discussion of the paradox of progress the reader 
will notice that Urban has eliminated all possibility of 
personal, individual immortality by implication without even 
discussing the subject, for he says that lives must have 
limiting points, that is, death. The reason for this is 
that persons are not valuable in themselves intrinsically; 
they are rather carriers of the value of the Infinite as 
it accomplishes itself. Immortality is for Urban a symbolic 
term that is not wholly literal (which he holds to be true 
of all metaphysical terms). It is symbolic for the conser-
1. Ibid., 33. 
2. Ibid., Chapter VII, 9. 
3. Ibid., Chapter VII, 14. 
4- Ibid., Chapter VI, 29~ 
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vation of values. An intelligible form for life must include 
death to give unity to the significance of life. Without death 
life "would fall apart into meaningless repetition, exfolia-
tion of process." Death gives perspective to life.l 
There is a stpong tendency toward an Hegelian monism in 
Urban's discussion of the paradox of progress, as indeed 
there is in his whole discussion of time. This monism, it can 
be seen, is the real basis of his elimination of personal 
immortality rather than the argument he gives. His argument 
is that death is necessary to complete and to conserve the 
value of the life, but this is not so except on the basis of 
holding that intrinsic value abides only in the Absolute and 
that man is only an instrument by which the Absolute realizes 
itself. It is entirely possible, if this is not first assumed, 
to have a doctrine of values with an open end instead of a 
closed one. This could be an argument in favor of personal 
immortality as it is for Kant. 
Furthermore, Urban's discussion contains an implicit 
circularity; it is this: Values are the key to reality; 
they are known only through human intrinsic value experience, 
but now human values are not really valuable; men are mere 
carriers of values which lie outside themselves; their own 
values are instrumental to those of the Absolute and not 
intrinsic; so the intrinsic key to reality is lost. 
In any metaphysics the doctrine of time is apt to be 
crucial. This is true for Urban. Some evaluation has just 
1. The Intelligible World, 420-422. 
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been given of his paradox of progress. several critical 
remarks need to be made about his discussion of time in 
general. 
iii. Critique of the Doctrine of Time. Urban contends 
that metaphysical propositions are those which are necessary 
to round out experience and to make it intelligible. By this 
test much of h is doctrine of time falls short. His first 
difficulty is his insistence on the inseparability of space 
and time. It is true that they are found together always in 
the physical world, but the physical world is by definition 
the space-time world. To carry this beyond physical existence, 
at least without argument, is unjustified. Urban speaks of 
a world which is non-spatial, but it is also non-temp~al 
and transcendent. 
A part of his problem here is his doctrine of empiricism. 
As noted in Chapter I, Urban limits t h e term "empiricism" to 
sensation. Th is is not broad enough, for experience includes 
much more, for example, moral, emotional, conative experience. 
Certainly with his emphasis on value as real he would not 
want to eliminate these; indeed he does allow for such non-
sensuous experiences under the terminology Erlebnis. 1 But 
by failing to consider them in empiricism he has set himself 
a psychological attitude that makes it easy to omit them in 
important p laces. 
The inseparability of space and time is a case in point. 
It is true that in sensational experience space and time are 
1. Cf. Chapter I. 
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always present together, but it is very significant that this 
is not true in non-perceptual experience. In experiences 
such as feeling, willing, and thinking space is not a part of 
the experience, but time is. It is true that a man's body 
with its spatial extension is a part of him while he is experi-
encing these, but it is not directly a part of the experi-
ences. The experiences are non-spatial in themselves. How-
ever, no experience ever comes to a man without a temporal 
aspect. Experiences are always reported in verbs or in 
other words derived from verbs; it is essential to all verbs 
that they have tense, or time. Of course Urban would not 
deny this; he only wants to add that space alw~ys belongs in 
experience, too. 
Urban bases his inseparability of space and time on 
the doctrine of ·relativity. So long as one is talking in the 
realm of physics this is a good foundation, but it cannot 
be used to deny non-physical areas. In these areas it is 
irrelevant. The direct experience of time and its philo-
sophical interpretation is more primary than physics.l Time 
is universally an aspect of experience. That this is not true 
of space is very significant in any interpretation of reality. 
Another difficulty in Urban's doctrine of time stands 
out, for to move to a non-temporal absolute realm, as Urban 
does, is really to fail to round out and to make experience 
intelligible. It does exactly the opposite. It makes the 
1. It seems likely that a strong case could be made for 
the view that psychological time is primary and physical 
time derived. 
wh ole unintelligible. It explains experience by denying a 
universal aspect of experience. This is grossly unintelligi-
ble. 
What does it mean to speak of a timeless present in the 
Absolute? Urban attempts to answer this question. He finds 
that the language of mysticism s~ys there is no place or 
time or number in the mystical experience with God.l No 
doubt this is a true representation of much mysticism. 
However, before accepting this as a final word perhaps it 
would be best to apply Urban's epistemological requirement 
to submit the claims of the mystics to confirming test by 
the community of men. The majority of men, particularly of 
educated men, do not have such non-temporal experiences.2 
This leaves the mystic under burden of proof before his 
testimony is accepted at face value lest he be the one who 
is making a false interpretation of his experience. \1hen 
the mystic is asked for this proof, typically he pleads the 
ineffability of his experience. 1bis incommunicability in 
itself denies the truth of his interpretation if one follows 
Urban's epistemology, for communication is an essential in-
gredient of truth for him. Hence, it appee.rs that Urban's 
appeal to the mystical for a metaphysical interpretation of 
time is basically an appeal to ignorance in order to avoid 
1. Humanity and Deity, 457-458. 
2. This statement does not mean to imply that men cannot 
leap beyond the present in thought, for they can; it only 
means that the experiencing of such a leap is itself in time. 
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the difficulties of his own unempirical interpretation. The 
appeal falls short of truth by Urban's own tests. 
Urban attempts further to make rational the concept of 
a timeless present. He says a person listening to a sym-
phony may be so absorbed in the unity of the whole as to lose 
himself in the durational flux. Here, he says, a person 
is on the way to escaping duration and on the way to under-
standing the timeless present in God's eternity.l This is 
an appeal to the specious present; this kind of defense 
has been given for the concept of a timeless present from 
Augustine on. It says that a man may hold a span of time in 
consciousness as if the whole time were present, and that the 
same thing happens with God, except that the span is ex-
panded to infinity, without beginning and without end. 
Now if it were contended that God's specious present 
were longer than man's there would be no objection, but to 
extend it to eternity is to change the quality and not merely 
the quantity of the specious or psychological present, for 
a present that has no past and no future hardly makes sense 
as a present. Its temporal context of past and future is 
necessary to make it a present. 
Furthermore, it must be said that whether a person 
notices the duration or not it is there, and one would hardly 
deny it, especially in the case of a symphony where the dura-
tion and temporal sequence of the notes is absolutely essen-
1. Ibid., 458. 
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tial to music as such. To notice the duration is a matter 
of self-consciousness. The duration itself is experienced 
as consciousness and need not rise to the level of self-
consciousness. It does not when one is "absorbed" in a sym-
phony. 
The true specious present, that is, the span of time 
which is experienced as one present moment, is never more 
than a few seconds long. It can never be as long as a sym-
phony. When one is absorbed in the unity of a whole symphony, 
he is transcending time by his conceptual activity as is 
possible in any concept. It is possible to rethink a past 
event so vividly as to make it seem present. Also one may 
conceptualize the future. Such conceptualization, however, 
is a matter of thinking of events as objects. Experiencing 
time is another matter. Here one experiences the flow of 
his own consciousness. Conceiving time, or blocks of it, are 
different from the immediate experience of time flow, and, 
except for the true specious present, it is always experi-
enced as a flow, a "stream of consciousness" to use James's 
term. 
In the light of these criticisms of Urban it is better 
to conceive of God as temporal, but not spatial, in spite 
of the fact that Urban says, "If we speak of God as temporal 
we have of necessity spoken of him in bodily form."l Urban 
1. Ibid., 460. 
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is not forced to say this by reason of experience but by 
his Hegelian presuppositions. Rather, experience (at 
least this is the experience of the present author, and 
there are many who agree with him) demands the concept of 
time even to be conceivable. Aristotle attempted to 
present a non-temporal Prime Mover. This being was en-
gaged in the activity of thinking about himself; but this is 
not non-temporal, for thought is always a temporal process. 
Augustine injected the idea of timeless present in Christian 
theology, but he was not consistent, for his God engaged in 
the temporal activity of ordering the lives of men through 
a temporal existence. In spite of a few special passagesl 
the Christian Scriptures present God as a being very much 
engaged in temporal activity. 
Among modernistic philosophers none has made more of 
time than Bergson. Urban opposes him strongly. But one may 
agree with Urban in rejecting the idea that time is causal, 
yet agree with Bergson that time as central to experience is 
essential to any empirical metaphysics. It may be true that 
space is merely phenomenal, but time is certainly more than 
this; it is an element of any metaphysical ultimate. 
Urban makes space and time merely phenomenal. They 
must be eliminated from ultimate metaphysics. It now be-
comes apparent why he holds that metaphysical terms are not 
literal but symbolic. Literal for him, means having space-
1. Cf., e.g., Exodus 3:14; John 8:58. 
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time objects for referents. Hence, he says, metaphysica.l 
terms must be non-spatialized and non-temporalized.l 
Several other points are open to criticism in Urban's 
doctrine of time, for example, the reconciliation of "ac-
complishing 11 with "accomplished" and the reconciliation of 
perfection and development. However, the burden of the next 
chapter is Urban's doctrine of God, and since the points 
at issue here depend upon that doctrine they will be cared 
for in that section. 
8. THE SUP.ERVENIENT CATEGORIES 
AND THE SUB-DIVISION OF KNOWLEDGE 
This completes the discussion of the primary categories. 
Concerning categories there remains to be discussed only 
an expansion of the implications in what Urban calls the 
categorial scheme which was given earlier. It concerns the 
supervenient categories. It says that the categories or 
concepts of the mind fall into a scheme of levels: matter, 
life, mind, and spirit. 2 Urban's law of the categorial scheme 
is stated thus: 
The different sciences or spheres of knowledge 
correspond to different levels of reality and 
each level is a natural one in that it possesses 
its own language and categories which, while not 
completely independent of the other levels, are 
largely so, and that, in consequence, they have 
coordinate reality.3 
1. Cf. section on "The Language of Metaphysics" above. 
2. God and the Historians, Appendix 1, 5. 
3. Ibid., 6. 
238 
The various fields of knowledge are to be tied together 
according to the dictates of this law. Philosophy, especi-
ally metaphysics, is the comprehensive, coordinating disci-
pline, and the sciences are the constituent elements. With 
the perspective given by this law of the categorial scheme in 
mind it is necessary now to turn to a consideration of the 
place of the constituent elements. 
There are three basic constituent fields of knowledge: 
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die Naturwissenschaften, die Geisteswissenschaften, and the 
humanities. These correspond roughly to the four levels of 
existence--matter, life, mind, spirit. Die Naturwissenschaften 
takes in both of the first two levels, but there is a dis-
tinction between physics, as the typical science of the 
material level, and biology, as the typical science of the 
life level. Die Geisteswissenschaften concerns the areas 
usually spo~en of as the social sciences and is typified 
for Urban by history. This is the level of mind. The 
humanities are not strictly a knowledge level. They do 
yield knowledge and that in its highest form; but they are 
also levels of value production and enjoyment. This is the 
level of spirit. Spirit is the supreme level of value and 
of reality. Urban does not always refer to it as the humani-
ties; he likes to refer to it as the level of dramatic lan-
guage or the level of poetry. In it he includes all the 
fine arts and literature; he also includes the practice of 
religion--worship, prayer, and so forth. However, religion 
cannot be completely seen on this level, for religion is 
not only a practice but also a highly metaphysical set of 
doctrines and, as such, is inseparable from philosophy and 
is very nearly co-extensive with it. 
Each of the levels of knowledge is somewhat independent 
of the other levels but not entirely so, for physics is 
fulfilled in biologw, and biology must have physics as its 
foundation. Biology is fulfilled in the social sciences, 
which take into consideration conscious mind, but these have 
their foundation in life and so build upon biology. Finally 
die Geisteswissenschaften reach the level of poetry where 
conscious mind reaehes not only its fulfillment, but the 
culmination of the entire scale in the full expression of 
values. This is the level of spirit; it presupposes all the 
other levels but is the crown of all that gives them their 
complete intelligibility. 1 
The independence suggested in the categorial scheme is 
manifested in the separate technical language of each sci-
ence and the secondary categories especially pertinent to 
the individual science. These are "supervenient" categories 
as noted earlier in this chapter; that is, they are not 
primary metaphysical c a tegories, but subordinate categories 
pertinent to the specific subject matter of the given in-
dividual science.2 Since they are not primary but super-
venient they are forms demanded for the intelligibility only 
of the science in its present stage of development; the 
1. Cf. entire Appendix of God and the Historians, also 
Beyond Realism and Idealism, Chapters VII and VIII. 
2. Cf. God and the Historians, Appendix, 2-9. 
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primary categories are necessary forms for the intelligi-
bility of experience (or reality) as a whole. The primary 
categories cannot change basically although they may adapt 
themselves in different times to different forms of expres-
sion. The supervenient categories, on the other hand, may 
change as a science develops and finds better explanatory 
theories. Examples of some of the categories of physics, 
which may or may not change in the generations to come are 
inertia, mass, element, atom, energy. These presuppose the 
unchanging, such as, substance or essence, as the core of 
being, and causality, as the efficient and final activity. 1 
The categories of physics are based ultimately upon 
intuitive knowledge of space-time existence. They are the 
interpretive levels of knowledge in this science. As such 
they have abstracted value from the intuitions. Being and 
value are inseparable in experience and in fact, but for 
the sake of development of a specific field they may be 
separated in thought. This is preeminently so in physics. 
It is the field to which the term ''existence" literally 
belongs; that is, it is the space-time world. Space-time is 
"the all-pervasive form of everything that 'is.' 11 2 Since 
physics abstracts in order to give unimpaired attention to 
a specific area of knowledge it is a partial field. There-
1. Ibid. 
2. Humanitt and Deity, 335-336; cf. also Language and 
Reality, 71 • 
fore it cannot stand alone. It cannot give a full explana-
tion of reality as naturalists sometimes try to make it do; 
neither can it complete its own field without going beyond 
it self. 
By making physics stand alone scientists sometimes see 
a tragic end to all of reality. This is through the second 
law of thermodynamics, or entropy. This law states that 
all energy in the universe tends to take on the form of 
heat; all things in turn are tending toward some neutral 
temperature where all activity will cease for lack of tem-
perature differences. This effectively means that the uni-
verse is running down. It may take untold millenia to reach 
this culmination, but physics, , as such, insists the universe 
is on a dead end street. Here, Urban says, is an example 
of a partial field of knowledge claiming to speak for the 
whole but falling into deep error in doing so. The point at 
issue here is that the physicist who contends for this dead 
end has forgotten the abstractions he made. For a total view 
one must take into consideration spirit and value and not mere-
ly space and time. This leads to metaphysics, which says, 
that progress is a necessary form for metaphysical intelligi-
bility. Urban repeats his statement quoted earlier, 11 The world 
bank is the one bank of which it may be said that if it is ulti-
mately insolvent, it has always been so."l Segments of the 
whole must have a terminus to have meaning; hence death is 
necessary to life.2 But the whole cannot die. Entropy can 
1. The Intelligible World, 407. 
2. cr. the discussion of immortality above. 
only be a "provincial law." It cannot be the final answer. 
It may be that entropy is subject to reversal, even though 
a physicist, as such, cannot now see it to be so. If it is 
not subject to reversal, some other principle must supercede 
it to meet the metaphysical demand of progress.l 
Hence, physics, as a partial level cannot substitute 
for the whole, but neither can it complete itself without 
going outside itself to metaphysics. Its metaphysical im-
plications come to a head as soon as it begins to talk in 
terms of metempirical wholes, and it is not complete until 
it does. This is especially true in any science as it seeks 
to give cosmological propositions, such as, for example, the 
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law of entropy. It is not complete until it reaches the 
metaphysical realm of cosmology, yet it cannot determine a 
cosmology by itself. Hence, it leads directly into meta-
physics and is dependent on interconnections with other fields.2 
What is true of physics as a partial field is true also 
of biology, the chief difference being that biology has moved 
higher in the scale of existences. Here many of the laws of 
the material level, the laws of physics and chemistry, still 
hold, but new laws appear. At this level it is impossible 
to eliminate values completely, for this is the level of 
life with its telic movement. Biology becomes metaphysical 
1. The fullest discussion of entropy is given in The Intelli-
gible World, Chapter XII, 395-427, of which this paragraph is 
a brief summary. Some discussion of it also appears in other 
places, especially in God and the Historians. 
2. Language and Reality, 554-566. 
as physics does; its preeminent cosmological pronouncement 
is evolution. Evolution is highly metaphysical and is un-
intelligible without being interpreted in value terms, that 
is, in terms of origin and finality.l 
As one moves up the scale of existence and arrives at 
the level of mind (typified by history) he is in the middle 
place in the categorial scheme. It presupposes the cate-
gories of the lower levels because matter and life are in 
it; it also presupposes the categories above it of ideas 
and values to explain progress and direction.2 The funda-
mental difference between physics and history is that phy-
sics eliminates values and history deliberately includes 
them. The categories of history come from a combination of 
a scale of values and time. Progress and regress are the 
time forms of value and basic categories of history. When 
history is taken as a whole, however, regress drops out and 
progress is taken from metaphysics to be a regulative idea 
in history.3 
At the highest level are the humanities, that is, the 
fine arts and literature)~ The real protagonist of the 
human is the poet, not the scientist.5 Urban uses poetry as 
1. Ibid. This has been discussed more fully in connection 
with-origin and finality earlier in thi s Chapter. 
2. God and the Historians, Appendix, 9. 
3. Ibid., 5. 
4. Humanity and Deity, 396. 
5. ~., 398. 
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typical of the humanities. He uses it to mean everything 
that is not scientific; he says the opposite of poetry is 
not prose but science.l Hence, poetry in his usage in-
cludes prose literary writing and even painting and sculp-
ture and music. Poetry, thus conceived, is bound up with 
religion also, because there is no true humanism without 
God; the imago Dei is necessary to true humanism.2 Poetry 
with religion moves beyond science. Without poetry man 
cannot be adequately understood, and since man is a vital 
part of reality, metaphysics cannot be understood without 
it.3 
Poetry has its own language, its own system of symboli-
zation distinct from that of science to express and to evoke 
feelings. Science speaks in terms of a language of reduc-
tion; it seeks to reduce all its data to space-time, mathe-
matics, and logic; ~vhat cannot be conceived in these terms 
does not belong. Poetry on the other hand is no~ especially 
interested in these. It speaks a lyrical and dramatic lan-
guage, the language of feeling and of conscious value acti-
vity.4 
Aesthetics is a mode of intuition distinct from other 
intuition but dependent upon it. It draws upon pictures 
1. LanBuaEie and Realit:;y:, .510. 
2. Humanity and Deitz, 394. 
3. Ibid., 393, 405. 
4. Ibid., 396-398. 
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from sensuous intuition, but it adds feeling and so is not 
merely sensuous picturing. In order to bring out the feel-
ing it actually distorts the accurate physical picture to 
emphasize the values it wants. An "aesthetic distortiontt 
is proper and necessary to art for value emphasis. 1 
Poetry operates at the level of emotion and experience 
of value, but it is not merely this. Poetry says something 
and, as such, is either true or false. "I venture to say 
that every work of art is an implicit proposition. n:2 The 
philosophy of a poet is a proper form of speaking. The mere 
evoking of feeling is not the main purpose of poetry. It 
is a mode of apprehending reality. As propositional it is 
logically the objectification of the life and s pirit of 
man and of his position in reality. It says that the indi-
vidual man is always the center and bearer of values.3 It 
says ttthat human life and man are unique, free, and self-de-
termining parts of nature. n4 Poetry ultimately says that 
metaphysics is spiritualistic and dramatic. By spiritua-
listie Urban means that values are an essential part of 
1. Language and Reality, 460-485. 
2. Humanity and Deity, 402. 
3. Language and Reality, 494. Man as a center of values 
and not merely a bearer of them is here in opposition to 
the position developed above in the section on "Time," where 
man is a bearer but not a center of values. Urban usually 
does not say "center of values." This opposition is a part 
of a very serious problem in Urban's metaphysics that will 
be discussed in the next chapter; it is the problem of 
monism versus pluralism. 
4. Ibid., 492-495. 
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reality; by dramatic he means reality is active under the 
motivation of values. 1 Poe try says that nature is living 
and that science denatures nature and dehumanizes man. It 
denies that science is the whole truth. 2 
But poetry, too, is incomplete. It has a covert meta-
physics, but it does not say all that it means about meta-
physics; hence, it must lead to conscious metaphysics for 
its completion. Without this it may become wild in its 
metaphysics and give just as much a partial and distorted 
view of the whole of reality as science.3 The full develop-
ment of poetry as action and realization of values in their 
fullest metaphysical apprehension leads on into religion. 
This and the full meaning of religion will become more 
apparent in the discussion of God and His relations to His 
world given in the next chapter. 
Hence, the categorial scheme unites in one comprehen-
sive philosophy ~11 the individual fields of knowledge. 
Each of them is a partial field with its own peculiar sym-
bolic form by which it represents reality. An individual 
field in isolation can be pressed so far that it gives a 
false view of reality, but all of them taken together 
contribute to a total. Science says space and time must be 
considered; poetry says spirit, personality, values must 
1. Ibid., 499. 
2. Humanity and Deity, 402-406. 
3. Language and Reality, 500. 
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be considered. Then metaphysics takes these contributions, 
exrunines them in maximum context, contributes its co-
implicates, and complete s a comprehensive, intelligible view 
of the whole of experience and reality. 
The categorial scheme as Urban uses the term above is 
a schema of only the four levels of being and their respec-
tive sciences. It is not a schema of the whole of reality. 
However, such a schema has been developed through this chapter 
as it is implicit in Urban. It will now be given in a 
summarizing graphic form. 
9. THE SCHEHA OF REALITY IN GRAPHIC FORM 
It is difficult to give a graphical representation 
of Urban's schema of reality because of the various in-
terrele.tionships. However, it is attempted here in order 
to show the schema in one comprehensive, summarizing picture. 
A few explanations of the diagrrun are necessary. God is 
above all distinction in this scheme;l in Him being and value 
( 1fthe most persistent of all dualisms") are united. Being and 
value are the main branches of reality as experienced by 
men. Value is raised above being to suggest its primacy 
for the interpretation of reality. The first double arrow 
shows being and value inseparable except for thought. The 
second shows that space and time are the distance between 
what is and what ought to be. Urban discusses them under 
1. The doctrine of God will have its full development in 
the next chapter. 
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SCHEMA OF REALITY 
God (ens realissimum and ens perfectissimum 
in spaceless, timeless etern~) 
Substance 
s~rit 
Mind 
Lif/ 
/ Matter 
Poetry 
I History 
I 
Biology 
I 
Physics 
7sali\ 
Origin Finality 
, I De,stJ.·ny Potentiality _ 
Space'-Time 
the value branch of the primary categories. Matter, life, 
mind, and spirit are sub-divisions of substances; they are 
staggered to indicate gradations or levels of being; also 
diagonal lines indicate interrelationships of the levels. 
Below the second full horizontal line are the individual 
(typical) fields of knowledge. They are tied to the corres-
ponding levels of being. Their categories yield intelli-
gibility only within their own fields and so are supervenient. 
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Metaphysics as the language of maximum context is concerned 
with the field above this line; the sciences as specialized 
branches of knowledge are concerned with the area below the 
line. 
This completes the discussion of the categories as 
Urban views them. Much of Urban's metaphysics is now 
apparent. Only one general area remains to be discussed, 
the area of the actual metaphysical objects. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE PRIHARY OBJECTS OF l1ETAPHYSICS 
Urban finds that there are three primary objects of 
the natural metaphysics of the human mind, which he claims 
his system to be. The three are the same as they are for 
Kant--the world, the soul, and God.l Much of what might 
come into the elaboration of these concepts has already of 
necessity been discussed in earlier settings. Hence some 
parts of the discussions in this section may be brief, but 
the length will not be an indication of significance. 
Kant's presentation of these three in Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft holds them to be merely regulative ideas, ideas 
that are necessary for an understanding of reality. Urban 
says they are necessary to round out experience; they are 
metempirical co-implicates of experience. But for him they 
are more than regulative. They are real objects. This 
derives from his strong emphasis on substance. Urban thinks 
t h at even for Kant these are ultimately real objects via 
the doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason. Urban 
admits that they are never directly given objects of sense 
experience; rather they are known to be objects by neces-
sary presupposition for the intelligibility of experience. 
The natural metaphysics (Urban's view) is a subject-predi-
cate or substance-attribute metaphysics. Hence, the meta-
physical objects must be conceived as existing substances.2 
1. L·angu~ge and Reality, 691. 
2. Ibid., 691-692. 
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1. THE WORLD 
About the world as a metaphysical object Urban says 
very little specifically. What he means by it is that the 
phenomenal realm of space-time must be conceived to be a 
unified whole. It will be recalled from Chapter I that one 
of the presuppositions of intelligibility is that reality 
is unum. Here this must be seen in the light of his doc-
trine of substance as the principle of unified individuality. 
Unity is derived axiologically. Now it is necessary to 
conceive wider and wider unities in order to round out ex-
perience until one reaches the widest possible unities. 
Metaphysics is here the universe of discourse. It includes 
maximum context. The objects of metaphysics are such 
unities. The world is properly conceived as a substance, 
the widest possible individual unity of space-time, the 
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broadest conceivable object on the material level of existence.l 
One would exp~ct that Urban would have four metaphysical 
objects to correspond to the four levels of existence, but 
the objects do not correspond directly with the levels. 
However, one may assume that the level of life without 
mind or spirit, where values are carried but not consciously, 
belongs to the lowest general metaphysical object, the world. 
This is analogous to Urban's including biology, the 
science of the second level of existence, in the same group-
1. This is not taken from any one spot in Urban but is a 
broad interpretation of what he means but has left unstated. 
ing with physics. The other two metaphysical objects become 
for him the finite mind-spirit and the Infinite mind-spirit. 
Ultimately both of the two lower levels are caught up in 
the Infinite. 
2. THE SOUL 
Urban, with Kant, speaks of the soul as the second 
metaphysical object. This has just been referred to as the 
finite mind-spirit. A part of man belongs to the world, 
for there is the spatio-temporal and purely biological to 
him. But he is more than a segment of space-time; he is more 
than merely life. He carries values but is unique in the 
world in that he is a conscious bearer of his values. Values 
give him conscious telic motivation and direction; he alone 
in the world feels obligation. Urban puts it thus: 
In him L%an7 at least, however it may be 
of other parts of nature, purpose, finality, 
'axiological determination' is its funda-
mental character and its 'deepest law.' 
The •tension' between what is and what ought 
to be, whether the 'is' be a law of society 
or a law of nature, is man's deepest char-
acter, and to have this character is to be 
a •soul.•l 
Urban adapts Kant's list of metaphysical objects, but 
it is evident here that the two men look at these objects 
differently. Kant needed soul as a transcendental subject to 
experience the empirical ego. Urban doubtless wants soul 
1. Humanity and Deity, 404. 
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to serve this function, too, but he wants more; he wants it 
to serve the value-center function as well. If being and 
value are inseparable, phenomenal reality must rise at 
some point to consciousness of value. Soul is this point. 
Urban thinks this function is also implicit in Kant, be-
cause the soul becomes very important to practical reason 
where values operate for Kant. 
Urban agrees with Kant that the soul or self is metem-
pirical, but in spite of the fact that it is not experienced 
directly it can be talked about meaningfully; it must be 
to make psychology intelligible. 
Nor can it be thus talked about except as 
an ens, except as a soul substance. It 
is ~refore (the substance notion) a 
regulative idea, or in our terminology, 
a symbolic conception.l 
It is necessary for Urban to maintain a soul substance doc-
trine to be consistent with the rest of his doctrine of 
substance and with his contention that statements cannot be 
made intelligibly except in a substance-attribute idiom. 
Hence, it might have been predicted that he would hold to 
a soul substance. 
To develop a full-sized critical meaning of soul from 
the writings of Urban is not possible because he says too 
little about it. What is possible, however, is to see that 
for him soul is basically what it is b y reference to value. 
1. Language and Reality, o98. 
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As quoted above, "The 'tension' between what is and what 
ought to be ••• is man's deepest character, and to have 
this character is to be a 'soul.'"l 
Soul is the conscious mode by which the Absolute 
realizes itself through phenomenal reality. This is not the 
only mode however, for the Absolute is infinite and doubt-
less has also non-phenomenal modes of self-realization. It 
was noted in the section on the categorial scheme that 
poetry is the objectification of the life and spirit of man. 
Poetry, not science, speaks the inner truth about man's 
soul. It always speaks about men as persons; science, as 
such never does. Scientific psychology is impersonal, 
without a soul because of its abstraction from values.2 
The differentia of the person is that he is the only 
conscious bearer of values and of the tought 1 or obligation, 
which is inseparable from awareness of values.3 Nature 
bears value but not consciously. Man alone knows himself 
as a bearer and feels the tension between the "ought" and 
the "is." This means the individual person. Peoples, 
movements, and periods of history also bear value, but in 
all these it is really the individuals who are the bearers, 
not man in the abstract . The level of the spiritual is a 
1. Humaniti and Deitz, 404; also Language and Realit:;y:, 494. 
2. Humaniti and Deiti, 403; also Language and Realit:;y:, 494. 
3. Humanity and Deity, 403-404; also Language and Reality 
494. 
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real level of existence, and its principle of individuality 
is the person, the individual, the conscious· bearer of 
values.l Personality is the principle of individuality in 
the spiritual as space is in the physical.2 If the spiritual 
individual is eliminated the only remaining part of man is 
biological and ultimately physical. This is what scientific 
psychology in the form of behaviorism finds by eliminating 
value and the poetic.3 Naturalists sometimes write poetry, 
and in it they may even deny personality, but they refute 
themselves, for they always speak of soul at least implicitly. 
Urban explains: 
By this I mean that even the naturalistic drama-
tist, let us say, in so far as he is a dramatist, 
must treat the personnae of the play as though 
they were persons even if he thinks they are not.4 
Poetry says more about man and human life. It always 
says "that human life and man are unique, free and self-
determining p·arts of nature. n.5 
But poetry is not without support from other sources 
in maintaining man1 s freedom. Kant held fre e dom to be a 
necessary postulate of value and obligation. Urban agrees 
1. God and the Historians, 18-19. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.; also Humanity and Deity, 403. 
4. Humanity and Deity, 403 • 
.5. Ibid., 404; also Language and Reality, 495. 
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and adds that it is necessary also for knowledge,l for 
"I\..nowledge in any meaningful sense of the word is free 
activity.n2 Urban finds science from time to time opposing 
his thesis of human freedom, but this is an instance of 
science imposing its own cause-and-effect (that is, mechani-
cal) form of language outside of the special province where 
it is appropriate. Psychology as a science seeks to use 
the mechanical form, but when it uses this exclusively it 
merely misses catching in its conceptual net those things 
not so determined. Mechanism fits man parti Ellly, in as much 
as he is a part of the biological and physical levels of 
existence, but it can say nothing about him as a person 
belonging to the spiritual level. For this level has been 
the developer even of the mechanical theory. For a scientist 
to use his freedom to develop a mode of knowledge which 
in turn makes freedom impossible is a self-destructive approach 
not only to man but to science as well. 
Thus poetry's assertion that man is free is supported 
by philosophy. Man in his free pursuit of value, including 
the value of knowledge, is a truer key to the ultimate nature 
of the universe than those parts of it which appear to be 
mechanically determined.3 
1. '1Kant and Modern Axiology," The Heritage of Kant, ed. 
George Tapley 1tlhi tney and David F. Bowers (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1939), 311. 
2. Fundamentals of Ethics, 417. 
3. Ibid., 394-419. 
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The soul aspect of man is really the most significant 
part of his nature. Man's experience of value and purpose 
is the driving force that produces the search for intelli-
gibility, which is the search for metaphysics. But, further, 
man's experience of value and purpose is also the key to 
intelligibility. 
The only thing that is self-explanatory is a 
will oriented towards value. An explanation 
to be intelligible--yes, even to be communi-
cable at all--involves the acknowledgement 
of this orientation.! 
The context makes it clear that this is not only the 
explanation of man but of all reality for Urban. It is pre-
supposed in his entire approach to knowledge and to meta-
physics. 
So far it has been shown that for Urban man is a person, 
a free, self-determining, self conscious bearer of values 
who finds a significant gap between the "is" and the "ought." 
He feels obligation to bridge that gap. He is one of the 
primary objects of metaphysics. This all sounds very good. 
It looks as if Urban is taking up a personalistic interpre-
tation of reality. This is especially true when he says that 
"the only thing that is self-explanatory is a will oriented 
toward value." Personality is basic here. 
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But as one continues to read Urban he is left with an 
uneasiness concerning the status of the individual person. 
This shows up at two points: the present constitution of 
the person and his ultimate end. 
In an ethical discussion of suicide the first of these 
points of uneasiness is manifest. After quoting Tennyson's 
"Flower in the Crannied Wall" to suggest that any individual 
is a center of relations he says that whatever the case with 
flowers or stones "it is certainly true of men that it is 
their relations that constitute their nature."l Now it is 
doubtless true that one's relations help to make him what 
he is, but Urban seems to be supporting the idea that a 
man's relations is all that the man is. He says that sui-
cide, except for cases of temporary insanity, is always 
carried out because "life is no longer worth living" and 
that this arises when relations which give life meaning are 
broken. "In short, the content of his Lthe suicid~7 self has 
been social, and when that content is lost he becomes, as it 
were, an empty shell, and life is no longer worth living. n2 
He says a person is a true individual only as he is a center 
of relations. This discussion makes the suicide too much 
of a test of the normal person, for many a person has lost 
his social ties and still continued to live and to enjoy 
value. It appears that there are inner resources that can 
1. Fundamentals of Ethics, 142. 
2. ~., 143. 
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give life significance even when the outer relations are 
severed. This suggests an inner self which can be a "will 
oriented toward value" regardless of outer relations. 
The second point of uneasiness is related to the first. 
Indeed without the second one might think that the first 
has been overly apprehensive of Urban's .treatment of the 
individual. The second may be stated thus: For Urban the 
individual soul is not an ultimate metaphysical object even 
though he lists it as one of the three primary objects of 
metaphysics; it is rather an intermediate object with is 
later dissolved into God after a pantheistic pattern. This 
is to be seen in his discussion of man as a bearer of values 
rather than as a center of values.l It is suggested in 
Urban's holding that values have an absolute status. It is 
apparent in the discussion of the relation of time and 
eternity in which time is seen to be swallowed up b y eternity; 
man, who is temporal, is only the phenomenal way of God's 
manifesting Hi~elf. It is apparent in Urban's insistence 
that man must die in order to make his life a complete value 
package. It is apparent in Urban•s doctrine that immorta-
lity is the persistence of the values of the individual life 
instead of an existential immortality of the individual him-
self. It is apparent above in making the individual a group 
of relations instead of a "natural unity," to use Leibniz's 
1. He does, inconsistently, at least once refer to man 
as a center of values, Language and Reali.ty, 494. Cf. 
footnotes 59-60. 
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term. Actually Urban does not want to sacrifice the indi-
vidual, as one can see in his making the individual and his 
values the key to reality. The following passage not noted 
before adds its weight in this direction to others already 
given: "That alone is ultimately and intrinsically valuable 
that leads to the development of selves, or to self-reali-
zation."1 However, in spite of such passages God seems to 
engulf the individual in his system. This is a basic, un-
resolved problem in Urban's thought. His only attempt to 
solve it is to hide behind the stat·ement that this is "trench-
ing on the mystical." This problem reaches its climax in 
the discussion immediately following on the third and final 
primary object of metaphysics, God. 
3. GOD 
God is the final, most comprehensive, and most ulti-
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mate of all the metaphysical objects. God is the widest possi-
ble unity. Metaphysics reaches its highest point in God. His 
existence is the final co-implicate of experience. God is 
the end point for philosophy. In this theology and worship 
agree. Metaphysics and religion are closely related. In the 
following quotation Urban shows them together and shows the 
importance he attaches to their common deliverance about God: 
The identity of the sovereign Good with absolute 
Being is the postulate of dogmatic theology; the 
logical necessity of this identification is the 
burden of rational theology, and the actuality of 
this identity is the essence of the beatific vision.2 
1. Ibid., 18; the italics are his. 
2. Hurna.ni ty and Deity, 431. 
Rational theology here may be interpreted as philosophy. 
This passage is the nearest to a brief summary of his 
view that Urban ever arrives at. But before this may be 
allowed to stand it is necessary to look into his support 
of this view. 
i. The Proofs for God1 s Existence. What is to be 
proven is that there is a sovereign Good or ens perfectissi-
~ and that it is identical with the ens realissimum, or 
most real (Absolute) Being. Urban explicitly states that 
any argument for the existence of God must be logical. The 
principles of identity and non-contradiction must apply 
here as anywhere in truth.l It remains to be seen whether 
Urban holds to this criterion. As a matter of fact Urban, 
in this same context, prepares his readers for logical 
difficulties ahead by saying that the principles of identity 
and non-contradiction must not be applied to God as if He 
were a man.2 This is significant, for his later applica-
tion of these principles to God as different from man really 
takes all the meaning out of them. 
The quotation at the beginning of this section on God 
suggests there are two theologies: dogmatic and rational. 
The former is the theology of intuition and faith, the latter 
of rational demonstration. The former develops a doctrine 
of revelation and builds on it. The two theologies lead to 
1. Ibid., 130. 
2. ~., 132-133; also 290. 
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the same God. Intuition arises first, but its doctrine of 
revelation cannot stand until it has received the support 
of reason. Intuition has temporal priority; reason has 
logical priority.l 
Intuition is direct experience of God in the individual 
worshiper and in special persons who deliver the revelation.2 
Urban says the classical exponents of intuitionism are 
Anselm and Descartes. Anselm held that v.rhen the fool has 
said in h i s heart there is no God he already knows the God 
to whom he denies existence. Urban grants this but adds 
that what is given directly in intuition is one's own sense 
of creaturely existence, of one's own finitude, which even 
the fool feels. "But," Urban adds, "the finitude of his own 
existence could itself not be known were it not for the con-
sciousness of infinitude, of infinite perfection, which is 
its necessary co-implicate."3 There is an experienced ten-
sion betv.reen the finite and the infinite, but both poles are 
there and both must be there for experience and for under-
standing.4 The existence of God is a necessary co-implicate 
of experience to make it intelligible. God is the ultimate 
metaphysical object. 
Urban ref'ers to this approach as the approach of in-
1. Ibid., 122-157. 
2. ~., 290. 
3. Ibid., 298 , 299. 
4. Ibid., 302. 
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tuition, but he means by it that through the immediate ex-
perience of finitude belief in an infinite Being is neces-
sarily mediated.l This is argument to presuppositions, 
that is, dialectical argument as interpreted in Chapter I 
of the present work. This would suggest that Urban's two 
approaches to theology are not two but one. However, he 
does mean that dogmatic theology is basically revelational, 
which is not the development that he gives to intuition here. 
But more needs to be seen of his dialectical argument. 
In a context in which he is talking about religious values 
Urban says that the transcendental co-implicate of experience, 
God, is as much a part of value intuition as the values them-
selves. Here he gives the same argument noted above; man 
in realizing his finitude is already reflecting on infinity. 
This is a priori to experience. The intuition of the infinite 
and perfect is a necessary co-implicate of all experience and 
all intelligible discourse.2 
But this is virtually the ontological argument according 
to Urban, and so he holds the ontological argument to be cen-
tral and back of all the other arguments for God's existence 
as Kant held.3 
Urban holds that the ontological proof for God is really 
a purely axiological conviction rather than a proof. He sets 
1. Cf. Ibid., 297. 
2. Language and Reality, 608-612. 
3. Ibid. Also Humanity and Deity, 165. 
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forth this view in a quotation from Lotze: 
An inviolate conviction breaks through into 
consciousness: to wit the conviction that 
the totality of all that has value--all 
that is perfect, fair and good--cannot 
possibly be homeless in the world or in the 
realm of actuality, but has the very best 
claim to be regarded by us as imperishable 
reality.l 
Urban agrees with Lotze. He thinks Kant's famous refuta-
tion of the ontological argument completely misses the 
point. Kant says one cannot move in thought from essence 
to existence, that one hundred dollars in thought does not 
at all mean the existence of one hundred dollars in the 
pocket. But with God, Urban holds, the distinction is not 
true, for His essence equals His existence; they are the 
same; the highest Good is really the determining ground of 
reason and therefore must have existence.2 
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Urban's axiology, it has been seen, holds that all values 
are in a scale a priori; the exact order of the scale is not a 
priori, but the fact of scale is, and it always leads to the 
top at which is located the ens perfectissimum. For him none 
of the values have meaning without this top; hence, ens perfec-
tissimum is an axiologically necessary presupposition. So 
the axiological view of the ontological argument sees both 
ens perfectissimum and ens realissimum at the top; the 
1. Humanity and Deity, 169, quoted from Hermann Lotze, 
Philosophy of Religion, 10. 
2. Humanity and Deity, 167-169. 
presupposition unum1 demands that these be united in one 
Being.2 
This being is of necessity infinite. He says, 
It is impossible, I believe, to express the 
essence of religion--the inmost core of mean-
ing of the religious ideas themselves, of our 
beliefs concerning the relation of value to 
existence, without recourse to this 'formal 
principle of Deity,' namely the idea of the 
infinite •••• God's infinity and his per-
fection are both identical with his essence.3 
Urban believes that all the traditional proofs have 
cogency, but that properly understood they all get their 
start from the ontologica l proof, axiologically interpreted. 
St. Thomas discarded the ontological proof, but Urban thinks 
his fourth proof (that from degrees of good) is much the 
same proof .4 
The ontological proof is an a priori proof. St. 
'l'homas' s first tbree proofs (from motion, cause, and design) 
are called cosmological and empirical or a posteriori by 
Urban. These all argue from cause and effect. Kant found 
them all wanting because his empirical world was purely one 
of space-time, and space and time were not n a tive to reality 
for him but imposed upon it by the human mind. Therefore a 
1~ Cf. Chapter I. 
2. Cf. Language and Reality, 610-612, and Humanity and 
Deity, 72. 
3. Humanity and Deity, 72-73. 
4. ~., 174. 
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cause-and-effect language cannot speak of God, or at best 
it can only speak of a finite maker. Urban's interpretation 
of empirical is close to Kant, and so he agrees with Kant 
in respect to these proofs. However that does not tell the 
whole story, for cause and effect may be used symbolically 
and have metaphorical meaning when transferred to the theo-
logical realm.l 
It is St. Thomas's fourth proof (from degrees of good) 
that really arrives at an infinite Being and a full-sized 
conception that can be called God. With this proof the 
others yield cogency, too. The fourth is really an axio-
logical argument. In spite of the fact that Kant did not 
allow the ontological argument he did allow an axiological 
argument, namely the anthropological argument. Urban finds 
this to be much the same as the ontological. However, he 
does develop it separately.2 In St. Thomas's scale of things 
that are more or less good, man is one; since he is only one 
the anthropological or moral argument is not as wide as the 
entire argument from degrees of good, but it is the deter-
minative aspect of that argument. For, to quote Urban, 
Doubtleas ,every created being has its own 
good but, so far as we know, man is the 
only being who knows, even imperfectly, 
his own good and is conscious of the ob-
ligation which arises from that knowledge.3 
1. Ibid., 170-173. 
2. Ibid., 174-175. 
3. Ibid., 175. 
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Hence arises the primacy of this argument and of the prac-
tical reason over the empirical. But the primacy has fur-
ther support also, for the knowledge of more and less of 
good in men themselves is the only way by which an external 
scale may be c onceived or known. 1be interior scale is 
the k ey to the externa l or der. Men cannot know God by go-
ing wholly outside themselves. However, they cannot know 
Him by staying comp letely within themselves, either. The 
cosmological proofs are the external witnesses; they add 
to the c oncept of God that must be begun internally. They 
show God on the basis of all things that are mad e and not 
mere ly on the basis of man. The moral or anthropological 
approach to God is not the only approach to God but is 
assumed in all the others.l 
Urban finds support for this approach in a contempor-
ary Thomist, Garrigou-Lagrange, who thinks that all St. 
Thomas's proofs are but refinements of one general proof 
held by untrained people: that the greater cannot arise 
from the less; only the higher explains the less~ The 
reader will note that all along this has b e en one of Urban's 
chief bases for justification of an axiolog ical interpreta-
tion of reality. Hence, he holds that all the proofs have 
1. ~., 175-177. 
2. Ibid., 178, from Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Dieu, son 
existenCe et sa nature; the reference in Urban is to the 
English translation, God, His Existence and Nature (St. 
Louis: B . Hereler, 1936), 252ff. 
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an axiological character.l 
This does not mean that proof of God's existence is 
dependent on desire or wishful thinking, as some would in-
terpret, but on the demand for intelligibility, for ration-
ality. 2 ~e argument does not say that unless a certain 
doctrine is true the universe would be intolerably miserable, 
but that it would be actually impossible as men now know it.3 
Urban holds that this argument is neither deductive 
nor inductive, rather that it is an argument to presupposi-
tiona; it yields the necessary conditions of the possibility 
of experience. It says if one acknowledges values then he 
must acknowledge what they presuppose to make them possible.4 
Urban's arguments for the existence of God are open 
to some second thoughts, but before criticizing them it will 
be good to examine the rest of his doctrine of God, to see 
something of the kind of God he finds as a co-implicate of 
experience. As a matter of fact, he finds two Gods; both 
must be seen and the two resolved to one. 
ii. The Problem of Two Godsa This is a problem which 
Urban himself recognizes and attempts to solve. The one 
God is quite like humans: temporal, personal, mutable, 
1. Humanity and Deity, 179. 
2. Ibid., 190-192. 
3. Ibid., 197. 
4. Ibid., 206, 208. This, of course, is Urban's dialec-
tica~thod mentioned in Chapter I. 
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finite, one among many; the other is the opposite: eternal, 
timeless, non-personal, immutable, infinite, monistic. 
Some treatment of this problem has of necessity appeared 
earlier in the disfussion in various places. A more syste-
matic statement of the problem is required now. 
The problem arises out of the nature of language. 
Human language is basically a space-time language. In order 
to express the non-temporal and non-spatial it must be used 
metaphorically, that is, symbolically. In symbolic usage, 
language is metaphorical, yet this does not exhaust the 
meaning. For there is a real meaning that is transferred 
to t h e new concept by the old name taken from another realm 
and applied metaphorically. This is the general situation 
of symbolism. When one tries to speak in the metaphysical 
universe of discourse he is in a realm where experience has 
not gone directly. It has gone there only indirectly by 
finding the co-implicates of experience. These of necessity 
must be spoken of in terms of the literal language of dir-
ect experience since this is the on l y linguistic form avail-
able. But this language is used symbolically in the meta-
physical realm. God is the most ultimate metaphysical ob-
ject; hence, human language in its metaphysical usage is 
weakest in symbolizing Him. It is unfitted to express com-
pletely the inexhaustible riches of God, yet it can "find 
names for Deity which, while human in their origin, yet 
are, when rightly understood, properly applicable to God. 111 
1. Ibid., 251. Cf. the entirety of Chapter VII. 
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This is the problem of Humanity and Deity (that is, of 
philosophy of religion), the problem of relating God and man 
through the linguistic forms of man. 
Religious language is true symbolically.l That is, it 
is true analogically--in a "mild'' sort of literalness in-
stead of a strict literalness. The strict literalist is 
an "unmitigated nuisance" wherever he is, in theology or in 
science. Human thought of God can only be by extension of 
literal hum·an experiences. To apply human language to God 
literally is impossible because the Infinite cannot be 
comprehended under the finite terminology. Hence, for ex-
ample, an absolutely perfect Being can be said to transcend 
all motion and yet to act and move without His motion im-
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plying imperfection. Neither pure literalism (fundamentalism) 
nor pure symbolism (liberalism) is right.2 
Some of the specific pronouncements of religious lan-
guage need to be considered not only as illustrations of 
the linguistic problem but also to give what can be known 
about God. 
Religion has a cosmology. It speaks of God as maker 
or creator. Maker is a word from the realm of space and 
time. Applied symbolically it means this much that can be 
1. Before overinterpreting the word "symbolically" the 
reader must remember that Urban finds both scientific and 
poetic language to be true symbolically. 
2. Ibid., Chapter VII. 
understood: The meaning and value of things cannot be 
separated from their ultimate origins and ultimate des-
tinies. (Ultimate destinies are also indicated in relig-
ious eschatology.) This is an application of the principle 
of causalityl as efficient and final, axiological, in 
other words. 2 But the doctrine that God is creator moves 
beyond human experience with "makers." It presupposes 
"one transcendent and supremely given reality" before all 
worlds and identical with the Good, a Being which extends 
its goodness to all things by merely be i ng. "The Being 
called God is one, transcendent, and identical with the 
Good. The transcendental predicates, ~, verum, bonum, 
are not attributes which Deity might or might not have and 
remain Deity." God does ''not have them, but is them. n3 
(The reader will note that these three, ~' verum, bonum, 
are those given in Chapter I as necessary presuppositions 
of intelligibility.) Urban thinks this is necessary if 
God is to be the basis of cosmology. 
The term existence is applicable to God and is a 
peculiarly good illustration of the symbolic element in 
theological terms. Here in h is own words is Urban's treat-
ment of this term: 
God is not beyond existence--that is not only 
1. Discussed above under "Categories." 
2. Humanity and Deity, 270-271. 
3. Ibid., 276-278 . 
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absurd but even blasphemous, for 'He Who is' 
is God's name--but he is beyond the category 
of existence which we use when we speak of 
Him in 'bodily form.' The word God involves, 
as we have seen, a double meaning. It con-
notes, and indeed must connote, an object 
endowed with qualities and actions--other-
wise it could not be an object of prayer and 
praise; but it also connotes the unconditioned 
transcendent. The former must in the nature 
of the case contain a symbolic element and 
this applies also to the categories of exis-
tence in terms of which we speak of Him; 
the latter is, in the stricteS.t sense of the 
word, precisely what it is said to be. It 
is this metaphysical truth that the so-called 
ontological argument embodies, and while it 
is not an argument for the 'existence' of 
anything .•• it nevertheless embodies an 
intuition which makes it the initial datum 
of all the other arguments. In this 'argu-
ment' human truth comes nearest, it would 
seem, to that veritas ontologica which is 
truth as God sees it.I 
This quotation clearly recognizes the double meaning 
problem. Ma.n does not understand God in God's own terms 
but in man's, which necessarily gives a distorted under-
standing. This is what gives rise to the problem of two 
Gods. Nevertheless, when man is conceiving the 'existence' 
of God and the ontological 'argument' Urban thinks man is 
closest to conceiving God as He is. 
The problem is the same when one is thinking of God 
as personal. He is and He is not personal. Person is one 
of the names properly applicable to God, but it must be in 
1. ~., 279. 
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part symbolical. 1 In Fundamentals of Ethics Urban says God 
must be conceived as mind and probably as Person. He says, 
It seems. • • impossible to doubt that if 
there is a God at all, he cannot be less 
than personal, less than that Lffi~ which 
nature or the universe produces. God may 
indeed be supra-personal, more than that 
contemplated by our ideas2of persons, but he certainly is not less. 
This statement appears in a section giving the nature of 
the kind of being postulated to give ethics a metaphysical 
basis. Here again human language is inadequate. God is 
and is not a person. 
Space and time have already been discussed at some 
length. However, a few words about them are appropriate 
in this context. God is sometimes spoken of in bodily form; 
this is necessarily in spatial terms. Most people have 
little trouble seeing this to be symbolic language. Tem-
poral language applied to God is more difficult.3 Urban 
grants that interpretation of the temporal predicates of 
Deity is one of the most fundamental problems of the philo-
sophy of religion and at the same time one of the most 
difficult.4 The difficulty is deeply rooted in human lan-
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1. Ibid., 304-307. In this context Urban says that he thinks 
God rs-personal but that he can offer no argument for the ad-
equacy of this belief. 
2. Fundamentals of Ethics, 468-469. 
3. Humanity and Deity, 453. 
4. Ibid., also God and the Historians, Chapter VII, 19. 
guage, for all human language uses verbs, which by their 
nature must have tense; all language is therefore temporal. 
Time seems to be of the essence of life. But theology has 
traditionally held that these temporal forms of expression 
are symbolic of a life that is timeless. Theology is 
driven to this by the 
underlying assumption that a Being must exist 
to whom nothing may attach which could pre-
sent itself to thought as an imperfection; 
only a most perfect Being, can for religious 
thought--and ultimately for religious feel-
ing also--be called God.l 
Urban finds support for this view in Augustine, who spoke of 
God possessing an n·ever-tarrying Eternity." He finds 
St. Thomas saying the same thing. Indeed he thinks that 
the main stream of both European theology and European 
philosophy deny the ultimate reality of time. Bergson is 
a vocal exception. Urban grants Bergson that men cannot 
picture in imag ination a timeless life but says that divine 
life must be thought of as timeless. The mystics uniformly 
give testimony that their mystical experience with God is 
without time, p ·ace, and number.2 Urban insists that his 
view is supported by the "necessary" linkage of space and 
time in traditional philosophy, 
1. Humanity and Deity, 454. 
2. Ibid., 454-458. 
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a linkage which made it inevitable that, if 
we cannot spe ak of God in spatial terms, 
neither can we in temporal terms •••• The 
essential point, of course, is that both 
space and time are indissolubly linked with 
body or matter and that if we speak of God 
as temporal we have of necessity spoken of 
him in bodily form.l 
This is very strong language. 1-ihat necessity is it 
that demands that time be tied to space? The answer is not 
apparent in Urban. If one is a Kantian at this point, as 
Urban certainly is, he assumes that space and time belong 
together and are characteristic only of the phenomenal 
world. But before this can be accepted proof is demanded. 
Urban gives none. He only says that the connection is 
"necessary." 
It has already been pointed out above in the section 
on space and time as categories that experience does not 
demand this inseparability of space and time. All experience 
testifies to time, but only physical experience testifies 
to space. Thoughts, for example, take place temporally 
but not spatially. Experience therefore allows for space 
to be purely phenomenal, but time is of the essence of 
all experience. No form of existence can be conceived 
without it. Urban's attempt to set God outside of time is 
unwarranted; to say that our temporal language applies to 
God symbolically does not help. For unless the symbolic 
element is understandable in human categories the symbolism 
1. ~., 460. 
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is mere words without meaning. The only meaning humans 
know anything about is always temporal in character. If 
God cannot be conceived in these terms then it is difficult 
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to see how He can be conceived by men at all. Urban's non-
temporal Absolute is in danger of meaninglessness. It appears 
that Urban's attempt to establish such a concept by an appeal 
to symbolism is merely a rationalization for ending his system 
in a contradiction. Such an end to any philosophical system 
is devastating. Urban's criterion of truth is "adequacy of 
expression." This is supposed to include coherence and more, 
but contradictions in a system do not pass even the elementary 
level of the coherence test. Bergson's interpretation of 
time as dur~e reelle is far more coherent with experience and 
reason.J. 
Furthermore, one may ask Is Urban's non-temporal God 
intelligible? Urban spoke of Whitehead's Process and 
Reality as "almost the most unintelligible philosophical 
essay ever written;" this he said because of Whitehead's 
"pulverizing all language into verbs," that is, interpreting 
all reality on a base of "becoming." But it seems now that 
Urban can be accused of unintelligibility for the opposite 
reason, for eliminating change at the heart of metaphysics. 
If Whitehead can be accused of reverting to a Heraclitean 
dynamism, Urban can be accused of reverting to a Parmenidean 
1. P. A. Bertocci also agrees that God must be temporal. 
Cf. his Empirical Argument for God (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1938), 287 • . 
staticism. Neither view is coherent when carried to ex-
elusiveness. 
The problem of two Gods is further seen in the contrast 
of the two terms "finite" and "infinite." Man is finite 
and God infinite, but the infinite God can be conceived by 
man only in finite terms. However Urban is sure that God 
is infinite. As noted above, Urban says man knows his 
finiteness by a consciousness of infinitude, his imperfec-
tion by consciousness of infinite perfection.l Urban is 
sure that a finite God will not do, for such a being could 
not provide salvation and would be a denial of the Perfect 
Being pointed to by his metaphysics. His doctrine of scale 
demands an infinitely perfect Being at the top of the scale 
to account for the existence of values at all. He says, 
Make of God a finite being lik e ourselves, and 
you have accepted a theory of the universe which 
makes honour, beauty and intelligen~e, in any 
genuinely valid sense 'impossible.' 
Closely related to this problem of two Gods is the prob-
lem of evil. Urban does not have very much to say about 
this problem. His basic approach to an answer is this: God 
. 
is infinite; man is finite. The principles of logic and 
reason apply to God but not in the same way they do to man. 
1. From Humanity and Deity, 298-299. 
2. Ibid., 420-421. 
The laws men call logical are indeed appli-
cable to all things, including the divine, 
but it does not follow that our human appli-
cation of them, conditioned always by the 
way thought appears in us creatures, is 
equally absolute.l 
Thus if evil seems contradictory to God's goodness man must 
not question, for his law of non-contradiction does not 
apply to God as it does to himself. Urban cannot say how 
it does apply. Effectively Urban's statement means that 
God is not subject to logic at all. Urban adds Leibniz's 
aesthetic analogy as a further answer to the problem of evil. 
It says evil is like seeing only a small part of the whole. 
In the whole picture the small spot shows its art. If man 
could see reality from the infinite perspective that God does 
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evil would not be a negative factor but a necessary contributor 
to the good of the whole.2 
This is a very brief and inadequate treatment of a problem 
so important as the relation of God to evil. The reason it 
can be so brief is that it is not really an answer but 
basically an appeal to ignorance. However, such an appeal 
is not out of place at this point in Urban's thought, for, 
as will be shown below, his entire approach to a solution 
of the problem of two Gods is basically an appeal to ignorance. 
l. Humanity and Deity, 133. 
2. God and the Historians, Chapter IX, 25-26. 
In all or the t e rms wh ich point up the problem of the 
two Gods there are strong monistic t endencies evi dent in 
Urban's thought. Also in oth e:r places in this discussion 
such tendencies have been pointed up, for example in the 
problem of immortality, in the problem of t h e relation of 
value to existence, in Urban's maintenance of an "over-
individual speech con:nnunity," in his doctrine tha t values 
have an absolute status, in his doctrine t hat progress is 
not of the whole but that it is value movement of the parts 
through which the Absolute is realizing itself under the 
time form. Furthermore, even though Urban is highly Kant-
ian, he tends to interpret Kant fr om the perspective of 
Hegel; he has many words of commendation for Hegel's thought 
with all of its monism. At one point he says, 
The only form of unity or tot ality that c an pro-
vide the conditions for an intelligible concept 
of cosmic development ••• is that unity which 
comes through the concept of the development of 
the "Idea." ••• Any concept of total evolution, 
as distinguished from parti a l evoluti ons within 
a universe, can be conceived only as a develop-
ment of t h e Idea , to use Hegel's terms.l 
The context here makes it quite cle ar that he approves of 
Hegel at tlns point. Here Urban is admiring Hegel i n the 
central part of his monism. 
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It appears tha t Urban would like very much to be a monist, 
yet he cannot completely convi nc e himself. God dwells in 
1. The Intelligible World, 326. 
a timeless eternity, but temporal predicates say something 
about Him that is true, symbolically; God is immutable, but 
if temporal predicates are applicable at all He must be 
active in some kind of sense and therefore changing; God is 
perfect, yet He develops through time; He is accomplished 
yet accomplishing; God is personal, yet He is not; God is 
infinite and beyond human conception, yet human, finite 
terminology applied to Him is not basically in error; God 
is an absolute, yet men are individuals, and they are in-
dividuals with responsible free determination. Urban wants 
to be a monist, but faithfulness to experience and to 
human linguis t ic forms (which he defends so strongly) will 
not allo~o-1 him. He is philosophically "tender-minded," but 
his tender-mindedness is a restless one suffering from 
"tough-minded" jabs. The two approaches, the two Gods, are 
each so insistent that he cannot solve the problem philo-
sophically. His dilemma is stated clearly in a personal 
statement in Contemporary ~merican Philosophy; he says, 
Thus, for me it is true--both psychologically 
and philosophically--that 'the soul possesses 
God in so far as it participates in the absolute,' 
but a complete identification of the religions 
with the metaphysical notion I have never found 
possible.l 
1. 11 JI1etaphysics and Value, 11 380. 
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This statement was published before publication of Lan-
guag e end Reality and Humanity and De ity. These works show 
that he did much more thinking about the problem but that 
it only led him to clearer formulation of the two sides of 
the dilemma instead of to a solution for it. 
Urban finds no solution in Karl Barth and his Nee-
Orthodox followers. Barthianism is too transcendent, re-
moving the human element altogether. Urban i s far too much 
a ra t ionalist to find common ground with this anti-ration-
alist mo v ement. On the other extreme is a religion of mere 
humanism which removes the element of infinity. One of his 
purposes in writing Humanity and Deity is to attempt to find 
a middle ground b-etween these two extremes.l 
Urban gives up hope of finding a philosophic answer. 
Re a soning on the basis of e xperience has set the problem 
but cannot ansv-rer it, for reason is always f i nite and can-
not enter the realm of the infinite. Hence, the answer, if 
it is t o be had at all, must be found elsewhere. This time 
the search is rewarding, for the answer is to b e round by 
"trenching on the mystical." This is a phrase tha t is used 
in most of h is major works and several of his articles. 
The doctrine reache s its fullest statement, properly enough, 
in h is philosophy of religion, Humanity and Deity. 
Here Urban holds tha t the essence of mysticism is 11 the 
1. Cf. Humanity and Deity, 20-27. 
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coincidentia oppositorium," its synthetic ability. And the 
most central of all its syntheses is that of the One and 
the Good, that is, Being and Value. This is not possible 
by intellectual means only.l The following quotation was 
used to introduce this section on God: 
The identity of the sovereign Good with absolute 
Being is the postulate of dogmatic theology, the 
logical necessity of this identification is the 
burden of rational theology, and the actuality 
of t his identity is the essence of the beatific 
vision.2 
The meaning of this is now more clear. Dogmatic theology 
refers to theology based on revelation; Urban does not dis-
credit this approach to reality but does not develop it 
much himself. Rational theology here means all that has 
been discussed in this section pointing to the existenc e 
of God and the kind of a Being He is. The beatific vision 
is the mystical experience. Rati onal theology says there 
must be the identification of ens realissimum and ens per-
fectissimura as a necessary co-implicate of experience; 
mysticism actually experiences them united. Urban finds 
this mystical approach originating in Pls to and Plotinus, 
but he holds it to be permeating all the major forms of 
1. Humanitt and Deity, 431. The reader's attention is 
called to t e latter part of Chapter II of the present 
work where this synthesis is discussed more thoroughly. 
2. Ibid., 4-31.. 
283 
Christian mysticism.l The mystics combine the God of prayer 
and praise, the loving heavenly Father, with the God of the 
philosopher, the most perfect Being.2 
Urban finds skeptics and atheists saying the mystic is 
the one person who· makes them think there might be a god . 
But Urban thinks that the reason such people believe the 
mystics is that there is an element of mysticism in every 
man. He says, 
But I cannot see why the mystic should make them 
thus consider unless they themselves had some ex-
perience in terms of which the deliverances of the 
mystic could be understood, and unless, moreover, 
they themselves had already considered the grounds 
for a reasonable belief. The knowledge value of 
my sticism, as I see it, consists rather in the 
fact that this identity of intuition confirms a 
belief already existing i mplicitly, whether the 
result of the intuitions of faith or of the demon~ 
stration of reason •••• If there is this 1 fuller 
grasp of the eternal' it can be only the deepen-
ing of an intuition which already exists.3 
In the same vein he adds later, "It is only because what 
the mystic says corresponds to s omething in the soul of 
every man that we either understand him or believe him. n4 
Thought has its limitations, and it is one of the chief 
functions of thought to know its own limits. It reaches 
its limit specifically a t the point of the relation of value 
1. ~., 432. 
2. ~., 436 . 
3. Ibid., 445. 
4. ~., . 447. 
and being. He s ays, 
The identity of the One and the Good, of value 
and being, remains ••• the 'sacred mystery' 
beyond which thought, as pure thought, cannot 
go. It can be shown that 1 value is no stranger 
to being.' It can be shown that to make the 
God-idea, however necessary and valid, only an 
idea, is not only to make the life of reli gion 
an illusion, but the life of reason also. All 
this thought can indeed show, but that is the 
limit of its showing. The fusion of the two 
Lthought and realit~7, the blending of which 
Plato speaks, can be realized only in experi-
ences that trench on the mystical and can be 
told only in language which bears the indelible 
mark of such experience.l 
He thinks the supreme exponents of philosophy have recog-
nized t h is trenching on the mystical. 
"In the mystical experience more than in any other, 
men knovr the two Gods are one. n2 Thus mysticism is the 
only answer to the problem of the two Gods; philosophy can-
not answer, but mysticism can. Mysticism is here a direct 
insight (intuition) into the nature of reality, bypassing the 
representative and interpretive levels of knowledge. As such, 
it must be a direct linkage of subject and object. Hence, it 
appears that the mystical experience is epistemologically 
monistic as well as metaphysically monistic. 
iii. Evaluation of the View. To be consistent with his 
dis.lectical method Urban should approach the problem of God 
on the basis that His existence is a necessary co-implicate o 
experience, that His existence is necessary as a presuppositi 
1. Ibid., 452. 
2. ~., 463. 
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to round out human experience and make it intelligible. 
Much of his argument follows this pattern. The point at whic 
he best illustrates it is in his axiological approach. He is 
consistent with his ·ovTn method and gives a cogent argument 
when he argues that a scale of values demands a being back of 
them to make them possible. He is on solid ground when he 
argues that man, as the only conscious bearer of values, is 
the main key to reality; he passes on to his readers good in-
sight from Garrigou-Lagrange when he says that all of st. 
Thomas's proofs basically mean that the higher cannot come 
from the lower but that the lower is explainable in terms 
of the higher. All of this holds cogency and has much in 
common with the anthropolo gical or moral argument developed 
by Kant and others. 
However, Urban confuses the issue when he attempts 
to make this and the ontological argument say the same thing. 
The moral argument really does not say as much as Urban 
would like for it to. It says there must bea superior be-
ing back of reality who is the source of values, a being 
superior to all human values, a being large enough to account 
for all values and for existence; the moral argument to-
gether with the cosmological and teleological arguments 
point to a being who unites in Himself both superior value 
and self-existence. However, these do not demand that such 
a being be infinite, although Urban thinks they do. He 
grants that the cosmological arguments do not demand i~ 
finity, but he thinks the axiological argument does. This 
is the point of confusion with the ontological argument, 
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for he thinks they are the same. He thinks that when the 
fool has said in his heart there is no God, he is in the 
very statement manifesting his intuition of God's existence. 
In the same vein he holds that everyone, even the skeptics 
and atheists, has something of the mystical experience, 
which is a direct 1intuition of God and of the union in one 
Absolute of value a.nd being. Anselm's putting of the onto-
logical argument may be given thus: "I have an idea of a 
most perfect being, than which nothing greater can exist, 
for if a greater could exist the first is not the most per-
fect; hence in order to conceive the greatest I must con-
ceive Him as existing. He therefore exists." Urban grants 
that this does not carry any weight as a syllogistic argu-
ment, but he thinks it is a necessary intuition that no man 
can escape. If it is experiential, the cogency of such an 
argument can be settled by asking men whether they do have 
such an intuition. This is as easily answered as it is asked, 
for the broad disagreement among men as to both the existence 
of God and the cogency of the ontological argument shows that 
either not all men have this intuition or that many badly mis-
interpret it. Both alternatives leave the ontological argu-
ment unconvincing. 
The second major point of criticism of Urban's argument 
for God has already been suggested in the first. It is that 
the arguments that do have power really necessitate only a be-
ing superior to man and his world; they do not necessitate 
an Infinite being. Besides the ontological argument Urban 
has two others which are basic to his doctrine of infinity. 
The first says that man can realize his own finiteness only 
as he realizes infinity set over against it. But this does 
not follow. Finitude means limitations. Experience is an 
abundant teacher of limitations set as barriers in one's path 
These limitations are legion, and it is hardly possible to ha e 
a legion of infinities. Most limitations are obviously them-
selves finite. One needs only to meet something other than 
himself to find his own limitations; it need not be an in-
finite other. 
Urban argues further that value scale demands an ens 
Eerfectissimum at the top to give it a metaphysical founda-
tion. This again is unwarrented. One may grant Urban's 
contention that value is always in scale a priori without 
granting an existing infinite Good at the top. It is true 
that in a value scale thought may move to an absolute per-
fection at the top as its limiting case, but such a limiting 
case does not imply its own existence. All value scale 
actually demands is that there must exist a being great 
enough in goodness and power to account for value as known 
and experienced, and anticipated as possible; this being may 
conceivably be less than infinite. It is possible that 
the highest Good is Himself active in realizing His o~m 
values through time. In fact such a case seems most likely 
in view of the difficulties found in believing in any kind 
of non-temporal existence. In seeking to develop a founda-
tion in reality to give stability and metaphysical status to 
human values Urban has gone beyond the minimum foundation 
necessary to account for values to a doctrine of absolute 
values in an unchanging, timeless, absolutely perfect being 
who is also the most real being. Instead of stabilizing 
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human values this makes of man and his values a mere transien , 
a mere shadow in eternal reality. This also violates Urban's 
contention that man and his values are the key to reality. 
If man is the key it would be more coherent to extend the 
value scale by coherent norm construction than to jump to an 
a priori ens perfectissimum at the top. 
Urban is also to be criticized in the whole area of the 
problem of two Gods, for this is a false problem brought on 
by incorrect analysis of experience and language. Urban has 
limited his interpretation of empiricism to space-time experi 
ence and steadfastly refuses to consider time separate from 
space. He is unempirical in not seeing that much experience 
is temporal without being spatial, for example, thinking, 
emoting, valuing, willing. He says that . if one thinks of God 
temporally he has of necessity thought of Him spatially. This 
does not follow; in fact many of the most important and in-
tensive human experiences witness to the contrary. 
The space~time analysis of experience leads Urban to 
hold that all language is literally space-time language 
so that human language can apply to God only metaphorically. 
It was shown above that this interpretation of language, 
when it is detemporalized and despatialized to apply to 
God, actually says nothing meaningful about God, for all 
human experience is temporal and has no means of communi-
eating any meaning of a non-temporal existence. 
Urban finds difficulties with human language when it 
is applied to God; however the difficulty is not really with 
the language but with the illogical, contradictory concept 
of God he is trying to support. He admits that philosophy 
and logic break down when one speaks of a non-temporal 
absolute who is absolutely perfect and unchanging while 
containing within Himself all time and change. This is not 
1 
unlike Barthi an irrationalism, v1hich he rejects summarily. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Abandonment of logic in the final stages of one's metaphysics 
I 
does not speak well of a philosopher. This is to deny to 
man his basic mode of understanding. God must be able to 
communicate something of His thoughts and nature to man 
through man's own mode of understanding if man is to under-
stand Him at all. Otherwise God either communicates de-
ception to man or He communicates nothing at all to him. I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Man's mode of understanding must include temporal and logic a~. 
form. 
The non-temporal interpretation of God not only gives 
difficulty to man1s understanding but it leaves a view of 
a God abiding in a static perfection where there can be 
no movement, no realization of values. Such a view makes 
God's existence seem infinitely more boring, infinitely 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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less interesting than man's. Is this a case of man, the 
greater, arising from Go d , the lesser? 
Urban's escape hatch for all this difficulty is "trench-
ing on the mystical." It is not to be denied immediately 
that mystics may have unique, metaphysical experiences. 
However, such experiences must be tested by the no~nal 
criteria for truth before they can be accepted, whether 
one's criterion is coherence or adequacy of expression. The 
coherence criterion demands non-contradiction; the adequacy 
criterion demands communication. Urban's use of mysticism 
fails both these tests. It is a failure at the point of 
non-contradiction that drives him to mysticism; it fails 
the adequacy test also, for he admits that human language 
is inadequate to express the "beatific vision." Hence, his 
retreat into mysticism shows that he, who has demanded so 
strongly rational intelligibility, has forced himself into 
a corner from which he can extract himself only by an un-
intelligible device. In a review of Urban's The Intelligible 
World, A. P. Brogan agrees with this criticism. He says, 
" 1-'Ir. Urban makes a frank appeal to mysticism •• • • I have 
not been able to learn why such an argument should be used 
in a book on the intelligible world.nl 
But not all of his system demands these i mpossibilities. 
1. A. P. Brogan, Review of The Intelli~ible World by 
vlilbur Urban, Philosophical Review, 195 , · 388. 
If, for example, his doctrine of God had been more conserva-
tive and had allowed temporal existence to God, if his doc-
trine of infinity had been less absolute and less monistic, 
he might h ave escaped. Instead of h is view one may conceive 
of God as far above man and the rest of reality in signifi-
cance, in goodness, in knowledge, and .in power; one may con-
ceive of God as self-existent and temporal, for it is possi-
ble (and coherent) to believe that time is grounded in the 
n ature of God, that time is bec ause He is and because He 
persists. One may conceive all of this without falling into 
the difficulties of a monistic absolutism. This does not 
make God depend on time but time depend on God. Eternity 
may be conceived as the extension of time from an unending 
past to an unending futur e . There is no need to conceive 
eternity as qualitatively different from time; time without 
limit is eternity, and an intelligible eternity at that.l 
1. Such a view is maintained by L. Harold DeWolf in A 
Theologt of the Livi ng Church (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1953),oo-Io3. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND FINAL EVALUATIONS 
This last chapter has three basic tasks to perform. 
First it will give a brief smmnary of Urban's system. 
Secondly, it will develop several critical evaluations 
not previously made because they are of the system as a 
whole. Finally, the major conclusions of the investigation 
will be listed in propositional form. 
1. SUMMARY 
The investigation began with a study of Urban's 
doctrine of intelligibility as a prolegomena to meta-
physics. This presents Urban's methodology and basic 
epistemology. 
Intelligibility might be defined as meaningfulness or 
compatibility with experience. It is to be distinguished 
from truth, for some intelligible propositions are still 
not a case of an existing state of affairs; however, in 
maximum context, that is, in metaphysics, this is not so, 
for there intelligibility and truth are synonomous. Truth 
is defined as adequacy of expression to that which is ex-
pressed. This is much the same as empirical coherence ex-
cept that it lays more stress on communication; it does 
not allow truth status until a proposition has been veri-
fied, or to use Urban's preferred term, "authenticated" 
in discourse. 
There are certain conditions of intelligibility which 
must be understood before one can interpret reality. To 
find them Urban searches for intrinsic intelligibility; 
he finds that the only thing that has intrinsic intelli-
gibility is "a will oriented toward value • 11 All other 
intelligibility must be interpreted in terms of this. 
Real intelligibility must always include a value reference, 
at least epistemological values, or intelligibility values. 
There is a primacy of values. The axiom of intelligibility 
is the inseparability of being and value. Intelligibility 
demands that reality be penetrable, comprehensible, and 
livable through the forms of the human mind. This means 
logic, language and communication, and human modes of ex-
perience are conditional to intelligibility. These are 
prior to all knowledge. 
Intelligibility and truth are built on a base of cog-
nition, which includes three elements or levels: intuition, 
description, and interpretation. Intuition for Urban is 
not the mere datum of experience)which Urban calls pure 
awareness; intuition for him includes thi~ but it also in-
cludes linguistic form as a contribution of the mind; "the 
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expression is ••• a constitutive part of the intuition 
itself."l Urban assigns great importance to the consti-
tutive function of the mind. The three elements in cog-
nition cannot be separated except for analysis. Hence, 
linguistic form in intuition is already bound up with the 
second level, description, which has as its chief function 
representing or symbolizing the data of experience. It 
does this by relating concepts metaphorically; that is, 
it transfers common elements of meaning from one object to 
another object. The third level of cognition, interpreta-
tion, is metaphysical; here the mind contributes whatever 
must be presupposed to round out experience, that is, the "co 
implicates" of experience. These are all value intentions. 
These value intentions lead one directly to Urban's 
basic metaphysical methodology, the presuppositional or 
dialectical method. One starts with experience and seeks 
to discover what presuppositions are necessary to make it 
intelligible. These presuppositions are always logically 
unsupported judgments of value, but this does not mean 
unsupported, for they are values which must be acknowledged 
if there is to be any knowledge of reality at all. Argu-
ment in this realm is not logical or empirical but per-
suasion to mutual acknowledgment. After the presuppositions 
1. Language and Reality, 347. Cf. Chapter I of the present 
work. 
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are clarified and made explicit they are synthesized into 
a systematic whole of metaphysics. 
The following presuppositions are necessary: "I exist 
and others like me, inhabiting a world.nl It must be pre-
supposed also that "ens est unum, verum, bonum."2 Ens est 
~ says intelligibility or meaning is impossible without 
the concept of unity and totality. Ens est verum says 
reality must be meaningful. Ens est bonum says there can 
be no meaningful reality except it be interpreted in terms 
of value. The good is determinative of the real. Ens 
realissimum is the fullness of both being and value and 
must be presupposed to make all lesser reality intelligible. 
Urban's whole metaphysics is contained in these presupposi-
tions in germ. 
Chapter II sought to establish the relation of 
value and existence. Urban made a shift in his approach 
to value early in his career. His first book was Valua-
tion: Its Nature and Laws. Here he developed a psycho-
logical interpretation of values; he defined them as 
funded affective-volitional meanings. 1f.hen he tried to 
develop a theory of norms he became confused and changed 
his approach from the examination of value experience to an 
interpretation of values as presuppositional. He felt that 
men try to justify values by taking them back to life, but 
1. The Intelligible World, 48. Cf. Chapter I of the present 
work. 
2. Ibid., 50-51. 
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that this presupposes already the value of life prior to 
experience; if this is apparent in the case of life it is 
even more so in the case of knowledge, for knowledge must be 
conceived in terms of meanings, and meanings always have valu 
intents. If life and knowledge are to have any significance 
they must get it from absolute values antecedent to psy-
chological processes. Hence, no meaningful object can be 
conceived without a value aspect. Being and value are 
inseparable. 
Value itself has the status of objective validity. 
Values are absolutes which are apprehended by mutual 
acknowledgement. This suggests a moral consciousness or 
intuitionist view, but Urban does not admit intuitionism. 
But Urban says no one can stay long in the "rarefied atmos-
phere" of validity. He must press on to metaphysics where 
values are found to be based in a perfect being. Values are 
derived from the ens perfectissimum, who is also the ens 
realissimum. Thought makes this demand that value and being 
be united at the ultimate level of being and value but it 
cannot tell how they are united. This is the "most persis-
tent of all dualisms" for thought; however, thought is not 
the only approach to knowledge. Mystical experience can and 
does show being and value ultimately united. 
The Great Tradition, philosophia perennis, has always 
acknowledged and presupposed the value character of in-
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telligibility and of reality. It has always acknowledged 
the inseparability of value and being in experience and 
their ultimate union in ens realissimum. Against this 
view are the philosophic mod'ernists who' deny that value is 
basic to reality and who assign to mind a derivative status 
in reality. 
Against the modernists (positlv1sts, naturalists, 
pragmatists, process philosophers) all those in the Gre a t 
Tradition should unite, for their areas of agreement are 
more basic than those of disagreement. One of the great 
disagreements has been between idealism and realism, but 
Urban sets himself the task of synthesizing the two. He 
thinks there is no real disagreement if the two are dia-
lect ics.lly exrunined. Hence, he seeks the value presuppo-
-
sitions back of each. For idealism the presupposition is 
dependency of reality upon the mind in the sense that the 
mind contributes the values necessary to intelligibility; 
for realism the presupposition is the mind-independence of 
the object. These are both logically unsupported judgments 
of value. Both are necessary. Mind-dependence is necessary 
because of the value character of reality, mind-independence 
because of the givenness in knowledge. YVithout givenness 
error could not be accounted for. Urban argues for the 
synthesis as if the problem were only epistemological, in 
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which case the synthesis would mean only the dualism of 
subject and object with each making contributions to 
knowledge, but it was shown that Urban also has implicit 
in his synthesis an ontological dualism; matter and mind 
are separate and independent forms of being. This takes 
his argument beyond epistemology. Urban calls his view 
"idealism along realistic lines." 
Chapters IV and V attempt to tie together all of the 
metaphysical data of the earlier chapters and to develop 
Urban's full metaphysical system, being idealism along 
realistic lines. The system must start from Urbanrs 
definition of metaphysics: Metaphysics is the language of 
maximum context, or it is the co-implicates of experience 
that must be presupposed in order to round out experience 
to where it is fully intelligible. 
Since truth is immanent in discourse the first pre-
supposition is the existence of other minds like one's 
self; all minds taken together form a metaphysical speech 
community which is tied together by an over-individual self. 
Urban is nebulous in his presentation of the over-individual 
self, but it later appears that this is an Absolute Being. 
One of the basic presuppositions of intelligibility is 
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ens est unum. Metaphysical language is occupied with discover·· 
ing and making clear basic unities. Metaphysical subject termn 
are always of unified wholes; these wholes are metempirical 
co-implicates of experience. Since language is built on 
the base of experience, and since these wholes are not 
directly experienced, metaphysical terms are symbolic; 
they are not wholly literal. 'l'his is true of both subject 
and predicate terms. The predicate terms must be dis-
torted from literal experience to make them applicable 
to metaphysics; the distortion consists especially of 
de-spatialization and de-temporalization. 
After establishing the existence of other minds and the 
symbolic character of metaphysical language, Chapter IV 
takes up its main task, the establishment of a system of 
metaphysical categories based on the criterion of intelli-
gibility. A category is a primary form through which the 
mind can render reality intelligible. They are metaphY-sical 
because they are the only forms by which the mind can appre-
hend reality; the mind is active in constituting reality 
through symbolizing, expressing, and interpreting what it 
intuits. The categories are to be derived from natural lan-
guage, which is always in a subject-predicate form. Hence 
the two basic categories are substance and causality. 
Substance is the basic category of being; causality is 
the basic category of value. 
Substance is the principle of unity in operation in 
respect to all objects. It determines their individuality 
and is the core of being. In all becoming, something must 
become; the 11 somethings 11 are substances. Whatever persists 
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through change is the substance. This is perceived by the 
mind and, as such, is partly value-determined, because the 
mind has as a logically unsupported value presupposition 
ens est unum; the mind individualizes and constructs unities 
of its intuitive data. Substances may be classified according 
to the four levels of being. This also provides a classi-
fication of the fields of knowledge. Physics deals with 
material substance, biology with life substance, the 
Geisteswissenschaften with mind substance, and the humani-
ties (typified by poetry) with the human spirit. The full 
implications of all of these fields and their inter-
connection plus the co-implicates of maximum context is the 
field of philosophy. 
Causality is the second primary category. It is both 
I 
efficient and final. When seen at the ultimate level both 
of these have value orientation. Efficient causality in 
maximum context has to do with origin because ultimate 
reasons are possible only in terms of aim towards values. 
Efficient causes originate ultimately in purposive intent. 
Final causality is goal or destiny which involves the purpose 
for which a thing was originally caused. Efficient and 
final causality are both teleological. Origin and destiny 
are the "time forms of value." 
Ultimately values are absolute and are accomplished, 
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but in human experience they must be realized through time. 
Space is integrally tied to time for Urban; space and time 
constitute the form of the 11 islf and mark the inalienable 
difference between it and the "ought."' They belong to 
the phenomenal world of human experience. At the ultimate 
level of being (in God) they are not pertinent, for there 
the nis" and the "ought" are identified. Through them the 
Absolute is accomplishing itself, but, seen from its own 
perspective, it is already accomplished and is beyond 
space and time. 
The presupposition of ens est unum drives one on in 
metaphysics to larger and larger wholes until one arrives 
at three primary metaphysical objects, which are discussed 
in Chapter V. They are metempirical co-implicates of experi-
ence. They are the world, the soul, and God. The world is 
the largest unity of non-mental reality. The soul, man's 
mental and spiritual being, is the finite conscious bearer 
of values. God is the g round of all being and value, the 
ens realissimum and the ens perfectissimum. 
There is a difficulty in the concept of God, for God 
c8.nnot be understood except in terms of human language and 
categories; space, time, personality, change, plurality, 
logic. Human language is a space-time language. But God 
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as the infinite author of all, must be beyond all of 
these; He must be timeless, non-spatial, non-personal, im-
mutable, infinite, one, beyond human logic. This is the 
problem of two Gods. At this point reason reaches its 
limits. It demands that the two be one, but it cannot tell 
how they can be since reason itself belongs to earth-bound 
humans. However, the frustration need not stand, for when 
one reaches the limits of reason then he can begin "trench-
ing on the mystical." Reason cannot see the two united, 
but mystical experience uniformly testifies to their union 
and to the ultimacy of the non-temporal and non-spatial. 
Thus Urban's synthesis of idealism and realism is only an 
intermediate metaphysics, if such terminology may be per-
mitted. His final view is that of absolute Idealism. 
Reason leaves the "persistent dualism" between existence 
and value, which for Urban means also between matter and 
mind. But mysticism, to which Urban commits himself as 
going beyond reason, dictates final unity of all things in 
one Absolute Being. 
2. EVALUATIONS 
The summary of Urban's system provides a perspective 
for evaluation and conclusions. It is not the task of this 
section to provide complete evaluation, for much evalu-
ation has been done in the other chapters in connection 
with points mentioned there. The remarks given here con-
cern the system as a whole, remarks that are less appropri-
ate to the individual problems of the chapters. Major 
criticisms given before will be summarized in the final 
list of conclusions below. 
i. Urbants emphasis on the central place of value in 
philosophy is at once his strength and his weakness. It 
is his strength because he made it central. He has made 
an excellent contribution to thought in pointing out that 
all knowledge has a value aspect that cannot be eliminated, 
that value intent is a part of all m~aning. Urban has done 
good work in pointing out the centrality of value in the 
Great Metaphysical Tradition, for many in the history of 
western philosophy have assumed this in their thought 
without ever seeing it clearly enough to make it explicit, 
but Urban has made it explicit. He has shown that value 
and being are inseparable in the Tradition because being 
always has value connotations in itself. Urban has found 
value to be the key to reality. This is especially true 
when he says that the only thing that has intrinsic in-
telligibility is a will oriented toward value. 
ii. The weakness that Urban's value theory gives to 
his system is his presuppositional method. Urban started 
on the axiological trail of values empirically. His first 
book describes experienced value. Then he abandoned this 
approach and decided that certain values must be pre-
supposed even prior to any experience of value in order to 
give validity to experienced values. So he developed the 
presuppositional approach to value. This has been critically 
examined already in Chapter II. The point that needs atten-
tion here is that the presuppositional or dialectical 
method was carried over into all his metaphysical thinking. 
As a result he has a strong rationalism at the expense of 
empiricism. This does not mean he is not at all empiri-
cal; his empiricism is too limited. He fails to derive his 
value universals from experience; instead he presupposes them 
and imposes them on experience. In his philosophy of science 
Urban makes universals to be empirical constructs. Why 
should he not do so in values as well? 
Some of Urban1 s presuppositions are valid, for example, 
the value character of reality and the inseparability of 
value; others are not valid. Several illustrations of in-
valid cases are given below. The ones that are correct are 
so, however, for~reason : more solidly grounded than p re-
suppositions. That reason is that they are coherent construct 
built of the data of experience.l 
1. Cf. the discussion of norm construction in Chapter II for 
a more detailed approach to empirical constructs. Mutatis 
mutandis the discussion there applies to any kind of conceptua 
constructs; it is not limited to norm construction. 
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Urban does not abandon experience; metaphysics, he 
maintains, is the systematic interpretation of experience 
with all its implications. He starts with experience but 
leaves it too quickly and does not bother to check back 
with it to see whether his presuppositions are in harmony 
with it. An initial confusion which helps to promote his 
neglect of experience is due to his thinking of experience 
in terms of sensation only. He is very much interested in 
non-sensuous experience but is loathe to c all it experience. 
The neme he assigns to it is Erlebnis. Now this distinction 
does not have to cause trouble; it is all right if one separ-
ates the two kinds of experience and carefully keeps them 
both in mind at all pertinent places, but he tends to neglect 
Erlebnis. 
However, this itself is not a criticism of the system; 
it only points out an easy way to get into difficulty. The 
real difficulty is definite omission of experience where it 
cannot logically be omitted. This is exemplified in a 
number of places. Several are given here. 
(1). In the doctrine of cognition where the datum of 
experience and the contribution of the mind meet, the datum 
is definitely subordinated; the datum as only pure awareness 
is too insignificant for Urban; it cannot even be given any 
status of meaning without some term being applied to it, 
and this already i mplies a certain amount of description 
and interpretation according to him. 
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(2). A place where the lack of empirical reference 
causes very serious trouble is in the case of the insepar-
ability of space and time and the consequent elimination of 
both in the doctrine of God. Here is a spot where he fails 
to consider both experience and Erlebnis. His analysis of 
space and time, it was pointed out, is out of harmony with 
experiences which are temporal but not spatial, such as, 
thinking, willing, emoting; his analysis thus actually 
becomes unintelligible. 
(3). There is a basic neglect of the problem of evil 
which would never be allowed by one more empirically grounded 
(4). The doctrine of' substance is evidently that of a 
rationalist instead of an empiricist, as pointed out in 
previous discussion, leaving subst ances conventional unities 
instead of experienced intrinsic unities. 
(5). Urban's key to reality is a will oriented toward 
value; this is empirical and therefore an excellent start-
ing place in metaphysics, but after making man thus the key 
Urban later abandons him as a metaphysical transient in 
reality. He denies to man immortality (except that man's 
values will live on); he makes man merely the instrument 
through which the Absolute expresses himself in phenomenal 
reality. Thus he builds a rationalistic monism at the ex-
pense of the experienced individuality of men, which experi-
ence is much more compatible with pluralism. A pluralistic 
idealism would be more faithful to his key. 
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(6). Another example of rationalism in difficulty is 
at the end of the system. There an unempirical rationalism 
has worked itself into a dilemma of two Gods from which it 
cannot extricate itself; so Urban has to abandon his ration-
alistic method and "trench on the mystical." A more con-
sistent empiricism could never have set a rationally impossi-
ble (contradictory) concept of God over against an intelli-
gible one. 
(7). There is another consideration that suggests 
rationalism though it does not necessitate it; that is the 
fact that Urban gives so very few illustrations from ex-
perience in any of his writings. This is one of the things 
that makes his works so difficult to follow and interpret. 
It is, however, a consistent method for a rationalist, but 
it is not so for one well grounded in empiricism. 
iii. One further illustration of the results of too 
much rationalistic emphasis deserves special treatment, 
because it was not discussed in earlier chapters as the 
previous illustrat ions were. It is the problem of unity. 
Urban's dialectic demands unity as a presupposition of in-
telligibility. Doubtless unity is an experience of the 
mind which can and should be developed into an epistem-
ological norm for all experience taken together; it should 
have strong metaphysical implications; furthermore, it has 
been proven in a broad field of experience to be a fruitful 
approach to reality. But since Urban has taken it as a 
presupposition instead of an experience and as normative 
construct he has allowed it to be carried too far. This 
reaches its cllmax in the doctrine of a monistic Absolute. 
His demand for unity goes all the way to one all-inclusive 
11 block universe." But unity as an empirically constructed 
norm does not demand this. It demands ultimately merely 
that reality come from and be so related to one being that 
He can be its creator and can have basic control; this 
view also provides an explanation of relationships of a 
kind in this world that allows for the possibility of 
interaction of all things. However, this kind of unity 
does not demand existential unity; there can still be a 
pluralism at least of persons in it; not all being needs 
to be swallowed into one great pantheistic being. Escape 
from metaphysical unity would save a lot of Urban's diffi-
culties which necessitate his "trenching on the mystical." 
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Metaphysical monism is frequently associated with 
epistemological monism. Such an epistemological approach is 
noy very app arent in Urban. Since his metaphysical monism 
comes only at the limits of reason Urban can and does hold 
to the dualism of subject and object. However, there are 
hints of an epistemological monism, for examp le the following: 
logically unsupported insights into value essences; the 
ontological argument as an intuitive insight, an "axiologi-
cal conviction;" and the mystical intuition of ens realis-
simum in identity with ens perfectissimum. ~Thile these do 
not necessitate epistemological monism, they are highly 
suggestive of it. 
3 • C ONC LUSI ONS 
1. Urban's metaphysics starts from a base of intelli-
gible interpretation of experience and its co-implicates, 
which are all value-determined since his axiom of intelli-
gibility is the inseparability of being and value; value 
as central to metaphysical interpretation is Urban's most 
significant contribution. 
2. Urban early defined values as funded affective-
volitional me anings, but later because he thought life and 
knowledge presuppose their own significance prior to experi-
ence he changed to a view that values are absolutes which 
have a reality status called valid objectives and which have 
their ultimate metaphysical status in God; in this shift 
Urban moved away from basic empiricism. 
3. Urban's presuppositional method is basically a 
rationalistic approach; it took Urban into unempirical in-
terpretations of intuition, value, substance, time, God. 
4. Against positivism and naturalism Urban urged a 
synthesis of idealism and realism because the two belong 
together in the Great Metaphysical Tradition; he argued that 
reality is mind-dependent (idealism) by virtue of the demands 
of intelligibility, and that it is mind-independent (realism) 
by virtue of the givenness necessary to any meaningful doc-
10 
trine of error; he thought the issues between idealism and 
realism were all epistemological, which he developed dualis-
tically, but in his rejection of Berkeley he surreptitiously 
slipped into ontological dualism. 
5. Philosophia perennis has taken its categories from 
the subject-predicate form of natural language which fits 
the categories of reality because natural language itself is 
the (value-oriented) mold in which reality itself is first 
given. 
6. The basic categories are substance (the principle 
of individual unity), causality (the dynamic, teleological 
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principle of value movement), space and time (the forms 
mark the distance from the "is 11 to the "ought"); substance 
was criticized as marking conventional instead of natural 
unities; time was criticized because Urban did not recognize 
its separability from space and its universality to experienc • 
7. The soul is a conscious bearer of value and is con-
stituted a soul by feeling the tension between the 11 is 11 and 
the "ought;" the soul is a will oriented toward value and as 
such is the key to reality because it has the only intrinsic 
intelligibility, but Urban loses this key by eventually 
submerging it in one Absolute Being. 
8. Ens est unum is a basic presupposition of reality 
which seeks wider and wider unified, but metempirical, 
wholes until it reaches the world as the widest unity of 
space-time, the soul as the unit for value development, 
and God as the widest of all unities; God is an Absolute 
who engulfs all reality in Himself (He is ens realissimum 
and ens perfectissimum), but reason cannot reach this monism 
because of persistent dualisms; Urban's monism was criticized 
on the grounds that the mind's demand for unity does not 
necessitate an existential unity but only a central being 
who is the common source of all reality, who maintains basic 
control over it, and who provides the ground for interaction 
in it. 
9. Urban solves his persistent dualisms, which are 
headed up in a dilemma of two Gods--one temporal, personal, 
mutable, the other non-temporal, infinite, beyond person-
ality, immutable--by abandoning his rationalism and ','trench-
ing on the mystical," which is basically an appeal to 
ignorance. 
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ABSTRACT 
·1. PROBLEM AND METHOD 
This investigation is an .attempt to organize and evalua ·e 
the metaphysical system contained in the writings of Wilbur 
M • . Urban by an examination of his theory of knowledge, of 
value, and of reality. 
2. SUMMARY OF THE INVESTIGATION 
For Urban the metaphysical task is the interpretation 
of the totality of experience and its co-implicates. All 
knowledge must include both the intuitive element of exper-
ience and "value intent" in order to be intelligible. Fact 
and value cannot be separated. Their union is the axiom of 
intelligibility, the criterion of truth and reality. 
In his early thought, Urbe.n analyzed valpe psych.ologica ly. 
He defined values as funded affective-volitional meanings. 
But, later he concluded that psychological analyses of value 
presuppose the value of life. Furthermore, the truth-seeker 
presupposes the value of knowledge. These two value-presup-
positions are a priori. Though he still held that value-
qualities are known through emotions, Urban believed that th 
values themselves are known by intellectual intuition as 
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objective validities, which, in turn, are ultimately conceive 
as nor.ms in the mind of God. 
Since positiviEm and naturalism neglect the value com-
ponent in meaning, Urban turned to idealism and realism for 
metaphysical guidance. At the core of all idealismsand real-
isms Urban found value presuppositions7 -mind-dependence in 
idealisms and mind-independence in realisms. Since Urban 
believes there is no conflict between these presuppositions, 
he synthesizes idealism and realism into the view that sub-
ject and object are interconnected in knowing. This episte-
mological dualism leads Urban to think that mind and matter 
constitute a metaphysical dualism. 
Nevertheless, Urban believes that reality must be one; 
ens est unum, verum, bonum. Substance, as the principle of 
unity, is the basic category of being; causality is the basic 
category of value. As the mind seeks wider and wider unities 
it finally reaches God as its widest possible concept. Intel -
igibility demands the unity of being and value as its axiom. 
Intelligibility ~lao ultimately demands the unity of matter 
and mind and of subject and object. But human reason reaches 
its limitation here and cannot gain the full unity of 
At this point Urban moves beyond reason and gains the 
"trenching on the mystical." In mystical experience all dis 
tinctions disappear, and God is intuited as a fusion of all 
realit.f in one great Eternal Now. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Urban's most important contribution is his emphasis 
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on value as central to all knowledge, especially to metaphys 
2. Urban's basic difficulty is his presuppositional 
method. I£ interpretation of experience is what is at stake 
his system might better have been constructed from the total ty 
of all experience. However, the presuppositions~ method led 
Urban to de-temporalize experience at the level of its 
metaphysical interpretation. De-temporalization left his 
concept of God in the following serious confusion~· 
3. Urbsn was led to a divided notion of God. T.he first 
notion, based on experience, sees God as temporal, finite, 
personal, mutable. The second, based on the demand for unit~, 
for de-temporalization, and for an absolute status for value 1 
sees God as timeless, infinite, impersonal, unchanging. 
Urban escaped his "dilemma" only by a final appeal to my-sti-
cism in which incompatibles are somehow united. However, th 
divided concept of God and the abandonment of reason at a 
crucial point would not have been necessary if Urban could 
have seen that life and knowledge are experienced to be 
valuable. T.hen the presuppositions! method would not have 
been necessary, and Urban would not have had to hold to the 
absolute status of va ues. 
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